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Mergers, Taxes, and Historical Materialism
AJAY K. MEHROTRA*
In the last few years, corporate mergers and acquisitions witnessed explosive
growth. Although more recent market conditions have halted the latest merger
movement, scholars and commentators have used the earlier rise in merger activity
to reevaluate the preferential tax treatment granted to those mergers and
acquisitions that fall under the U.S. tax law's definition of a corporate
"reorganization. " Under the current Internal Revenue Code, neither shareholders
nor corporations recognize gain or loss on the exchange of stock or securities in
transactions that qualify as a "corporate reorganization." The significance of this
tax rule raises a central question: why does this tax preference exist? Since its
statutory inception in 1919, numerous scholars have debated the theoretical
justifications for this tax law. Few, however, have sought to move beyond
intellectual and conceptual origins to address the more pertinent question of
institutional development: how and why has this tax benefit become a deeply
entrenched part ofAmerican corporate tax law?
This Article mainly addresses this second question. It contends that historically
constituted political and economic interests have gradually transformed this law
from its beginnings as a limited statutory exception into a modem version of
voluntary corporate welfare. This transformation can be explained less by resort to
timeless economic logic or legal doctrine than by reference to the institutional
dynamics and the unfolding of concrete economic, political, and social processes.
In chronicling the early phases of this gradual transformation, this Article has
two interrelated objectives. First, it seeks to historicize the prehistory, the statutory
origins, and the early liberalization of this corporate tax law. Second, this Article
highlights the chronological and contingent development of the reorganization
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provisions. In examining the historical processes and conditions that led to the
early expansion and entrenchment of this tax law, this Article illustrates the
contested and provisional nature of the creation, expansion, and maintenance of
this corporate tax benefit. This Article mainly investigates two pivotal periods-the
1920s when this rule was gradually liberalized, and the early 1930s when this tax
law faced near elimination-to underscore how material context and historical
sequence determined the possibilities of legal change.
This historical story about the reorganization tax preference, in the end, is not
simply a tale about the evolution of an important and enduring corporate tax law.
This narrative is also a case study of the broader legislative process. It shows how
a typical legal regime is molded by the interactions of democratic institutions; how
the lawmaking process is shaped by the negotiations among citizens, Congress, the
courts, and executive agencies. Accordingly, this historical story illustrates the
continuing dynamic that exists between law and society, revealing how the legal
process offortifying and routinizing laws can unwittingly create special interests-
interests that often reshape and help maintain the laws that have created them.
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[M]odern taxation or tax-making in its most characteristic aspect is a group
contest in which powerful interests vigorously endeavor to rid themselves of
present or proposed tax burdens. It is, first of all, a hard game in which he who
trusts wholly to economics, reason, and justice, will in the end retire beaten and
disillusioned. Class politics is of the essence of taxation.
-Thomas S. Adams (1928)'
INTRODUCTION
In January 2005, Martin Lipton, the legendary Wall Street lawyer, circulated his
annual forecasting letter to his prominent corporate and individual clients. Long
regarded as one of the most acute, and often pessimistic, observers of corporate
merger and acquisition (M&A) activity, Lipton had recently developed a reputation
as an incorrigible market cynic, once declaring that deal making itself had fallen
into disrepute. But by the start of 2005 all that seemed to change. Reflecting on the
upswing in merger activity in the last quarter of 2004, Lipton accurately identified
"the return to confidence in the economy," as he boldly predicted a forthcoming
"M&A boom."
2
Not surprisingly, Lipton was correct. Not only did M&A activity increase
throughout 2005, by the middle of 2006 economic commentators were confidently
reporting how a new "era of megamergers" marked the arrival of the "2000s M&A
Boom." 3 Fueled by a huge surge in private-equity acquisitions, total U.S. M&A
transactions for 2006 were valued at $1.6 trillion, just shy of the $1.7 trillion record
set in 2000.4 Meanwhile, the value of global M&A activity in 2006 reached a new
high of $3.8 trillion, a thirty-eight percent increase over the previous year.5 During
1. T.S. Adams, Ideals and Idealism in Taxation, 18 AM. ECON. REv. 1, 1 (1928).
2. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Wall Street's Designs on '05? A Boom in Merger Activity,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2005, at 1.
3. Dennis K. Berman & Jason Singer, Blizzard of Deals Heralds an Era of
Megamergers, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2006, at 1; Michael Connolly, The 2000s M&A Boom
Has Arrived, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, June 27, 2006, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB1 15137773055891596.html.
4. Dennis K. Berman, Can M&A 's 'Best of Times' Get Better? WALL ST. J., Jan. 2,
2007, at R5.
5. Id. Private-equity purchases totaled roughly $415 billion in 2006, accounting for
more than a quarter of the total value of U.S. M&A activity. Brad Kelly, M&A Activity
Speeds Up in '07 as Buyout Firms Lead Way, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Feb. 7, 2007, at Al.
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the first half of 2007, the merger boom continued apace,6 at least until a crisis in
subprime mortgages triggered a tightening of credit markets and subsequent
volatility in equity markets, which together denoted the last gasp of the early 2000s
M&A boom.
7
Nonetheless, the upward trend in merger activity from 2005 to 2007 has led
legal scholars and commentators to reevaluate the tax treatment of various
corporate mergers and acquisitions.8 In fact, now that the latest M&A wave has
subsided, one can perhaps undertake a more detached analysis of the tax
consequences of these transactions. Under the current Internal Revenue Code
("Code"), neither shareholders nor corporations recognize gain or loss on the
exchange of stock or securities in transactions that qualify as a "corporate
reorganization." 9 Most property exchanges, including a sale of stock for cash and
an exchange of shares of one corporation for shares of another, are generally
deemed to be "realization" events under the Code. Realized gain, if "recognized,"
gives rise to taxable income.' 0 Congress, however, has historically permitted "non-
recognition" treatment for particular exchanges of property." In such "non-
6. Total U.S. M&A activity in the first two quarters of 2007 was valued at roughly
$756 billion, keeping pace with figures from previous quarters, see generally M&A
Scoreboard 2007, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS: THE DEALMAKER'S J., Aug. 1, 2007, at 80.
7. See Lina Saigol, No Signs Yet of the Deal Hotpot Cooling, FIN. TIMES, July 21,
2007, at 32; Linda Saigol & James Politi, M&A Market Takes a Tumble, FIN. TIMES, Sept.
27, 2007, at 17; Andrew Ross Sorkin, After the Party, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2007, at SPG1.
8. See, e.g., Joshua D. Blank, Confronting Continuity: A Tradition of Fiction in
Corporate Reorganizations, 2006 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1; Jeffrey L. Kwall, What is a
Merger? The Case for Taxing Cash Mergers Like Stock Sales, 32 J. CORP. L. 1 (2006);
Herwig J. Schlunk, Rationalizing the Taxation of Reorganizations and Other Corporate
Acquisitions, 27 VA. TAX REv. 23 (2007); Linda Z. Swartz, Multiple-step Acquisitions:
Dancing the Tax-Free Tango, 107 TAX NOTES 609 (2005).
9. Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) Section 368 describes the types of "reorganizations"
that qualify for non-recognition treatment. I.R.C. § 368 (2000); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.368-
1(e). Sections 354(a)(1) and 361(a) provide non-recognition of gain or loss for shareholders
and corporations, respectively, on the exchange of stock or securities in a transaction
constituting a "reorganization." I.R.C. §§ 354(a)(1), 361(a) (2000). Whereas Section 368
describes various types of reorganizations, for the sake of simplicity this Article is primarily
concerned with acquisitive corporate reorganizations, which are generally driven by the
same policy rationales as other types of tax-favored reorganizations.
10. "Realization" refers to the legal principle that the income tax consequences of a gain
or loss in property value will not be "recognized" until the taxpayer sells or disposes of such
property. I.R.C. §§ 1001(a), 61(a) (2000); Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499 U.S. 554, 559
(1991) ("Rather than assessing tax liability on the basis of annual fluctuations in the value of
a taxpayer's property, the Internal Revenue Code defers the tax consequences of a gain or
loss in property value until the taxpayer 'realizes' the gain or loss."); Eisner v. Macomber,
252 U.S. 189 (1920); see also MICHAEL J. GRAETz AND DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (5th ed. 2005); WILLIAM D. POPKIN,
FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX 47-50 (4th ed. 2002).
11. Congress has also granted non-recognition treatment for the creation of controlled
corporations, and the exchange of like-kind property. I.R.C. §§ 351, 1031 (2000). On the
historical origins of the like-kind exchange rules, see Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Section 1031:
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recognition" transactions, taxpayers are permitted to swap certain types of property
without an immediate tax.' 2 Instead, they generally are taxed when they
subsequently dispose of the exchanged property.' 3 In the context of corporate
mergers and acquisitions, this tax rule, in effect, allows corporations and
shareholders to defer the tax on the receipt of stock and securities related to a
transaction that qualifies as a "tax-free" reorganization.'
4
Consider, as an illustration, the structure of the largest merger in American
history: the ill-fated 2001 merger of Time Warner and America Online (AOL). In
that transaction, Time Warner shareholders received 1.5 shares of the new
corporate entity, AOL-Time Warner, in exchange for each of their Time Warner
shares.15 The exchange of stock for stock amounted to a realization event. But
because the transaction was structured in compliance with the Code's tax-free
reorganization provisions, the Time-Warner shareholders did not recognize the
realized gain on the stock-for-stock trade. Instead, they were permitted to hold the
stock of the new combined entity as if it were the same as their original investment,
thereby deferring the accrued but unrealized gain in their initial investment.
6
The reorganization tax rules have become exceedingly important with each
succeeding M&A wave, especially as corporations continue to search for ways to
minimize their tax burdens. But this tax law provides both benefits and costs. When
equity markets are on the rise, as they were in the 1990s, publicly-traded companies
can exploit the advantages of tax deferral by using their stock as currency for
We Don't Need Another Hero, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 397,424 (1987).
12. I.R.C. §§ 358(a)(1), 362(b) (2000).
13. Id. Tax deferral, rather than exemption, is preserved under current law when each
party to the reorganization carries over its respective basis in the property and securities
exchanged in the transaction, thereby generally maintaining the built-in gain or loss. Id.
14. HOWARD E. ABRAMS & RICHARD L. DOERNBERG, FEDERAL CORPORATE TAXATION
219 (5th ed. 2002); Bopas I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EuSTCE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 12.01[1] (7th ed. 2000); LEANDRA LEDERMAN,
UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE TAXATION 237-38 (2d ed. 2006). Technically, corporate
reorganizations receive the benefit of tax-deferral, not exclusion. But because the property
exchange is itself a tax-free transaction, most tax scholars and practitioners refer to these
transactions as "tax-free" reorganizations. See ABRAMS & DOERNBERG, supra, at 218.
15. Eric Auchard, AOL, Time Warner Agree to World's Biggest Merger, REUTERS
NEWS, Jan. 10, 2000; see also 1 MERGENT INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 2640-1 (2001). Shareholders
of AOL received one share of the combined entity, AOL-Time Warner, for each of their
AOL shares. Id. For more on the difficulties of the merger, see generally NINA MUNK, FOOLS
RUSH IN: STEVE CASE, JERRY LEVIN, AND THE UNMAKING OF AOL TIME WARNER (2004);
KARA SWISHER, THERE MUST BE A PONY IN HERE SOMEWHERE: THE AOL-TIME WARNER
DEBACLE AND THE QUEST FOR A DIGITAL FUTURE (2003); Matthew T. Bodie, AOL Time
Warner and the False God of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 975 (2006).
16. For example, if a person initially owned 100 shares of Time Warner, which they
purchased well before the merger for $100 (giving them a cost basis in the stock of $100),
and the 150 shares of the new combined entity that they received was valued at $500, the
person would have a realized, but unrecognized, gain of $400 on the exchange of stock for
stock. If after the transaction, the shareholder subsequently sold their 150 shares in the new
combined entity for $550, they would have a realized and recognized gain of $450 (the
realized amount of $550 less the initial cost basis of $100). See I.R.C. §§ 368(a)(1)(B),
354(a)(1), 358(a)(1) (2000).
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corporate acquisitions.1 7 Even during less economically buoyant times, when the
deflated stock prices of target companies appear attractive,' 8 tax benefits may
influence the structure of-if not the decision to execute-a merger.' 9 Although not
all mergers and acquisitions exploit the reorganization tax benefit, the tax
consequences of these transactions frequently help determine how they are
executed.2 ° While numerous parties can benefit from this tax preference,2'
including corporations, their owners, and the professionals who are handsomely
22
compensated to structure these complex transactions, the "costs" of this tax
17. See Alfred Rappaport & Mark L. Sirower, Stock or Cash? The Trade-Offs for
Buyers and Sellers in Mergers and Acquisitions, 77 HARV. Bus. REv. 147 (1999).
18. Kenneth L. Fisher, Do Your Own M&A, FORBES, June 6, 2005, at 178. The recently
announced merger of Delta and Northwest airlines suggests that stock-for-stock transactions
are viable even during difficult economic times, Jeff Bailey & Micheline Maynard, Delta
and Northwest in $3 Billion Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2008, at Cl.
19. Tax scholars have long debated the incentive effects of the reorganization
provisions. See ALAN L. FELD, TAX POLICY AND CORPORATE CONCENTRATION 87, 100 (1982)
(determining that the savings from tax-deferral made some acquisitions less expensive
thereby inducing, in theory, more tax-deferred acquisitions); John Lintner, Tax
Considerations Involved in Corporate Mergers, in JOINT COMM. ON THE ECON. REPORT, 84TH
CONG., FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STABILITY, 690, 697-99 (1955)
(concluding tentatively that the income and estate tax considerations of target shareholders
had increasing importance as the size of such transactions increased); Benjamin C. Ayers,
Craig E. Lefanowicz & John R. Robinson, The Effect of Shareholder-Level Capital Gains
Taxes on Acquisition Structure, 79 ACCT. REv. 859 (2004) (suggesting that shareholder-level
tax effects have an impact on the structure of acquisitions); but see also Alan Auerbach &
David Reishus, The Impact of Taxation on Mergers and Acquisitions, in MERGERS AND
ACQuISITIONS 80-81 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988) (concluding that shareholder tax benefits
of corporate reorganizations did not play an important role in the structure and frequency of
mergers and acquisitions); Merle Erickson, The Effect of Taxes on the Structure of Corporate
Acquisitions, 36 J. ACCT. RES. 279-98 (1998) (acquiring firm's tax attributes, rather than
shareholder tax benefits, are generally more significant in determining the structure of such
transactions); David J. Shakow, Wither, 'C'!, 45 TAX L. REv. 177, 182 (1990) (summarizing
the then current literature to conclude that tax consequences had little influence on the
occurrence and form of M&A transactions).
20. Since private-equity acquisitions fueled the latest M&A wave, cash transactions
were tremendously popular in the latest cycle. Lina Saigol, Runaway Train of Deal Activity
Set to Continue, FIN. TIMES, May 24, 2007, at 26. Nonetheless, even some private-equity
purchases exploit the reorganization rules in innovative ways. Mark Mandel, Sellers Avoid a
Tax Bite With Sponsored Spin-Offs, MERGERS & ACQuIsITIONS: THE DEALMAKER'S J., Apr.
1, 2007, at 62; Martin Sikora, PE Funds Push the Envelope in a New Wave of Deals, 41
MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS: THE DEALMAKER'S J., Aug. 1, 2006, at 32.
21. Legal scholars have, of course, noted that the use of the term "preference" to
describe certain tax benefits is highly contingent and political. See Boris I. Bittker A
"Comprehensive Tax Base'" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HARV. L. REv. 925 (1967).
Also note, however, the replies to Bittker in volume 81 of the Harvard Law Review.
22. David Lat, When $1,000 an Hour Is Not Enough, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2007, at
SPG6; Gretchen Morgenson, What Are Mergers Good For? N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 5, 2005,
at 56.
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benefit-in the form of forgone revenue-are borne by the national treasury, and
hence all other citizens and taxpayers.23
The significance of this tax rule, especially in the apparent wake of an M&A
boom, raises a central question: why does this tax preference exist? Since its
statutory inception in 1919,24 numerous scholars and analysts have debated the
theoretical justifications for this tax law. Frequently, they have contrasted the
purported original intent of the law with their own contemporary time period to
either denounce or embrace the reorganization tax rule.25 Few scholars, however,
have sought to move beyond conceptual origins to address the more pertinent
question of institutional development: how and why has this rule become a deeply
entrenched part of American tax law? 26 This Article mainly addresses this second
historical question. By focusing specifically on two critical junctures in the early
history of this tax law, this Article seeks to explain how this tax benefit (1) was
expanded during the early 1920s, and (2) why an attempt to repeal this rule failed
in 1934, but may have succeeded during a subsequently altered social and political
environment.
This Article contends that historically constituted political and economic
interests have gradually transformed this law from its beginnings as a limited and
formalistic statutory exception into a modem version of voluntary corporate
welfare.27 This transformation can be explained less by any resort to timeless
economic logic or legal doctrine, than by reference to the institutional dynamics
and the unfolding of social processes. Thus, this Article focuses on the concrete
economic, political, and social conditions that existed over time and during crucial
moments in the incremental liberalization and maintenance of this tax provision.
This Article seeks to tell the story of the early phases of this gradual
transformation.
23. While quantitative estimates of the cost of such favorable tax treatment-in terms of
lost revenue-have been difficult to determine mainly because of the wide-spread dispersion
of stock ownership and the price volatility of publicly-traded stocks and securities involved
in these transactions, the reorganization tax rules provide taxpayers who have previously
engaged in such tax preferred transactions with the present value benefits of tax deferral-
benefits that come at the cost of the national fisc. Prior to the 1986 repeal of the General
Utilities doctrine, deferral could be transformed into complete tax avoidance. See Gen. Utils.
& Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935); see also Kwall, supra note 8, at 27.
24. Revenue Act of 1918, Ch. 18 § 202(b), 40 Stat. 1057, 1060 (1919).
25. See infra Part 1.
26. Notable exceptions, to which this Article is deeply indebted, include Steven A.
Bank, Mergers, Taxes, and Historical Realism, 75 TUL. L. REv. 1 (2000); Jerome R.
Hellerstein, Mergers, Taxes, and Realism, 71 HARv. L. REv. 254 (1957); Randolph E. Paul,
Reorganizations, in STuDiES IN FEDERAL TAXATION, THIRD SERIEs 3 (1940). I have elsewhere
examined the multi-valence of these rules and how such historically ascribed multiple
meanings have provided extended support for the provisions. Ajay K. Mehrotra, The Story of
the Corporate Reorganization Provisions: From 'Purely Paper' to Corporate Welfare, in
BUSINESs TAX SToRIEs 27 (Steven A. Bank & Kirk J. Stark eds., 2005); see also infra Part I.
27. Tax experts have concluded that the modem reorganization rules are "easily
manipulated" and hence are in a sense voluntary or elective for sophisticated taxpayers. AM.
LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: SuBCHAPTER C xiii (1980).
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Other scholars and commentators, to be sure, have identified this important
shift, as they have debated the normative question of whether this tax law ought to
exist.28 This Article, by contrast, sets aside this normative question to chronicle
how and why the corporate reorganization provisions have changed over time. The
Article thus has two principal and interrelated objectives. First, it seeks to
understand the current reorganization rules by historicizing the prehistory, the
statutory origins, and the early-yet formative-development of this tax law. The
present dizzying complexity of the reorganization provisions cannot be explained
adequately by simply referring to the original intent or supposedly consistent
economic logic of the rules. Instead, one must disaggregate the stratified layers of
policymaking to see how the rules have evolved over time. As the economic
historian, Paul A. David has observed, "it is sometimes not possible to uncover the
logic (or illogic) of the world around us except by understanding how it got that
way. ' '29 By focusing on the historical dynamics among taxpayers, the Treasury
Department, Congress, and the courts, this Article shows how changing social,
economic, and political conditions have shaped the ideas and actions of key
policymakers, institutions, and organized interests, as they evaluated the changing
meaning and implications of the corporate reorganization provisions.
30
Second, and perhaps more importantly, this Article focuses on the temporal
dimensions of legal change, on the sequential unfolding of social and political
events, to highlight the historical contingency of this tax law. In examining the
historical processes that led to the expansion and maintenance of this tax law, this
Article illustrates that there was nothing inevitable or preordained about the
creation and expansion of this corporate tax benefit. 31 Conventional explanations
often underscore the relative stability of the reorganization rules, eliding in the
process the abandoned lines of potential precedents. 32 Not only were the
reorganization tax rules created at a time of crisis and legal uncertainty, when the
basic structures of American tax law were themselves highly malleable and open to
multiple paths of institutional development; the reorganization regime was
subsequently altered during several seminal moments of flux and fluidity-
28. See infra Part I.
29. Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REv. 332
(1985).
30. For more on how ideas and institutions have interacted throughout American tax
history, see generally W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA: A SHORT
HISTORY (2d ed., 2004).
31. Historically-inclined social scientists and legal scholars have frequently referred to
this type of analysis as one that emphasizes the path dependency of policymaking. See
generally PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS
(2004); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate
Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REv. 127 (1999). But see Adrian Kay, A Critique
of the Use of Path Dependency in Policy Studies, 83 Pun. ADMIN. 553 (2005).
32. Critical legal historians have referred to this use of history as "denaturalizing" our
current way of thinking by illustrating lost alternatives. William W. Fisher III, Texts and
Contexts: The Application to American Legal History of the Methodologies of Intellectual
History, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1065, 1097-1101 (1997); Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal
Histories, 36 STAN. L. REv. 57, 81-87 (1984).
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moments when the confluence of organized political interests and material social
conditions often determined the possibilities of legal change.
33
Moving beyond the World War I origins of this tax law, this Article mainly
investigates two pivotal historical periods: the 1920s, when this provision was
gradually expanded, and the early 1930s, when this tax law faced near elimination.
The first half of the 1920s was a crucially formative period for this tax preference
because it was then that Congress broadened and refined the rule in response to the
changing social, political, and economic dynamics of the times, and in response to
the actions of taxpayers and the U.S. Supreme Court's intervention into
reorganization law.
The early 1930s was an equally critical period. With the advent of the New
Deal, lawmakers initially considered repealing the reorganization tax benefit. The
ravages of the Depression, stories of rampant tax avoidance by wealthy citizens,
and growing concerns about earlier corporate consolidations brought nearly all tax
preferences under increased scrutiny. The Treasury Department, however, rejected
a 1934 congressional proposal to repeal the reorganization tax benefit. Responding
to revenue concerns and fear of stifling an economic recovery, Treasury officials
recommended revising rather than eliminating this tax law. With business lobbying
groups supporting Treasury's recommendation, Congress ultimately retained and
revised the reorganization tax rule. Within a year, though, the social and political
climate changed dramatically, and the Roosevelt Administration began to use the
tax system to attack pockets of concentrated wealth and power. If the proposal to
repeal the reorganization rules had been initially introduced, or perhaps even re-
introduced, during these subsequently altered circumstances, the possibilities of
legal change may have been different. In the end, though, Congress appeared
satisfied with the modifications it had made to the law as part of the 1934 Revenue
Act. Responding implicitly to cues from the courts, Congress in that year made
several changes that have had a lasting impact on current tax laws--changes that
secured the future durability of the provisions.
This historical story about the reorganization tax preference, in the end, is not
simply a tale about the early evolution of an important and enduring corporate tax
law. For this narrative is also a case study of the broader legislative process. It
shows how a typical legal regime is molded by the interactions of democratic
institutions, and it also shows how the lawmaking process is shaped by the
negotiations among citizens, Congress, the courts, and executive agencies.
33. As the title and epigraph suggest, this Article's thesis is motivated by the underlying
claim that material economic conditions determine class interests, and conflicting class
interests in turn explain historical change. Rather than focusing on broad historical changes
in the modes of production and exchange, however, this Article mainly investigates several
discrete periods in the early twentieth century structural development of American corporate
tax law to reveal how historically specific structures of political economy have constituted
ideas and interests. On the Marxist origins of the materialist conception of history, see Karl
Marx, Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, in THE MARX-ENGELS
READER 3-7 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978). For a recent non-traditional reconstruction
of Marx's mature social theory, see generally MOISHE POSTONE, TIME, LABOR, AND SOCIAL
DOMINATION: A REINTERPRETATION OF MARX'S CRITIcAL THEORY (1993).
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Accordingly, this historical tale illustrates the continuing dynamic that exists
between law and society, revealing how the legal process of fortifying and
routinizing laws can unwittingly create special interests-interests that often
reshape and help maintain the laws that have created them.
Before exploring the history of this tax law, this Article begins in Part I with a
brief overview of the conventional justifications for these rules and a truncated
history of the scholarship surrounding the tax treatment of corporate
reorganizations. Just as one of the aims of this Article is to place the development
of the reorganization provisions in historical context, this literature review section
attempts to historicize past studies by showing how previous scholars may have
been influenced-however implicitly-by the political and social currents of their
own times.
Part II, then, begins the historical analysis by briefly tracing the neglected pre-
statutory history of corporate reorganizations. This Part examines how a new wave
of corporate readjustments in the early twentieth century compelled U.S. Treasury
Department officials to address the taxation of business combinations. The modest
aim of this prehistory is to demonstrate that national lawmakers in 1918 were not
the first to grapple with this complex and important issue. Part III briefly
recapitulates the well-documented statutory beginnings of the reorganization
provision. Part IV then analyzes the gradual liberalization of the reorganization
rules during the 1920s. In this pivotal post-war decade, Republican retrenchment
and the eventual rebound in economic productivity unleashed an anti-tax backlash
that included strident businesses lobbying for an expansive and comprehensive
reorganization tax law. These political and social conditions prompted not only
Congress, but also the federal courts to revise the meaning of this corporate tax
benefit. Part V explores the other seminal moment of plasticity: the early 1930s
when Congress began to reconsider the merits of the reorganization tax benefit.
This part chronicles how policymakers' fears of reducing revenues and restraining
a potential economic recovery and the political power of organized interests helped
to preserve the reorganization rule. The Article concludes with a brief summary of
the significance of a historical analysis of the corporate reorganization provisions.
I. THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE CORPORATE REORGANIZATION PROVISIONS
From the moment of its creation, lawmakers, commentators, and scholars have
attempted to justify the existence of the corporate reorganization rules. The
conventional rationale contends that this provision was created to remove the tax
frictions associated with what the 1918 legislative history vividly referred to as
"purely paper" transactions. 34 This reasoning suggests that, initially at least, the tax
benefit was meant to be a limited exception aimed only at those minor business
readjustments that were mere changes in corporate form not substance-those
transactions in which shareholders simply traded different types of paper
certificates of ownership without substantively altering the underlying economic
stake, and hence risk, inherent in their original investments.
34. S. REP. No. 65-617, at 5 (1918).
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Following the traditional reasoning, modem commentators have typically
justified the reorganization tax preference under the "continuity of interest"
principle .3 Like the "purely paper" rationale, continuity of interest implies that
parties to a corporate reorganization maintain the substance of their initial
investment in a modified form. As one group of tax experts has explained, the
reorganization rules operate under the assumption "that the new enterprise or the
new corporate structure that may hold the corporate assets, and the new stock or
securities received in exchange for old stock or securities, are substantially
continuations of, and interests in, the old corporation. 36 Essentially, under this
principle corporate transactions that comply with the Code's reorganization
provisions do not alter shareholders' investments enough to warrant an immediate
tax.
Since its inception, scholars and lawmakers have also been revising the
conventional explanation supporting the reorganization provisions. Some have
argued that administrative considerations best explain the existence of the
reorganization rule. Expanding on the traditional justification, these commentators
have argued that the twin administrative challenges of valuation and liquidity make
taxing nearly all property exchanges impractical.3 7 In other words, property
exchanges come with the dual difficulties and unease of (1) accurately valuing
exchanged property and (2) imposing a levy when a taxpayer does not receive cash
as part of the transaction. Others, focusing on corporate governance issues and
individual fairness, have contended similarly that it is unjust to tax an individual
shareholder who may not consent to a merger.38 More reluctant supporters of the
provisions have argued that because of their longevity, the rules have become
inexorably embedded in our legal system. Resigning themselves to the drift of
institutional inertia, many of these commentators have highlighted the potential
political and economic benefits of the reorganization rule. 39 Still other revisionists
have claimed that the reorganization provisions are a result of the historical and on-
going theoretical debate over the definition of taxable income. Recovering the
intellectual history that gave rise to this tax rule, these scholars have maintained
that the reorganization preference can be seen as part of the enduring conceptual
compromise over competing economic paradigms of taxable income.4 °
35. BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 14, at 12.0111]; see also MARTIN D. GINSBURG &
JACK S. LEVIN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS AND BUYOUTS 610 (2004 ed.); Robert Clark, The
Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory Evolution and Reform, 87 YALE LJ.
90, 123 (1977).
36. BITTKER& EUSTICE, supra note 14, at 12.01[1].
37. ROBERT S. HOLZMAN, CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS: THEIR FEDERAL TAX STATUS
2-11 (1948). See generally Hellerstein, supra note 26.
38. Schlunk, supra note 8, at 25-26; John Dane, Jr., The Case for Nonrecognition of
Gain in Reorganization Exchanges, TAXES, Apr. 1958, at 244, 246-49.
39. Daniel Q. Posin, Taxing Corporate Reorganizations: Purging Penelope's Web, 133
U. PA. L. REV. 1335 (1985); Daniel N. Shaviro, An Efficiency Analysis of Realization and
Recognition Rules Under the Federal Income Tax, 48 TAX L. REv. 1, 3 (1992).
40. Bank, supra note 26, at 43-51. For a similar historical analysis of the theoretical
debates surrounding capital gains taxation, see Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Origins of
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Critics, to be sure, have consistently questioned the conventional and revisionist
accounts. Initially, some doubted whether the tax benefit did anything but provide
an unnecessary subsidy for corporate consolidations.4 ' Those who focused on
antitrust policy were similarly concerned that these tax rules were undermining the
regulation of concentrated corporate power.42 More recent commentators have
argued that given the immense complexity, the universal application, and the
elective nature of the provisions, substantive reform or perhaps outright abolition
ought to be pursued.43
Like the traditional and revisionist explanations they challenge, most of the
critical accounts have paid little attention to the historical development of the
reorganization rules. And those that have explored the law's history, generally have
been preoccupied with comparing their own contemporary situation with the
theoretical and conceptual origins of the provisions. This focus on intellectual
origins-on the beliefs and desires of lawmakers and academic thinkers at the
moment of creation-has led most scholars and commentators to dwell on singular,
transhistorical explanations for the enactment of the reorganization provisions. In
so doing, the existing literature has elided how changing social, political, and
economic conditions and interests, and the temporal dimensions of policymaking
have affected the development of this tax rule over time. Yet, while the prevailing
scholarship may have discounted the importance of historical change, the studies
themselves have not been immune to the forces of changing historical conditions.
The scholars, policymakers, and commentators who have critically scrutinized
the corporate reorganization provisions throughout the decades have implicitly
reflected the pressing concerns of their times. Although commentary on the law
existed when the rules were first enacted, serious and detached analysis did not
begin until the 1930s. Writing amid the devastation of the Great Depression, many
tax commentators confidently accepted the expanded reorganization tax benefit.
They firmly believed that Congress enacted and refined these rules to remove
"oppressive and premature" taxes that might be a serious hindrance to "normal
business adjustments.' Focusing mainly on the simplest of corporate
Capital Gains Taxation: What's Law Got to Do with It?, 39 Sw. L.J. 869 (1985). Bank has
recently revised his explanation of the durability of the tax-free reorganization rule to
account for the power of corporate managers and their attempts to retain their autonomy over
corporate decision-making. See Steven A. Bank, Tax, Corporate Governance and Norms, 61
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1159 (2004).
41. Paul, supra note 26, at 4; Milton Sandberg, The Income Tax Subsidy to
'Reorganizations,' 38 COLUM. L. REv. 98, 125 (1938).
42. Sheldon S. Cohen, Conglomerate Mergers and Taxation, 55 A.B.A. 40 (1969);
William A. Lovett, Tax Subsidies for Merger: Should Mergers be Made to Meet a Market
Testfor Efficiency?, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 844 (1970).
43. AM. LAW INST., supra note 27, at 22-312 (1980); Yariv Brauner, A Good Old Habit,
or Just an Old One? Preferential Treatment for Reorganizations, 2004 BYU L. REv. 1;
Glenn E. Coven, Taxing Corporate Acquisitions: A Proposal for Mandatory Uniform Rules,
44 TAX. L. REv. 145, 203 (1989); Shakow, supra note 19, at 177; Everett Skillman,
Comment, The Non-Recognition of Taxable Gain in Corporate Reorganizations-
Reassessing Legislative Policy, 20 Sw. U. L. REv. 369 (1991).
44. ROBERT N. MILLER, HOMER HENDRICKS & EWING EVERETT, REORGANIZATIONS AND
OTHER EXCHANGES IN FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 53 (1931); Hugh Satterlee, The Income
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readjustments, such as recapitalizations and reincorporations of single enterprises,
these treatise writers echoed key portions of legislative history in reasoning that the
tax preference applied principally to "purely paper transactions"-to changes in the
mere form of a business, rather than its substance. As part of the early New Deal
search for economic recovery, tax commentators also optimistically assumed that
the deferral of taxation would "stimulate business transactions by eliminating
uncertainty" surrounding the tax treatment of corporate reorganizations.45 This
early group of tax experts thus embraced the reorganization provisions as a
necessary step in the revival of the American economy, and the rationalization of
U.S. business tax law.
Such trust and confidence was not unanimous. By the end of the 1930s, with the
New Deal positive state in full swing, some legal scholars skeptically questioned
the existence and need for favorable tax treatment for corporate reorganizations.
Describing the provisions as "the most serious tax avoidance leaks in the capital
gains tax," and as "a legislative subsidy to business combinations," some
academics claimed that the reorganization sections not only burdened the
government with lost revenue and high administrative costs, they also spurred
dangerous levels of corporate concentration.46 Weaned on the Democratic politics
of Franklin Roosevelt's Administration, and reacting to the failed 1934
congressional attempt to repeal the reorganization tax rule, these scholars viewed
the tenor of such corporate tax preferences as antithetical to the broad aims of the
New Deal order.47
Doubt continued into the post-World War II period. Some treatise writers, of
course, still supported the reorganization provisions during the 1930s and 1940s,
and into the post-war era.48 But by the late 1950s, legal scholars and tax
policymakers, in particular, had become disillusioned with any principled policy
rationale for the rule. Indeed, during the so-called "golden age" of American
capitalism, 49 commentators doubted whether commercial interests needed any type
of stimulation or subsidy. Reviving the New Deal critique, tax experts such as
Tax Definition of Reorganization, 12 TAX MAG. 639, 646 (1934).
45. ARNOLD R. BAAR & GEORGE M. MORRIS, HIDDEN TAXES IN CORPORATE
REORGANIZATIONS 6 (1935); Homer Hendricks, Federal Income Tax: Definition of
"Reorganization, " 45 HARv. L. REv. 648, 667 (1931).
46. Sandberg, supra note 41, at 125; see generally Paul, supra note 26.
47. Other scholars of the period were not nearly as vociferous in their opposition to the
reorganization provisions, but they nonetheless appeared concerned about the exploitation of
the tax preference. See Roy G. BLAKEY & GLADYS C. BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX,
493-97 (1940); ROSWELL MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME 52-58 (1936). On the history and
legacy of the New Deal order, see generally THE RISE AND FALL OF THE NEW DEAL ORDER,
1930-1980 (Steve Fraser & Gary Gerstle eds., 1989).
48. See generally HOLzMAN, supra note 37. Although scholars supported the
reorganization provisions, they were concerned that judicial interpretations were creating
greater legal uncertainty during the mid-1940s. Valentine Brookes, The Continuity of
Interest Test in Reorganizations-A Blessing or a Curse?, 34 CAL. L. REv. 1, 2 (1946);
Erwin N. Griswold, 58 "Securities" and "Continuity of Interest," HARV. L. REv. 705
(1945).
49. See generally THE GOLDEN AGE OF CAPITALISM: REINTERPRETING THE POSTWAR
EXPERIENCE (Stephen A. Marglin & Juliet B. Schor eds., 1989).
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Jerome Hellerstein and Stanley Surrey began to suspect that the large-scale
corporate acquisitions that accompanied the post-war economic boom did not
adhere to the initial historical justification for tax-favored treatment.
In an article entitled "Mergers, Taxes, and Realism," Hellerstein traced the
origins and early development of the reorganization rules to conclude that the law
in its current form could no longer stand.50 Hellerstein conceded that the original
intent of the law might have corresponded with the empirical reality of corporate
reorganizations in the infancy of the income tax regime, but by the late 1950s the
structures of the American corporate economy had changed dramaticallyfs' Surrey,
as part of an American Law Institute study on corporate taxation, echoed
Hellerstein's concerns. Most mergers in the post-war period, Surrey contended,
were acquisitions of small companies by relatively large corporations. 52 These
mergers did not appear to conform to the original intent of the tax benefit, yet they
frequently received tax preferred treatment. Picking up on earlier congressional and
scholarly recommendations, Hellerstein and Surrey independently proposed
circumscribing the application of the reorganization sections.
53
If Hellerstein and Surrey were dissatisfied with the conventional justifications
for the reorganization provisions, subsequent scholars were stridently opposed to
this tax law. Alarmed by evidence released in the late 1960s that illustrated a
pattern of economic concentration resulting from corporate mergers, 54 national tax
administrators and academics questioned whether the tax incentives embedded in
the reorganization rules were undermining antitrust policy. These critics pointed to
the increasing number of vertical or conglomerate mergers that were taking place at
the time to argue that favorable tax treatment for reorganizations should be
abolished.
In the last few decades, tax scholars and practitioners have continued to dissect
the reorganization provisions. Whereas many still bemoan its existence as an
50. Hellerstein, supra note 26. In a direct response to Hellerstein, John Dane, a tax
administrator, supported the reorganization provisions on the grounds that small
stockholders generally do not agree to mergers, and hence they should not be taxed on what
is in effect an involuntary transaction. Dane, supra note 38, at 246-49.
51. Hellerstein, supra note 26, at 258-61.
52. Stanley S. Surrey, Income Tax Problems of Corporations and Shareholders:
American Law Institute Tax Project-American Bar Association Committee Study on
Legislative Revision, 14 TAx. L. REv. 1 (1958).
53. The 1934 House Ways & Means subcommittee arrived at a similar conclusion. See
infra note 270. And as early as 1921 Robert Montgomery also implied that the tax benefit
should be similarly curtailed. Robert Montgomery, Reorganizations and the Closed
Transaction, in THE FEDERAL INCOME TAx 131 (Robert M. Haig ed., 1921).
54. Fed. Trade Comm'n, Economic Report on Corporate Mergers: Hearings on
Economic Concentration Before the S. Subcomm. on Antitrust & Monopoly of the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 8A, at 143 (1969); Merger Growth at Historic
High, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1968, at 61.
55. Cohen, supra note 42, at 40, 43-44; Ulysses S. Crockett, Jr., Federal Taxation of
Corporate Unifications: A Review of Legislative Policy, 15 DuQ. L. REv. 1 (1976); Lovett,
supra note 42, at 844-47.
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unnecessary form of corporate welfare, 56 or as a "needlessly complex, internally
inconsistent" set of rules, 57 others have attempted to defend the tax preference on a
variety of grounds. In the late 1970s, some scholars were claiming that the
provisions were an indelible part of the genetic makeup of the tax code.58 By the
1980s, as the non-recognition rules for reorganizations became exceedingly
intricate and complex and as new proposals to simplify the provisions began to
emerge just as M&A activity was soaring, tax practitioners were resigning
themselves to the notion that the rules were "too well-settled to accommodate
serious consideration" of terminating tax-favored treatment 59 Tax scholars,
meanwhile, seemed to be afflicted by a similar sense of institutional inertia and
drift. Many conceded that the provisions were less than ideal, but they defended the
status quo by pointing to political pragmatism, or the limited efficiency gains
generated by non-recognition treatment.
60
More recently, scholars influenced by the latest-and perhaps largest-wave of
mergers during the 1990s have returned to the early roots of the reorganization
rules to explain the persistence of this tax benefit. Using history as a guide, Steven
Bank in his article "Mergers, Taxes and Historical Realism," has contended that
this tax preference can best be understood as part of the ongoing compromise
within economic and legal theory over the concept of realization and the definition
of taxable income. Under this view, the initial and current debate over the
realization requirement-the tax rule that some event, such as a sale or exchange,
must occur before property appreciation can be recognized as income-
demonstrates that the reorganization provisions themselves are the result of a
tenuous but enduring compromise between the accretion and consumption models
of taxable income.
61
56. Brauner, supra note 43, at 49; Skillman, supra note 43, at 370-71.
57. Coven, supra note 43, at 203; Shakow, supra note 19, at 179-80.
58. See generally Clark, supra note 35.
59. Robert A. Jacobs, Reorganizing the Reorganization Provisions, 35 TAX. L. REV.
415, 418 (1980).
60. Posin, supra note 39, at 1405-08; Shaviro, supra note 39, at 66-68; see also
William D. Popkin, The Deep Structure of Capital Gains, 33 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 153, 158
(1983); Joshua D. Rosenberg, Tax Avoidance and Income Measurement, 87 MICH. L. REv.
365, 497 (1988); Daniel M. Schneider, Closing the Circle: Taxing Business
Transformations, 58 LA. L. REV. 749, 784 (1998). For a recent critique of the economic
efficiency claims supporting the reorganization provisions, see Brauner, supra note 43, at 6-
17. If the reorganization rules are indeed inefficient, this article's historical analysis may
shed some light on how and why this inefficient outcome has become an entrenched part of
American tax law. On the use of history to explain the adoption of sub-optimal social
outcomes, see generally David, supra note 29.
61. See Bank, supra note 26, at 43-51. A similar compromise over the tax consequences
of the corporation's ability to "lock-in" capital for long-term managerial use may explain the
existence of the corporate tax itself. Steven A. Bank, A Capital Lock-In Theory of the
Corporate Income Tax, 94 GEO. L.J. 890 (2006). For more on the lock-in theory, see
Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business
Organizers in the Ninteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. Rev. 387 (2003). For a critique of the
lock-in theory, see Larry E. Ribstein, Should History Lock In Lock In? 41 TULSA L. REv. 525
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In the aftermath of the M&A boom of the 1990s, scholars once again began to
raise doubts about the provisions. Some commentators have underscored the
subsidy effects of the reorganization provisions, and challenged the empirical
accuracy of some of the doctrinal details that defined tax-advantaged corporate
consolidations. Reacting to the limits of fundamental tax reform, and challenging
the efficiency claims supporting the provisions, some scholars have employed the
lessons of a larger body of empirical studies to reveal the "arbitrary, unfocused, and
hard-to-justify subsidy" embodied in the reorganization provisions, 62 and to show
how changing historical conditions have provided multiple meanings and
justifications for this law.63 Other recent scholarly investigations, in an apparent
effort to rescue the substantive distinction between taxable and tax-deferred
transactions, have analyzed how broader changes in corporate tax law have shaped
the tax consequences of mergers, and how the undifferentiated application of the
reorganization provisions may affect various shareholders differently. 64 Despite
their varied categories of analysis, these scholars seem to concur that the existing
corporate reorganization provisions are badly in need of reform.
Thus from the 1930s to the present, the reorganization provisions have been
carefully evaluated by succeeding generations of scholars and policymakers.
Responding to the evolution of the reorganization rules and their own historical
circumstances, commentators have oscillated between condemning and praising the
provisions. Some have called for their elimination, while others have extolled the
provisions for permitting efficient and ordinary business transactions, and still
others have sought to carve out a middle-ground, suggesting that only certain
corporate reorganizations be granted the privilege of tax deferral. All the while, the
provisions have grown in scope and complexity, leading nearly every observer to
wonder how these laws have become such an important, yet contested, part of
American corporate tax law.
II. A BRIEF PREHISTORY OF CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS
Although Congress did not pass the first reorganization tax rule until 1918,
corporate consolidations had long been a common part of the American business
landscape. Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, entrepreneurial
managers and companies, seeking to increase their market share and reap the
benefits of economies of scale, consolidated their operations by combining with
other companies. 65 In the ten years or so that straddled the turn of the twentieth
century, the American economy witnessed an unprecedented merger movement that
(2006).
62. Brauner, supra note 43, at 4.
63. Mehrotra, supra note 26.
64. See supra note 8.
65. See generally ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR. THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 315-17 (1977); NEIL FLIGSTEN, THE TRANSFORMATION
OF CORPORATE CONTROL (1990); Maury Klein, Competition and Regulation: The Railroad
Model, Bus. HIST. REV., Summer 1990, at 311-25.
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created some of the country's largest corporations, including many like U.S. Steel
and International Harvester that still exist today.
66
These and other business consolidations occurred long before any specific
federal pronouncement on the taxation of corporate mergers. The Civil War income
tax and the 1909 corporate excise levy attempted to tax capital gains,67 but taxing
authorities did not appear willing to use these laws to tax corporate acquisitions.
Indeed, before the first permanent national income tax was established in 1913,
there seemed to be little reason to believe that corporate mergers would trigger tax
liability.68 Even then, it was not until the mid- and late-teens after income tax rates
began to climb, stock ownership became more widespread, and a new trend in
corporate readjustments emerged that federal taxing authorities began to exercise
their nascent powers by taxing corporate mergers and acquisitions.
A. The Progressive Income Tax and a New Wave of Corporate Readjustments
Initially, the enactment of the 1913 income tax did little to change the tax
treatment of corporate mergers and acquisitions. Though the law described in some
detail the permissible deductions in calculating net income, the definition of
income itself was left rather vague and open-ended.69 This was, of course, in
keeping with the uncertainty surrounding the acceptance of the income tax itself. 70
Within a decade, however, the onset of World War I and the growing pressure for a
more redistributional tax system radically altered the nation's fiscal environment.
But before then, changing social and political attitudes toward the role of
governmental power and a new wave of corporate readjustments were already
afoot.
As the modem forces of industrialization, urbanization, and mass migration
impinged on American society at the turn of the century, political leaders and social
reformers increasingly turned to state power to solve their pressing problems and
concerns. 7' Among the many reforms established during this period, the income tax
66. Between 1895 and 1905, nearly 2,000 firms were enveloped by consolidations,
which reached a peak in 1899 with over 63 consolidations in the manufacturing sector alone.
NAOMI R. LAMOREAuX, THE GREAT MERGER MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN BUSINESS, 1895-
1904, at 2 (1985); RALPH L. NELSON, MERGER MOVEMENTS IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY, 1895-
1956(1959).
67. Revenue Act of 1862, ch. 119, 12 Stat. 432; LAWRENCE H. SELTZER, THE NATURE
AND TAX TREATMENT OF CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES 31-33 (1951).
68. TariffAct of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114.
69. See id. § II(B). The 1913 law defined income rather capaciously, in the hopes of
giving some credence to the Sixteenth Amendment's expansive language permitting
Congress "to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived." U.S. CONST.
amend. XVI.
70. See generally JOHN D. BUENKER, THE INCOME TAX AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA
(1985); ROBERT STANLEY, THE DIMENSIONS OF LAW IN THE SERVICE OF ORDER: ORIGINS OF
THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX, 1861-1913 (1993); JOHN F. WITrE, THE POLITICS AND
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAx (1985).
71. See generally MICHAEL E. MCGERR, A FIERCE DISCONTENT: THE RISE AND FALL OF
THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1870-1920 (2003); DANIEL T. RODGERS,
20081
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
expressed the desires of citizens and leaders to extend the reach of state power into
the economy. Like the other innovations of the Progressive Era, the income tax was
in many ways a grand experiment that required giving the federal government
flexible and expansive powers. And like all experiments, it came with a great deal
of uncertainty and ambiguity. In contrast to the Civil War income tax, which was
presumed to be a direct, but temporary, response to an unprecedented national
emergency, the 1913 levy was enacted during peacetime in response to social
democratic demands to provide Congress with a broad, elastic, and permanent
source of revenue.72 This newfound taxing power was soon tested in many ways,
including in the context of capital gains and corporate reorganizations.
While the new income tax provided lawmakers with fledgling national taxing
powers, an emerging boom in corporate readjustments and the subsequent increase
in tax rates during World War I tested the limits of these new powers. In response
to changes in state-level corporate laws and federal regulatory pressures, large
corporations throughout the country began in the mid-teens to alter their corporate
structures. When Delaware, in competition with New Jersey and New York,
leniently revised its incorporation laws and lowered its franchise taxes, numerous
companies reorganized their corporations in Delaware.73 In 1915, for instance, the
DuPont Company transferred all the assets of its New Jersey enterprise into a
newly created Delaware corporation in exchange for the shares of the new
Delaware company.74 Likewise, in the following year, General Motors created a
new Delaware corporation and transferred its new shares for the stock of the old
New Jersey corporation. Others followed suit, and by 1919 Delaware easily
surpassed New Jersey as the leading state of incorporation for large, publicly-traded
corporations.75
At about the same time, oil companies also began to rearrange their corporate
structures in response to the Interstate Commerce Commission's regulation of the
petroleum industry and the transportation of oil. In 1914, oil companies, led by
Standard Oil, began to sever their pipeline assets from their operations, placing
them into two distinct corporations, usually within the same state. In one
transaction, a Kansas oil company subdivided its enterprise into two separate
Kansas corporations, one that held the pipeline properties and the other that ran the
oil business. In exchange for the pipeline assets, the new corporation transferred its
shares directly to the owners of the oil company. In sum, these transactions divided
ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN A PROGRESSIVE AGE (1998); ELIZABETH SANDERS,
ROOTS OF REFORM: FARMERS, WORKERS, AND THE AMERICAN STATE, 1877-1917 (1999).
72. EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND
PRACTICE OF INCOME TAXATION AT HOME AND ABROAD 675 (1914); see BROWNLEE, supra
note 30, at 36-37; SIDNEY RATNER, AMERICAN TAXATION, ITS HISTORY AS A SOCIAL FORCE IN
DEMOCRACY 321-40 (1942); RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 99-109
(1954).
73. See generally CHRISTOPHER GRANDY, NEW JERSEY AND THE FISCAL ORIGINS OF
MODERN AMERICAN CORPORATION LAW 79-80 (1993); JAMES W. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY
OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1970 (1970);
RUSSELL C. LARCOM, THE DELAWARE CORPORATION 17 (1937).
74. United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156 (1921); LARCOM, supra note 73, at 160.
75. LARCOM, supra note 73, at 161, 175-76.
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the assets of a business into two distinct corporations, while leaving the ownership
interests intact. 76 These seemingly straightforward and formal business
rearrangements provided an important commercial context for lawmakers when
they turned their attention to the tax treatment of these and other corporate
transactions.
B. The Early Treasury Department Rulings on Corporate Reorganizations
Although the courts did not address the reorganizations of the mid-teens until
several years later, Treasury officials were well aware of these transactions.77 As
early as 1915, the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), the
predecessor of the Internal Revenue Service,78 issued the first of several private
letter rulings on the federal income tax treatment of corporate reorganizations.
Though modem scholars have tended to discount the "mixed guidance" that these
pre-statutory rulings provided,79 there are at least three reasons why the early BIR
pronouncements represent an important period in the development of the
reorganization tax regime. First, the BIR's evolving position on corporate
reorganizations demonstrates how a relatively weak executive agency,
overwhelmed with administrative responsibility, 80 was incrementally developing a
murky, yet principled, position on the tax treatment of these new corporate
transactions. Second, the early BIR rulings show that when Congress turned its
attention to these transactions in 1918, it had two distinctive paths it could follow in
drafting legislation. Third, the rulings illustrate how congressional action in 1918
and thereafter was built on a legacy of past policies-a legacy that began with a
76. Cullinan v. Walker, 262 U.S. 134 (1923); Rockefeller v. United States, 257 U.S. 176
(1921); see also HAROLD F. WILLIAMSON, ARNOLD R. DAUM, RALPH L. ANDREANO &
GILBERT C. KLOSE, THE AMERICAN PETROLEUM INDUSTRY: THE AGE OF ENERGY 1899-1959,
at 107 (1963). In some cases, state-level tax pressures also induced firms to sever their
transportation business into separate corporations. See Rockefeller, 257 U.S. at 181.
77. Arthur A. Ballantine, former Solicitor of Internal Revenue during the Great War,
recalled many years later that the "Treasury Department had given much consideration to
these problems long before these Supreme Court decisions were handed down." Arthur A.
Ballantine, The Corporation and the Income Tax, 22 HARv. Bus. REV. 277, 283 (1944).
78. The Bureau of Internal Revenue was renamed the Internal Revenue Service in 1953
as part of a congressionally mandated reorganization. THE AMERICAN WAY IN TAXATION:
INTERNAL REVENUE, 1862-1963, at 38 (Lillian Doris ed., 1963).
79. See, e.g., Bank, supra note 26, at 7; Posin, supra note 39, at 1340.
80. As Thomas S. Adams, an economist and key Treasury official during World War I,
explained, "the Bureau of Internal Revenue [was] charged with the responsibility of
administering, throughout a nation of 110,000,000 people, some of the most complicated and
burdensome taxes ever adopted by a self-governing people." Letter from Thomas S. Adams
to Rep. James E. Watson, Chairman of the Select Comm. to Investigate the Bureau of
Internal Revenue I 1 (April 11, 1924), RG 56 General Records of the Dept. of the Treasury,
Correspondence of the Office of the Sec. of the Treasury, Folder "Individual Files, Thomas
S. Adams," National Archives and Record Administration, College Park, MD [hereinafter,
NARA H] (on file with the archive).
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great deal of confusion and uncertainty but seemed to be moving towards a
plausibly sound policy position.
From April 1915 to March 1918, the Treasury Department issued several
apparently contradictory rulings. Although these conflicting decisions intimate that
Treasury officials were equivocating over the taxation of corporate rearrangements,
taken as a whole the rulings suggest that the BIR was incrementally moving
towards a coherent position of taxing certain corporate reorganizations, while
carving out reasonable exceptions. In one of its first rulings, the Commissioner
examined an asset-for-stock transfer where a newly created corporation exchanged
its shares for the assets of the old corporation. The owners of the companies
remained the same and the shares remained with the old corporation. The BIR
concluded that there was no tax liability because the initial investment had not been
liquated; in fact, the shareholders did not even receive the stock of the new
corporation. The Commissioner ruled that "until the stock issued by the purchasing
or reorganized company in payment for the assets of the first company is converted
into cash or its equivalent, no taxable income will have been realized."'', Simply
put, the BIR did not believe that income was realized when the same investors
simply changed the corporate structure of their underlying investments. Moving
assets from one corporation to another was an insufficient event to trigger tax
liability.
The BIR was not nearly as accommodating, however, when some taxpayers
questioned what the tax consequences would be if shareholders in a nearly identical
asset-for-stock transfer received the stock of the new corporation. "If the shares of
stock received by the selling corporation are distributed by it to its stockholders,"
the Commissioner ruled in September 1916, "the amount so distributed in excess of
the stock held by them in the original corporation will be considered income to
such stockholders." 82 Although the BIR did not elaborate on its ruling, the implicit
assumption seemed to be that a distribution of the new company's shares to the
existing owners "in excess of the stock held by them" was paramount to a
liquidation of part of the original investment.
The September 1916 ruling did not explain the phrase "in excess of the stock
held;" presumably this was a reference to the par values of the stocks. In an earlier
ruling, the BIR had used the par values of exchanged stock as a proxy for their
market worth.8 3 Although par value, even by 1915, was becoming less
economically relevant as a marker of a corporation's creditworthiness or capital
value, the BIR continued to use this anachronistic measure to determine the
potential gain or loss from the exchange of stock. The government's continued use
81. May 3, 1915, Income Tax Service 1918, 1294, at 226. "In other words," the
Commissioner continued, "the excess of the nominal par value of the stock issued in
payment for assets over the nominal par value of the stock of the selling company, the stock
in both cases being supported by the same assets, does not constitute income within the
meaning of the federal income tax." Id.
82. September 9, 1916, Income Tax Service 1918, 1 1297, at 226-7; Treas. Reg. 33
(revised), art. 101 (1918), 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 182 (1918).
83. April 1, 1915, Income Tax Service 1918, 398 at 99.
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of par value as a measure for determining taxable gain would over time
significantly hinder the rationalization of the reorganization rules.8
By March 1917, the BIR seemed to support the presumption that it was using
the capital stock of the companies and the par values of the exchanged stock as a
metric for determining gain or loss. In examining another asset-for-stock transfer,
one where the old corporation was dissolved after the reorganization, the BIR
focused on the capital stock of the two corporations involved in the transaction.
When the capital stock of the two companies was identical and the shares of the
new company were immediately distributed by the selling corporation to its
shareholders, no tax liability was imposed on either the selling corporation or its
shareholders.8 5 The Commissioner determined that because the underlying assets of
the two corporations remained essentially the same, there was no taxable event.
Such a transaction "resulted in no gains, profits or income to either the first
corporation or its stockholders," the Commissioner stated, because "it is simply an
exchange of assets of like character and like value."
86
By contrast, the BIR concluded in subsequent rulings that there would be tax
liability for both the corporation and its shareholders on certain transactions where
the capital stock, or equity capital, of the two corporations varied. For example,
when the capital stock of the new corporation was greater than the capital stock of
the old company in an asset-for-stock transaction, there was potential tax liability at
both the corporate and shareholder level.87 Similarly, when the combined par
values of the transferred securities exceeded the initial costs of the exchanged
assets, a tax liability could be imposed on both the old corporation and its
shareholders.
8 8
The Treasury rulings issued between 1915 and 1918 left much to be desired.
Lacking details about the context of the reorganizations that were evaluated, these
administrative decrees, which themselves were executive agency rulings not
statutes or even Treasury regulations, created a great deal of legal uncertainty at a
84. Historically, par or face value of stock represented the amount of capital that
investors initially contributed to a venture in exchange for such stock. Creditors and other
potential investors could examine the par value of a business' outstanding shares to
determine the amount of capital that had already been committed to the venture. But by the
second decade of the twentieth century, "no-par value" shares became increasingly common,
as creditors developed other institutional mechanisms to monitor creditworthiness. ROBERT
C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW §17.1.2 (1986); BAYLESS MANNING & JAMES J. HANKS, JR.,
LEGAL CAPITAL 22-26 (3rd ed. 1990); see also James C. Bonbright, No-Par Stock: Its
Economic and Legal Aspects, 38 Q. J. EcON. 440-65 (1924) (a contemporary account of the
declining economic significance of par value stock).
85. March 8, 1917, Income Tax Service 1918, 1302, at 228. This private letter ruling
also introduced the principle of carryover basis for the stock exchanged in a reorganization
when it declared that "if the stockholders in the new company shall hereafter sell their stock,
they will be required to account for as taxable income, any amount which they may receive
for the same in excess of the cost to them of the stock of the first company." Id. 1304, at
228.
86. Id. 1303, at 228.
87. November 10, 1917, Income Tax Service 1918, T 1309.
88. March 19, 1918, Income Tax Service 1918, 3222.
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time when corporate relocations to Delaware and the division of oil company assets
were becoming increasingly popular. Still, there appeared to be a certain logic that
drove the BIR rulings. The agency seemed to understand--even if it did not clearly
articulate-that corporate reorganizations might be necessary, as one taxpayer put
it, "for certain internal and other reasons. ' '89 Practical economic considerations
could force corporate owners to change the structure of their business investments
without altering their risk exposure, or cashing out their investment. In such cases,
the BIR seemed willing to postpone tax liability.9° It was only when taxpayers
seemed to exploit the uncertainty of the inchoate tax laws that tax officials
intervened to clarify the situation-such as when taxpayers appeared to be
exchanging stock with a built-in gain, or when the capital stock of corporations
engaged in an exchange were dramatically unequal. 91 Even in these cases, there
were sound arguments against Treasury's position of taxing such transactions; the
lack of liquidity, after all, remained a consistent concern. But at the very least, the
BIR seemed to be developing a plausible rule behind its decisions, namely that
most reorganizations would be taxed as sales, granting an exception for minor
readjustments in corporate form. For those corporate managers contemplating
domiciliary reincorporations, this evolving regulatory guidance may have provided
minimal comfort during a rather dynamic period in the development of American
corporate capitalism.
III. WORLD WAR I AND THE STATUTORY FOUNDATIONS OF THE REORGANIZATION
RULE
As American corporations were readjusting their business structures and the
Treasury Department was struggling to comprehend the tax consequences of these
transactions, larger world-historical events were taking shape across the Atlantic.
What began as a small skirmish in the Balkans in the early summer of 1914 was
soon transformed-through a volatile combination of imperialism, nationalism, and
mass politics-into a total world war that was dubbed the "Great War" by
contemporaries even before it began.92 Although the United States attempted to
remain resolutely neutral in the early years of the war, its traditional allegiance to
Britain and the Allies eventually submerged the nation into hostilities by the spring
of 1917, when President Woodrow Wilson famously announced that the United
States had a duty to make the world "safe for democracy."
93
89. March 8, 1917, Income Tax Service 1918, 1302, at 228.
90. Id.
91. November 10, 1917, Income Tax Service 1918, 1309; March 19, 1918, Income
Tax Service 1918, 3222.
92. See generally JENNIFER D. KEENE, WORLD WAR 1 (2006); DAVID M. KENNEDY, OVER
HERE: THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND AMERICAN SOCIETY (1980); DAVID TRAXEL, CRUSADER
NATION: THE UNITED STATES IN PEACE AND THE GREAT WAR, 1898-1920 (2006).
93. Full Text of the Address by the President to Congress, L.A. TIMES, April 3, 1917, at
I, 16; Must Exert All our Power, N.Y. TIMES, April 3, 1917, at 1.
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Nearly every facet of American life, including the federal tax system, was
dramatically altered by the war. Beginning with the Revenue Act of 1916,94 which
significantly increased income tax rates, enacted a graduated estate tax, and
imposed an innovative war profits tax on certain businesses, the World War I
revenue acts radically redirected American fiscal policy toward a new institutional
path-one that broke from an earlier reliance on tariffs and toward a new era
marked by the direct and progressive taxation of individual and business income.
95
At the same time, the increasing cooperation between big business and the state
demanded by war mobilization fostered a new type of corporatism. As the federal
government began to intervene into the economy in unprecedented ways, including
nationalizing the railroads and controlling capital markets, lasting institutional
bonds between the federal government and large corporations were gradually
emerging.
96
The expansion of the wartime American economy led to other important
changes. Large businesses began once again to combine vertically by acquiring
direct competitors. The stock ownership of large corporations became relatively
more dispersed among a large number of small shareholders. And ordinary citizens
who purchased war bonds became increasingly familiar with the culture of credit
and capital markets. With these dramatic changes, a federal government searching
for revenue to fund a global war could no longer haphazardly exercise its taxing
powers. It needed to act decisively on all fronts, including in its taxation of
corporate transactions.
A. The Wartime Political Economy: Rising Taxes, the Creditor Class, and a New
Merger Boom
Among the social and political factors that contributed to the fiscal revolution
occasioned by the Great War, the most important included the growth of anti-
business sentiment and the formation of a fragile congressional coalition in support
of radically redistributive tax laws. Since the onset of war in Europe in 1914,
American businesses enjoyed an explosive expansion of revenue. Opponents of the
war and supporters of redistributive taxes latched onto the incredible rise of
corporate profits to demand that the war-brides pay up.97 As one popular periodical
documented, by 1916 the aggregate profits of the nation's leading companies
"exceeded the profits of the year in which the war began by over a billion
94. Revenue Act of 1916, Ch. 463, §§ l(a)(b), 7(a), 10, 201, 301(1), 39 Stat. 756, 756-
57, 761, 765, 777, 781 (1916); see also W. Elliot Brownlee, Wilson and Financing the
Modem State: The Revenue Act of 1916, 129 PROC. OF THE AM. PHIL. SOC'Y, 173-210 (1985)
(explaining the political context of the Revenue Act of 1916).
95. BROWNLEE, supra note 30, at 58-80; KENNEDY, supra note 92, at 111-12.
96. See generally ROBERT D. CUFF, THE WAR INDUSTRIES BOARD: BUSINESS-
GOVERNMENT RELATIONS DURING WORLD WAR 1 (1973); KENNEDY, supra note 92, at 109-
10; PAUL C. KOIsTINEN, MOBILIZING FOR MODERN WAR: THE POLTICAL ECONOMY OF
AMERICAN WARFARE, 1865-1919 (1997).
97. See Helping the War Pay for Itself, OUTLOOK, July 27, 1917, at 319-20.
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dollars." 98 Once the country officially entered the fray, a fragile political coalition
began to coalesce around the policy of using steeply graduated taxes to pay for the
war. Led by the Democratic Wilson Administration, this alliance consisted of
powerful Democratic and Republican lawmakers in key institutional positions, such
as House majority leader and Chairman of the Ways & Means Committee Claude
Kitchin (D-NC), and the progressive Senator Robert M. La Follette (R-WI), who
occupied a pivotal seat on the Finance Committee. This political alliance, in sum,
sought to use tax policy to attack concentrations of wealth and special privilege,
while paying for the war.
99
Given the popular resentment of enormous wartime corporate profits, and the
congressional coalition in support of redistributive taxes, the federal government
launched an unparalleled "soak-the-rich" form of tax policy. Accordingly, World
War I profoundly transformed the American tax system. Not only did top marginal
income tax rates soar throughout the war, innovative levies like the war profits and
excess profits taxes were also introduced.1 ° In 1913, top marginal rates on
individual income did not exceed seven percent, and the income tax on individuals
and corporations brought in only about $35 million, or less than five percent of
total federal revenue. 0 1 Toward the end of the conflict, after several revenue acts
had dramatically increased rates, lowered exemption levels, and expanded the reach
of the federal taxing powers, top marginal rates reached as high as seventy-seven
percent, and the income and profits taxes brought in over $3 billion, or nearly sixty
percent of total ordinary federal receipts for fiscal year 1919.102 By the end of the
war, the richest one percent of American families accounted for approximately
eighty percent of total federal personal income tax revenues.'
0 3
Yet even with this transformation in tax power, the federal government still
needed to resort to borrowing to fund the enormous war effort. ° 4 This government
98. For instance, the Du Pont Company, as the largest producer of dynamite and
smokeless gunpowder, saw its profits soar from nearly $5 million in 1914 to well over $82
million by 1916-an amazing increase of almost 1600%. Id.; see also The Excess Profits
Tax, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 15, 1917, at 174-75; To Tax "Excess Profits," LITERARY DIG.,
January 27, 1917, at 176.
99. BROWNLEE, supra note 30, at 48-58; KENNEDY, supra note 92, at 48-58.
100. W. Elliot Brownlee, Historical Perspective on U.S. Tax Policy Toward the Rich, in
DOES ATLAS SHRUG? THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING THE RICH 42-47 (Joel B.
Slemrod ed., 2000).
10 1. The top marginal rate in 1913 was a combination of a one percent normal tax rate
and a six percent surtax rate. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY ON THE
STATE OF THE FINANCES FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1914, at 293 (1914);
BROWNLEE, supra note 30, at 46; HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES Series
Ea588-593 (Richard Sutch & Susan B. Carter eds., 2006).
102. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY ON THE STATE OF THE
FINANCES FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1919, at 857 (1919); HISTORICAL STATISTICS
OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 101; WITTE, supra note 70, at 85.
103. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 47, at 591; Brownlee, supra note 100, at 44.
104. Ultimately, the Wilson Administration financed WWI mainly with government
borrowing and lenient monetary policy. See CHARLES GILBERT, AMERICAN FINANCING OF
WORLD WAR I (1970); KENNEDY, supra note 92, at 98-106; Hugh T. Rockoff& Sung Woo
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borrowing, in turn, exposed more and more ordinary citizens to the importance of
capital assets and the tax treatment of those assets. In one sense, the wartime
popularization of capital markets simply accelerated a historical trend. Since the
turn of the century, when American industrial firms began to tap the capital
markets more aggressively and the institutional worlds of industrial manufacturing
and finance capital began to converge, the ownership of large corporate
organizations was becoming increasingly dispersed. 105 While legal scholars in
subsequent years would identify this trend towards dispersion in stock holdings as
one of the key contributing factors to the growing separation of corporate
ownership and control, 1' 6 "the quasi-public nature of industrial ownership in the
United States" also meant that more and more upper-class Americans were
becoming familiar with financial markets.
10 7
The World War I bond drives fundamentally hastened this historical trend.
Whereas the increase in stock ownership in the early twentieth century remained
isolated among the upper and middle-class, the wartime bond drives reached nearly
every strata of American society. Artfully dubbed as "Liberty Loans," many of
these below-market government securities were issued as part of a well-crafted
propaganda machine that convinced ordinary individuals that buying U.S. bonds
was part of one's patriotic and civic duty. These bonds were hardly sophisticated
financial instruments, yet they introduced millions of everyday Americans to the
operations of the growing capital markets. And in the process, they ushered in a
new "creditor class."' 08 With an American population increasingly aware of stocks
and bonds by 1918, Congress was surely cognizant of the need to address the tax
treatment of the exchange of securities related to corporate reorganizations.
As taxes increased and Americans became more familiar with capital assets, a
new boom in corporate mergers also heightened the need for the government to
clarify the proper tax treatment of such transactions. Companies continued to
rearrange their businesses by re-incorporating in Delaware and legally subdividing
Kang, Capitalizing Patriotism: The Liberty Loans of World War I (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. WI 1919, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=875678.
105. See WILLIAM G. Roy, SOCIALIZING CAPITAL: THE RISE OF THE LARGE INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATION IN AMERICA (1997) (discussing the institutional convergence of American
manufacturing and finance capital).
106. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932).
107. H.T. Warshow, The Distribution of Corporate Ownership in the United States, 39 Q.
J. ECoN. 15 (1924); see also LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY: How
FINANCE TRIUMPHED OVER INDUSTRY (2007); David Hochfelder, "Where the Common
People Could Speculate": The Ticker, Bucket Shops, and the Origins of Popular
Participation in Financial Markets, 1880-1920, 93 J. AMER. HIST. 335 (2006); Thomas R.
Navin, The Rise of a Market for Industrial Securities, 1887-1902, 29 Bus. HIST. REv. 105,
106 (1955).
108. As the financial historian James Grant has noted, "World War I marked a great
divide in American credit." Whereas "[t]he prewar population of bond-buying Americans
was estimated at only 350,000" by the end of the war "four million new members of the
creditor class" subscribed for several billion dollars worth of government bonds. JAMES
GRANT, MONEY OF THE MIND: BORROWING AND LENDING IN AMERICA FROM THE CIVIL WAR
TO MICHAEL MILKEN 145, 147 (1992).
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their organizational units, but the more notable consolidations during the war were
the mergers of several smaller businesses into large holding companies. In 1917,
alone, nearly 200 firms disappeared by merger, a figure that had been exceeded
most recently in 1905, the tail-end of the first great merger movement. 0 9 Indeed,
the creation of the $238 million Union Carbide and Carbon Corporation in the
summer of 1917-the largest merger since the consolidation of U.S. Steel in
1901-highlighted how the new wave of corporate reorganizations was not just
about the mere rearrangement of business assets, but increasingly about the
emergence of large-scale vertical business organizations.' 0 These corporate
consolidations were only the beginning of a trend that accelerated in the post-war
period.
The combination of increased tax rates, the growing popular awareness of
capital markets, and a renewed cycle of business mergers brought forth new and
increased scrutiny to the tax treatment of corporate consolidations. "When tax rates
are low you can muddle through without much respect for the finer equities,"
explained Thomas S. Adams, a leading Treasury Department economist."' "But
when the tax rates reach 75 and 80 per cent, the inherent complexities of income
taxation must be recognized, or taxpayers will be bankrupted by the tax."'"12
Taxpayers were well aware of this. According to BIR lawyer Randolph Paul,
"[T]he larger income tax rates and excess profits tax" of the wartime tax laws
"precipitated a flood of inquiries on the subject of corporate reorganizations" into
the BIR." 3 With top marginal tax rates reaching new highs, businesses combining
on a regular basis, citizens monitoring their investments, and the federal
government desperately searching for revenue, the need for some certainty
regarding the tax treatment of corporate consolidations became increasingly acute.
B. Treasury Department's Attempt at Coherency
Beginning in the winter of 1918, the Treasury Department set out to provide
some badly needed tax certainty by issuing Treasury Regulation 33.' 14 Aimed
mainly at the tax treatment of corporate dividends, this regulation also attempted to
resolve the BIR's position on the tax consequences of asset-for-stock readjustments
and mergers. Prior private letter rulings, as we have seen, determined that both
corporations and their individual shareholders had a tax liability when the old
corporation transferred its assets to the new corporation in exchange for securities
that had a combined par value in excess of the cost basis of the transferred assets." 5
109. See NELSON, supra note 66, at 35.
110. E.g., Big Chemical Merger, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1917, at 13; Big Merger
Completed, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 1917, at 7; see also ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR. & TAKASm
HIKINo, SCALE AND SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM 180 (1990).
111. Thomas S. Adams, The New Revenue Act, NATION, Mar. 1, 1919, at 316.
112. Id. at 317.
113. Paul, supra note 26, at 9.
114. Treas. Reg. 33 (revised), arts. 101, 118 (1918), 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 182, 187
(1918).
115. Nov. 10, 1917, Income Tax Service 1918, T 1309; March 19, 1918, Income Tax
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Treasury Regulation 33 did away with the outdated references to par value; it
simply stated that when a corporation sold its assets for stock of another
corporation, the taxable gain would be determined by the difference between the
cost basis of the assets and the "actual value at the time of the stock issued in
payment in such assets."" 1 6 Stock, it appeared, would be treated as the equivalent of
cash. This implied that individual shareholders engaged in a stock-for-stock
reorganization could also be taxed on the difference between the cost basis of their
initial shares and the fair market value of the shares received by the new
corporation.
Although Regulation 33 left many questions unanswered, it revealed how the
BIR was trying to use its institutional expertise to impose some rationality on the
ambiguous tax treatment of corporate reorganizations. By referring to past private
letter rulings, and the changing dynamics of corporate finance, the BIR eliminated
references to par value and appeared to be moving gradually toward a seemingly
coherent policy of treating stock as the equivalent of cash and thus taxing the gains
from the exchange of stock related to corporate reorganizations. While it is likely
that the BIR would have created some exceptions, by the summer of 1918, the
agency, according to Randolph Paul, was in the process of issuing an official
"Solicitor's law opinion," solidifying its policy of taxing such gains. But before the
BIR could act, Congress pre-empted its efforts and took up the issue as part of the
Revenue Act of 1918.1
7
The pre-1919 Treasury pronouncements provide an informative glimpse at an
institutional path that corporate reorganization tax law might have taken. If
Congress did not begin to provide statutory rules for these transactions, the
Treasury Department-together with the courts perhaps-could have molded a
systematic policy of taxing such corporate reorganizations. After all, BIR officials
did have a claim toward institutional competence, especially as compared to
Congress. With the enactment of numerous new revenue acts and rules during the
war, tax law was quickly becoming the vanguard of the proto-administrative state.
Leading the way was the BIR. As the agency became increasingly familiar with
complex corporate transactions, it also appeared to be more experienced at
developing sound, coherent, and flexible tax rules. It is certainly possible that the
"gossamer intricacy" of the modem corporate reorganization might have been
avoided, 18 or at least curtailed, if contemporaries were willing to allow the
Treasury Department to develop its policy of treating corporate reorganizations just
like any other sale of corporate assets or stock.
C. The 1918 Act and the Initial Reorganization Exception
Congress, however, did not appear to have much institutional confidence in the
Treasury Department. As the war in Europe raged on, national lawmakers turned
their attention to drafting a new tax bill in the summer of 1918. Because the
Service 1918, 3222.
116. Treas. Reg. 33 (revised), arts. 101, 118 (1918), 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 182, 187
(1918).
117. See Paul, supra note 26, at 9.
118. Id.
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legislative process stretched over six turbulent months, with final enactment
coming in February 1919, several political events and social and economic
circumstances affected the details of the new law, including the scope of the
reorganization exception. First and foremost, both the Armistice ending the war and
mid-term elections delivering Republicans control of Congress occurred in
November 1918, just as lawmakers were drafting the new revenue bill. Second,
once the war was over, social attitudes towards taxation changed dramatically, as
Americans became less tolerant of high taxes. Third, in the immediate wake of the
war, huge budget deficits haunted legislators at a time when taxpayers and industry
were trying to convert to a peacetime economy. These changing historical
conditions intruded on the tax legislative process, and they had an important impact
on how lawmakers framed and envisioned the meaning of the tax treatment of
corporate reorganizations.
Although the reorganization tax rule itself was a relatively minor part of the
more comprehensive 1918 Revenue Act, lawmakers carefully considered the merits
of the new provisions. In the end, they drafted a statute that was a peculiar
combination of previous Treasury pronouncements. On its face, the 1919 corporate
reorganization tax law appeared to be a rather formalistic and narrow exception to
the broad rule that all property exchanges would be taxable. Section 202(b) of the
law provided the general rule that, in exchanges of property, taxpayers would, "for
the purpose of determining gain or loss," treat the property received "as the
equivalent of cash to the amount of its fair market value, if any." The all-important
exception for corporate reorganizations was embedded within section 202(b):
[W]hen in connection with the reorganization, merger, or consolidation of a
corporation a person receives in place of stock or securities owned by him new
stock or securities of no greater aggregate par or face value, no gain or loss
shall be deemed to occur from the exchange, and the new stock or securities
received shall be treated as taking the place of the stock, securities, or property
exchanged."19
This exception essentially provided a tax-deferral benefit for those reorganizations
where the par values of the stock exchanged were equal. In those cases where the
total par values of the stock received exceeded the aggregate par value of the
transferred stock, "the amount of the excess in par or face value" was to be treated
"as a gain to the extent that the fair market value of the new stock or securities is
greater than the cost ... of the stock or securities exchanged."'120 The last phrase
created a ceiling on taxable gain, one that limited the gain to the lower of the
difference in par values or the difference between the market value of the shares
received and the cost basis of the shares exchanged.'
21
119. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, §202(b), 40 Stat. 1057, 1060 (1919).
120. Id.
121. A subsequent Treasury Decision confirmed the provision's ceiling on taxable gain.
Treas. Reg. § 45, art. 1569, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 396 (1919); see also ROBERT H.
MONTGOMERY, INCOME TAX PROCEDURE 366 (1920).
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There were many drawbacks to Congress's first, rather crude, attempt to
articulate the tax consequences of corporate reorganizations. Chief among them
was the reliance on par value as a first-order measure of gain or loss.'22 By 1919,
the BIR had already eschewed the use of par values. 123 Similarly, section 202(b)
explicitly addressed only stock for stock transactions, but the myriad of
reorganizations also included asset for stock transfers. Contemporary tax
commentators were rather critical of Congress's initial foray into the realm of
corporate reorganizations. Robert Montgomery, a leading tax attorney, accountant,
and Columbia Business School professor, observed at the time that "weird" section
202(b) "was the result of a compromise, and like most compromises in the
enactment of statutes the conflicting intentions of the legislators produced an
unsatisfactory effect."'124 Montgomery singled-out Congress's use of par values as
an ersatz measure of economic gain. Not only did differences in par value miss the
true economic gain resulting from the exchange of publicly-traded securities; a
large economic gain-as determined by the difference between the basis and the
market value of the sharestransferred-could be completely exempted, if the par
value of the shares were equal. Montgomery noted how one of the law's perhaps
unintended consequences was that it made the tax exception a type of elective
corporate dispensation. "Any reorganization can go through without making
anyone liable to the tax," wrote Montgomery, "if care is taken to keep down the par
value of the new securities."' 125 Although Congress would soon abandon the use of
par value,' 26 the essence of Montgomery's critique would be echoed decades later
by lawmakers and other tax experts.
27
D. The 1918 Legislative History and the "Purely Paper" Rationale
If contemporary tax experts like Montgomery were dissatisfied with Congress's
initial attempt to clarify the tax treatment of corporate consolidations, the
legislative history of the law provided little solace. The published congressional
reports suggest that lawmakers struggled over the parameters of the tax-deferral
benefit. While most legislators agreed in theory with the early Treasury rulings that
focused on the economic substance of these transactions, there was strong
disagreement about which types of corporate transactions deserved the benefit of
tax-deferral.
Some lawmakers believed that the main purpose of the new reorganization rule
was to permit and facilitate superficial changes in corporate structures, such as the
domiciliary reincorporations in Delaware that were dominant at the time.
According to this view, the main congressional intent behind Section 202(b) was,
as the Senate Finance Committee described it, "to negative the assertion of tax in
122. For a more detailed analysis of other drawbacks, see Mehrotra, supra note 26.
123. Treas. Reg. 33 (revised), arts. 101, 118 (1918), 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 182, 187
(1918).
124. MONTGOMERY, supra note 121, at 379.
125. Montgomery, supra note 53, at 128.
126. Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, § 202(b), 42 Stat. 227, 230 (1921).
127. See infra text accompanying note 220.
2008]
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
the case of certain purely paper transactions."'12 Though the Senate Report did not
elaborate on what constituted "purely paper transactions," the implication seemed
to be that these words were meant to describe the simplest of formal corporate
readjustments. Echoing some of the language found in earlier Treasury rulings, the
Senate Finance Committee seemed to be suggesting that the limited exception was
designed only for those transactions that involved the mere reshuffling of paper;
those changes in corporate form that did not trigger a substantive change in the
ownership of, or the underlying risks inherent in, the businesses involved in the
transaction. 129 To further this intent, the Senate Finance Committee attempted to
extend the tax-deferral benefit to transactions that led to the creation of a
corporation. The logic of exempting "purely paper" transactions surely applied, the
Finance Committee reasoned, to those exchanges where "a person receives in place
of property stock of a corporation formed to take over such property."' 13
Other lawmakers, however, disagreed. The Conference Committee, in fact, was
firmly opposed to extending this tax privilege. Members of the committee
explicitly rejected the Senate Finance Committee's attempt to broaden the scope of
the tax exception to include incorporation transactions. 131 The Conference
Committee did not provide a detailed explanation, yet the revisions indicated that
certain lawmakers, with mounting war debts perhaps in mind, viewed the exception
as a potentially generous tax benefit, and thus they sought to keep the exception as
narrowly confined as possible.
Beside revenue concerns, there also appeared to be a principled policy rationale
for limiting the exception. Though lawmakers did not articulate this justification,
analysts like Montgomery did. For this acute observer of tax law, non-recognition
treatment was appropriate for those transactions where the ownership or investment
risk in the underlying business remained the same. In support of the Finance
Committee's position, Montgomery explained that "When the shares received in
exchange cover the same, or substantially the same, property as was covered by the
property or shares exchanged there is a continuing interest which should not be
taxed." He added that,
It may be, however, that the new shares represent the ownership of radically
different assets so that the old owner, instead of continuing his interest, in fact
sells out and acquires an interest in a different concern. In the latter case the
transaction should be referred to as a sale and not as a reorganization.' 32
Montgomery's analysis did not address why Congress excluded incorporation
transactions, but it did provide a rational explanation for why certain
reorganizations ought to be taxed.
128. S. REP. No. 65-617, at 5 (1918).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 5-6.
131. See H.R. REP. No. 65-1037, at 44-5 (1918). Incorporation transactions are currently
granted non-recognition treatment. See I.R.C. § 351 (2007).
132. Montgomery, supra note 53, at 131.
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Montgomery's substantive economic analysis intimated that the limited
exception was intended to draw a stark distinction between different types of
transactions based on the underlying, specific risk inherent in the investments. The
domiciliary and regulatory reincorporations that were popular at the time, one could
presume from Montgomery's comments, were the quintessential transactions where
"there is a continuing interest which should not be taxed."'133 Large-scale vertical
corporate combinations, by contrast, were more akin to transactions where "the
new shares represent the ownership of radically different assets," and thus "should
be referred to as a sale."'
' 34
E. Other Explanations for the Reorganization Exception
If Montgomery was able to discern a principled policy rationale behind the new,
limited reorganization exception, some lawmakers, by contrast, saw only the
reflection of partisan politics and class interests. With Republicans controlling
Congress and a post-war anti-tax backlash emerging in early 1919, legislators who
supported the radically redistributive edge of wartime taxes-with the hopes of
making such laws permanent after the war-were put on the defensive. As a
barrage of letters, telegrams, and petitions from business leaders requesting tax
relief flooded congressional offices, proponents of progressive taxes feared that the
1919 law was the beginning of the end.
135
Senator La Follette, one of the pivotal members of the wartime political
coalition, railed against the new law. He identified the tenor of the act as an assault
on progressive reform, and its specific reorganization exception as an unnecessary
indulgence to the elite owners and managers of large corporations. In criticizing the
provision on the Senate floor, La Follette described the reorganization preference as
a "cushion to ease off' other taxes.136 He claimed that because of "this cushion in
the bill" and many other "relief measures," the proposed legislation would
undermine the steeply graduated rate structure of wartime tax policy. "The basis of
all income-tax laws of the United States has been to tax large incomes at a higher
rate than smaller incomes," La Follette reminded his Senate colleagues.'37 This
fundamental principle of progressivity was put at risk by "the relief provisions in
this bill," which "change this basis and tax large incomes and enormous profits at
the same rate as are taxed small incomes and small profits." 13 La Follette feared,
moreover, that such "cushions" were the thin edge of the corporate welfare wedge.
He specifically identified the tax preference for corporate reorganizations as among
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See generally W. Elliot Brownlee, Social Investigation and Political Learning in the
Financing of World War I, in THE STATE AND SOCIAL INVESTIGATION IN THE UNrrED STATES
AND BRITAIN 323-364 (Mary 0. Furner & Michael J. Lacey eds., 1993).
136. 57 CONG. REc. 828-29 (1918) (statement of Sen. La Follette).
137. Id.
138. Id.
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the "provisions which open the door wide for corporations to escape their just
taxes."'
139
While La Follette and other progressive leaders criticized what they saw as the
capacious "cushion" provided by the new reorganization exception, Republican
leaders were forced to explain to their constituents why the measure was not
broader. With peace talks on the horizon, and the national deficit nearing historic
proportions, Republican leaders were attempting to walk a fine line between
searching for tax revenue to repay the war debts, and providing taxpayers, who
endured the sacrifices of the wartime tax system, with some relief at the conclusion
of the conflict.
Consequently, some lawmakers justified the limited scope of the reorganization
statute as an expedient response to revenue concerns. When Joseph Fordney (R-
MI), the new Chair of the House Ways & Means Committee, responded to taxpayer
inquiries as to why the 1919 reorganization law did not include incorporation
transactions, he spotlighted the growing federal deficit. In May 1919, Fordney
received such a letter from the president of an Oklahoma oil and gas company.
Although the taxpayer embraced the new reorganization law as a first step towards
not "taxing, as income, imaginary profits indicated by a mere change in form of
ownership of property," he complained that the final version of the exception was
too narrow.14 0 The taxpayer contended that by omitting incorporation transactions
Congress missed an opportunity to use tax law to spur economic growth. When a
business owner incorporated his sole proprietorship into a corporation, the taxpayer
explained, the owner not only continued his initial investment in a slightly different
form, but he was also now about to grow his business and put his capital to more
productive use. Incorporation would "convert dormant property into industry;" it
would "provide labor for idle men . . .buy machinery, thus providing labor for
other idle men, and incidentally," it would make the newly created corporation,
with its increased earnings, "a good customer of the Internal Revenue
Department."' 4' The release of such entrepreneurial energy through the tax laws,
the taxpayer concluded, should be "protected-not penalized.' 42
This subsidy argument fell on deaf ears. Fordney, concerned more about the
rising deficit than about spurring economic growth, agreed with the taxpayer that
there are "many things in the Revenue Act that I do not like." But he explained "the
expenses of the coming year will be very heavy and how to meet expenditures is
quite a proposition."'143 Fiscal discipline appeared more important to Fordney than
139. Id.
140. Letter from R.W. Hart, President, Stebbins Oil & Gas Co., to Hon. Joseph W.
Fordney (May 23, 1919), RG 233 Records of the U.S. House of Representatives, 66th
Congress Committee Papers, Committee on the Ways & Means, (HR 66A - F38.2)
"Taxation of Corporation Stocks and Bonds," Box 536, National Archives and Record
Administration, Washington, D.C. [hereinafter NARA I] (on file with archive).
141. Id.
142. Id. (emphasis in the original).
143. Letter from Hon. Joseph W. Fordney to R. W. Hart, President, Stebbins Oil & Gas
Co. (May 27, 1919), RG 233 Records of the U.S. House of Representatives, 66th Congress
Committee Papers, Committee on the Ways & Means, (HR 66A - F38.2) "Taxation of
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stimulating economic growth. All that would change, however, in the coming year
or so, when the American economy began to sputter, and calls for using tax laws as
subsidies for corporate growth would soon become more common-and more
persuasive.
IV. THE 1920s AND THE EARLY LIBERALIZATION OF THE REORGANIZATION
PROVISIONS
During the post-World War I decade, the initially narrow and formalistic
reorganization exception began to expand gradually in response to changing social,
political, and economic conditions, as well as to the growing power of special
interests. Reacting to fundamental changes ushered in by the war, government
officials engaged in a purposeful, though incremental, process of addressing the
ambiguities in the initial version of the law. In the early 1920s, the increasing
national political power of pro-business Republicans, the growing social backlash
against wartime taxes, and congressional concerns over federal revenue continued
to exert pressure on the policy-making process, just as they had during the initial
1919 enactment of the law. But the legacy of the war, especially the creation of a
more corporatist political economy, also profoundly shaped the economic interests
that were fast becoming wedded to tax preferences like the reorganization rule.
Amid these changes, Congress revised the tax law twice during the first half of the
1920s: first in 1921, and then again three years later after the courts began to
intervene in reorganization tax law. '
The expansion of the reorganization tax provisions reflected a broader structural
shift that was occurring in American law and political economy. Reprising a debate
that occurred in the realm of antitrust policy only a decade earlier,145 lawmakers
and political activists in the 1920s used the reorganization rule to reconsider the
larger role of the state in the post-war economy. Some old-guard laissez-faire
advocates continued to argue that because the original reorganization exception was
meant to remove tax frictions from ordinary corporate restructurings, the federal
government had an obligation not to interfere in such simple, straightforward
corporate transactions. When the courts began to question this tax benefit, these
laissez-faire proponents extended their logic to contend that even more complex
corporate mergers and acquisitions deserved tax-favored treatment because they
were "ordinary business transactions."1 46
Other proponents of the reorganization exception, by contrast, defended the tax
benefit as a necessary part of the emergence of a more statist political economy.
Pointing to the initial post-war economic slump and the success of corporatist
cooperation between government and business during the war, commercial interests
Corporation Stocks and Bonds," Box 536, NARA I (on file with archive).
144. For a more complete analysis of the 1920s, see Mehrotra, supra note 26. Portions of
this Part have been drawn from that earlier work.
145. See generally RUDOLPH J.R. PERrrZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA, 1888-1992:
HISTORY, RHETORIC, LAW 38-58 (1996); MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE
RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1890-1916: THE MARKET, THE LAW, AND
POLITICS 179-332 (1988).
146. See infra note 227.
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frequently argued that the state had a responsibility to encourage businesses to
engage in productive corporate consolidations. In promoting a uniquely American
form of state capitalism, or corporate liberalism,147 these supporters of the
provision argued that the government had an important part to play in channeling
resources and providing political and economic stability. Some forward-looking tax
officials, similarly, welcomed an expansive reorganization rule on the theory that a
more comprehensive and detailed reorganization tax law would reduce uncertainty
and hence provide rational, profit-maximizing businesses and investors with a more
stable, consistent, and predictable legal environment.
As government officials and business interests coalesced around the
instrumental use of tax laws to provide greater commercial stability, more and more
taxpayers became attached to the benefits that were being doled out by Congress.
Lawmakers, likewise, soon learned that they wielded a great deal of power in
carving out pockets of tax privileges through the creation of crucial tax benefits, or
what modem scholars would refer to as "tax expenditures."' 48 Over time, the
mutually reinforcing reliance between political interests and the lawmakers who
served them would insure the continued existence of this reorganization tax rule.
A. The Context of Postwar American Political Economy
The continued political dominance of national Republicans, a sharp but limited
postwar recession, and the unleashing of anti-tax business lobbying all contributed
to the initial expansion of the reorganization exception. Republicans not only
controlled both houses of Congress throughout the 1920s, but Warren Harding's
1920 presidential election marked the beginning of a succession of Republicans
occupying the White House all through the decade. The national ascendancy of the
Republican party led to the commencement of a striking political and economic
147. On corporate liberalism, see generally JEFFREY R. LUSTIG, CORPORATE LIBERALISM:
THE ORIGINS OF MODERN AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORY, 1880-1920 (1982); SKLAR, supra
note 145, at 1-40; JAMES WEINSTEIN, THE CORPORATE IDEAL IN THE LIBERAL STATE, 1900-
1918 (1968).
148. The term "tax expenditures" is generally associated with work of Stanley Surrey.
STANLEY SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES (1973).
Ronald King has shown how Republican politicians of the 1920s were among the first to use
this power to create "hegemonic tax logic." RONALD KING, MONEY, TIME & POLITICS:
INVESTMENT TAX SUBSIDIES AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1993); see also BROWNLEE, supra
note 30, at 60. For more on the role of interest-group politics in the making of American tax
law, see generally JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCi
GULCH: LAWYERS, LOBBYISTS AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM (1987); WITTE,
supra note 70; JULIAN E. ZELIZER, TAXING AMERICA: WILBUR D. MILLS, CONGRESS AND THE
STATE, 1945-75 (1998); Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study
of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REv.
1 (1990). On how lawmakers have benefited in recent history fiom the role of special
interests in the tax legislative process, see generally Richard L. Doemberg & Fred S.
McChesney, Doing Good or Doing Well?: Congress and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 62
N.Y.U. L. REv. 891 (1987); Edward J. McCaffery & Linda R. Cohen, Shakedown at Gucci
Gulch: The New Logic of Collective Action, 84 N.C. L. REv. 1159 (2006).
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retrenchment process.149 Known as a party of social conservatism and free market
economics, the Republicans led by Harding began almost immediately to repudiate
Wilson's domestic and foreign policies. Harding's successors--Calvin Coolidge in
1924 and Herbert Hoover in 1928--continued the cutbacks, rhetorically embracing
the return to limited government at a time when the national economy was
exhibiting spectacular, though uneven, prosperity.'Is
The concurrent retrenchment of fiscal policy was guided by Andrew W. Mellon,
the Pittsburgh Steel magnate, who was Secretary of the Treasury during all three
Republican administrations.' 5' Mellon and his treasury associates, particularly the
former Wall Street lawyers S. Parker Gilbert and Garrard B. Winston, focused on
dismantling the redistributive edge of the wartime tax system-much to the
pleasure of the business community. Although some scholars have long lionized
Mellon as a libertarian promoter of supply-side economics, 5 2 the industrialist
turned statesman was not a myopic tax-cutter. Rather, Mellon was a prototypical
corporate liberal-an enlightened capitalist who realized that an active federal
government that provided a stable and predictable political environment could do
as much for commercial interests as any laissez-faire state. In fact, Mellon may
have done as much to save the progressive income tax as he did to level the
graduated rate structure.
53
The postwar Republican ascendancy coincided with a sharp but short economic
slump. The challenges of converting wartime resources to a peacetime economy
brought forth a slowdown in productivity, which was exacerbated by the
commitments to cut government spending and tighten monetary policy. The
national economy soon began to rebound by 1922, but the brief recession provided
149. See generally DAVID J. GOLDBERG, DISCONTENTED AMERICA: THE UNITED STATES IN
THE 1920s (1999); JOHN HICKS, THE REPUBLICAN ASCENDANCY, 1921-1933 (1960).
150. See generally GOLDBERG, supra note 149; ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE GREAT WAR AND
THE SEARCH FOR A MODERN ORDER: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND THEIR
INSTITUTIONS, 1917-1933 (1979); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE PERILS OF PROSPERITY
(1958).
151. JULES ABELS, IN THE TIME OF SILENT CAL 215 (1969); STEVEN R. WEISMAN, THE
GREAT TAX WARS: LINCOLN-TEDDY ROOSEVELT-WILSON: How THE INCOME TAX
TRANSFORMED AMERICA 351 (2004). So dominant was Mellon's reign as Secretary of the
Treasury that one contemporary quipped that "three presidents served under him." Id. For
more on Mellon, see generally DAVID CANNADINE, MELLON: AN AMERICAN LIFE (2006).
152. Gene Smiley & Richard H. Keehn, Federal Personal Income Tax Policy in the
1920s, 55 J. ECON. HIST. 285-303 (1995); Veronique de Rugy, Tax Rates and Tax Revenue,
The Mellon Income Tax Cuts of the 1920s, 13 TAx & BUDGET BULL. 1 (2003), available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/tbb/tbb-0302-13.pdf.
153. See BROWNLEE, supra note 30, at 61; Lawrence L. Murray, Bureaucracy and Bi-
Partisanship in Taxation: The Mellon Plan Revisited, 52 Bus. HIST. REV. 200 (1978); Joseph
J. Thomdike, The Republican Roots of New Deal Tax Policy, 100 TAX NOTES 1201, 1203
(2003). See generally Anne L. Alstott & Benjamin Novick, War, Taxes, and Income
Redistribution in the Twenties: The 1924 Veterans' Bonus and the Defeat of the Mellon
Plan, 59 TAx L. REV. 373 (2006); M. Susan Murname, Selling Scientific Tagc ation: The
Treasury Department's Campaign for Tax Reform in the 1920s, 29 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 819
(2004).
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business owners and Republican lawmakers with an important opportunity to
bolster their calls for tax reduction as an economic stimulus.'
4
These political and economic conditions created a receptive environment for tax
cuts. Whereas wartime patriotism muffled business displeasure over the high tax
rates and exceptional levies, the end of the conflict brought a barrage of strident
protest, as taxpayers inundated national leaders with demands for tax relief. 55
Despite some focused opposition to tax reduction by organized labor and agrarian
associations, 156 the early 1920s witnessed a harsh social backlash against the
numerous taxes of the wartime revenue laws-a backlash led by prominent
Republican business leaders. As one Republican banker reminded President
Harding and his Treasury colleagues, the future success of the Republican Party
rested on "deal[ing] effectively with our tax laws ... , perhaps particularly with
regard to two points: first, the necessity for the repeal of the excess profits tax and
second, the very considerable reduction of the high surtaxes."'5
B. An Early Judicial Influence: Macomber and the Inchoate Nature of Tax Law
If the national ascendancy of the Republican Party, the downturn in the
economy, and the anti-tax backlash provided Congress with an impetus for tax
relief, Supreme Court rulings at the time only seemed to intensify the need for
legislative action. The taxpayer and congressional responses to these judicial
interventions illustrate how the reorganization rules were molded by the
institutional interactions among the courts, Congress, and society. Of the Supreme
Court cases that indirectly shaped the development of the reorganization
provisions, one of the earliest and most important was Eisner v. Macomber.
158
154. See generally WILLIAM. J. BARBER, FROM NEW ERA TO NEW DEAL: HERBERT
HOOVER, THE ECONOMISTS, AND AMERICAN ECONOMY POLICY, 1921-1933 (1985); MILTON
FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES,
1867-1960, at 230-39 (1963).
155. BROWNLEE, supra note 30, at 73-75.
156. Letter from John J. Quinlivan, Toledo Central Labor Union, to Rep. William W.
Chalmers (Apr. 29, 1921); Letter from J.R. Howard, Am. Farm Bureau Fed'n, to House
Ways & Means Comm. (Aug. 16 1921), RG 233, Records of the U.S. House of
Representatives, 67th Congress, Petitions & Memorials, Committee on Ways & Means
(HR67A - H23.5) Internal Revenue, Box 503, NARA I (copies on file with author).
157. Letter from James G. Cutler, President, Lincoln-Alliance Bank, Rochester, NY, to
President Warren G. Harding (July 30, 1921); RG 56, General Records of the Dept. of the
Treas., Correspondence of the Office of the Sec. of the Treas., Central Files of the Office of
the Sec. of the Treas, 1917-1932, Folder, "Tax-Corporations, 1917-1926," Box 178, Entry
191, NARA II (copy on file with author). The Boston Chamber of Commerce echoed this
sentiment by circulating a survey of its members, which concluded that businesses
overwhelmingly favored the abolition of the excess profits tax and a reduction of the high
marginal rates. Letter from James A. McKibben, Sec'y, Boston Chamber of Commerce, to
Hon. James A. Gallivan, (Apr. 7, 1921), RG 233, Records of the U.S. House of
Representatives, 67th Congress, Petitions & Memorials, Committee on Ways & Means
(HR67A - H23.5) Internal Revenue, Box 504, NARA I (copy on file with author).
158. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
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Decided in 1920, Macomber addressed whether a pro rata stock dividend issued
by Standard Oil to a shareholder was taxable. In striking down the taxation of stock
dividends, a 5-4 majority of the court relied on the distinction between what
contemporaries referred to as "continuing" and "closed" transactions in drawing a
line between taxable income and non-taxable capital. "Continuing" transactions
were those where the economic substance or market risk of an investment remained
intact, while "closed" transactions were those where investors had liquidated their
risk by cashing in their investment. The court held that stock dividends issued by a
corporation were not taxable income to shareholders because they were not gains
severed from capital. The new stock represented a continuing interest in the
business enterprise. Justice Pitney wrote on behalf of the majority:
The essential and controlling fact is that the stockholder has received nothing
out of the company's assets for his separate use and benefit; on the contrary,
every dollar of his original investment, together with whatever accretions and
accumulations have resulted from employment of his money and that of the
other stockholders in the business of the company, still remains the property of
the company, and subject to business risks which may result in wiping out the
entire investment. 15
9
Justices Holmes and Brandeis separately dissented in Macomber. Holmes's curt
opinion simply stated that as a constitutional matter, the capacious language of the
Sixteenth Amendment was meant to provide Congress with the broad power to tax
gains, including those in the form of stock dividends. 60 Brandeis's dissent was
neither as short nor as straightforward. He agreed with Holmes in interpreting the
scope of the Sixteenth Amendment broadly, but he explicitly criticized the concept
of realization embodied in the majority opinion. Brandeis also analyzed the stock
dividend in terms of its economic substance, concluding that the pro rata stock
dividend issued by Standard Oil was equivalent to a distribution of a cash dividend
combined with an option to purchase additional lower-priced shares.' 6'
As modem scholars have demonstrated, Macomber not only established the
realization principle into American tax law, but it also illustrated how the
realization concept itself was an administrative compromise between competing
economic theories of taxation. 62 This compromise may also explain the origins of
the reorganization rules.' 63 But Macomber is significant for other reasons. The
dissenting opinions in the case, particularly the one filed by Justice Brandeis,
164
159. Id. at211.
160. "The known purpose" of the Sixteenth Amendment, wrote Holmes, "was to get rid
of nice questions as to what might be direct taxes, and I cannot doubt that most people not
lawyers would suppose when they voted for it that they put a question like the present to
rest." Id. at 220 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 220-21 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
162. Majorie E. Kornhauser, The Story of Macomber: The Continuing Legacy of
Realization, in TAX SToRIEs: AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT TEN LEADING FEDERAL INCOME TAX
CASES 53, 64-65 (Paul L. Caron ed., 2003).
163. Bank, supra note 26, at 61-62.
164. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 220-38. In deferring to Congress, Brandeis wrote,
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foreshadowed how the Court would be divided over the analysis of corporate
reorganizations. 65 And perhaps more importantly, Macomber symbolized the
fluidity and uncertainty surrounding many aspects of the income tax at the time.
The taxation of capital gains, property exchanges, and corporate reorganizations
were all matters that were less than certain.
66
Although Macomber did not directly address the tax treatment of corporate
reorganizations, the decision was an important precursor to future judicial
pronouncements. The corporate readjustments that took place during the 1910s-
the domiciliary reincorporation of single enterprises in Delaware and the
subdivision of oil company assets-would eventually come before the Court,
forcing the justices to reflect back on Macomber and grapple with the income tax
treatment of these corporate rearrangements. But before these controversial cases
came to light, Congress was attempting to clarify some of the ambiguities it had
created in the initial 1919 law.
C. Clarifying Ambiguities While Expanding the Exception-The 1921 Revenue Act
With taxpayers clamoring for tax relief, President Harding urged Congress in
the spring of 1921 to begin drafting a new revenue bill. 167 Though lowering tax
rates was the main concern, lawmakers also focused on clarifying the ambiguities
inherent in the initial version of the reorganization exception. The Macomber
decision and a set of early BIR interpretations of the 1919 law seemed to create
greater uncertainty, 16 compelling lawmakers to design a more comprehensive law.
In attempting to clarify ambiguities, Congress began the process of liberalizing
the reorganization provisions. Some legislators believed that the reorganization
exception ought to be modified to prevent taxpayers from exploiting technical
ambiguities to shelter income.' 69 Others wondered whether changes to the statutory
definition of "reorganizations" might implicate important corporate governance
issues. 170 But the overwhelming desire among lawmakers, tax experts, and business
leaders was for the greater rationalization of the reorganization rules. Clarifying the
provisions' existing ambiguities could provide greater tax certainty and stability,
creating conditions that could stimulate an economy mired in a postwar recession.
Like the other rationales, the call for greater tax certainty eschewed principled
"Congress possesses the power which it exercised to make dividends representing profits,
taxable as income, whether the medium in which the dividend is paid be cash or stock, and
that it may define, as it has done, what dividends representing profits shall be deemed
income." Id. at 237-38 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
165. See Posin, supra note 39, at 1342-43.
166. Komhauser, supra note 162 at 60-61.
167. Tells Congress of Policy, N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 13, 1921, at 1; see also BLAKEY &
BLAKEY, supra note 47, at 200; Congress Task Vast, WAsH. PosT, Apr. 11, 1921, at 1.
168. The BIR attempted unsuccessfully to address the use of no-par stock in
reorganizations and the definition of eligible transactions. Montgomery, supra note 53, at
130.
169. See infra notes 213-215.
170. See infra notes 216-218. On the links between the rights of minority shareholders
and the revised reorganization rule, see Mehrotra, supra note 26. For more on how these tax
rules addressed corporate governance issues more generally, see Bank, supra note 40.
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policy reasons for granting the benefit only to "purely paper" transactions. Instead,
lawmakers focused on economic productivity. They used tax policy instrumentally
to justify changes to the law as a badly needed business stimulus.
As early as 1920, taxpayers began to notify congressional leaders about the
practical limits and economic consequences of the 1919 reorganization exception.
Echoing comments that were made earlier by small business owners, taxpayers
underscored the limits of the existing tax benefit. In writing to Ways & Means
Chairman Fordney, the owners of a privately held Philadelphia tool-making
company complained in May 1920 about how the law was "hampering the efficient
conduct of business" by "holding up expansion or reorganization which would
bring about increased and more efficient production." 171 The taxpayers also
emphasized the liquidity concerns that affected privately-owned corporations that
were considering a reorganization. Because the 1919 law taxed the gain derived
from the difference between the aggregate par values of the swapped shares, a
taxpayer who owned a closely-held corporation was put at a distinct disadvantage.
"To raise [the] money" to pay the tax, "he would have to sell the new stock he
receive[d], for which there is no market," the Philadelphia business owners
informed Fordney. "Consequently, the sale can not be effected. If it were effected it
would result in the more efficient and energetic conduct of the business." 
172
Tax experts corroborated that the existing reorganization rules were restraining
economically beneficial transactions. In his 1921 testimony before the Senate
Finance Committee, the Treasury economist T.S. Adams outlined the many
drawbacks of the 1921 law, including the enormous administrative burdens placed
on the BIR.173 In addition, Adams highlighted how the "principal defect of the
present law" was that it blocked "desirable business adjustments." At a time when
the national economy was desperately seeking industrial readjustments, Adams
rhetorically asked: "The reorganization itself may be a good, legitimate and
desirable thing. Why tax it at that time?"1 74 Others familiar with the corporate
merger market concurred with Adams's assessment. New York corporate attorney
Fredrick B. Kellogg explained to lawmakers how the high marginal rates and the
confusion surrounding the taxation of reorganizations were responsible for killing
"millions of dollars of proposed transactions." 175 Consequently, Kellogg reasoned,
the tax law "remains a statute in restraint of trade or in restraint of alienation at any
171. Letter from Fayette R. Plumb to Hon. Joseph W. Fordney (May 25, 1920), RG 233,
Records of the U.S. House of Rep., 66th Cong. Committee Papers, Committee on Ways &
Means (HR 66A - F38.2) "Taxation of Corporation Stocks and Bonds," Box 536. NARA I
(on file with archive).
172. Id.
173. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 47, at 194.
174. An Act to Reduce and Equalize Taxation, to Amend and Simplify the Revenue Act of
1918, and for Other Purposes: Hearings on H.R. 8245 Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 67th
Cong. 29 (1921).
175. Revenue Revision: Hearings Before the Committee on Ways and Means House of
Representatives, 67th Cong. 128 (1921) (statement of Mr. Frederick R. Kellogg, New York
City).
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rate, and is not a tax statute at all, because the transaction does not exist in a great
many cases where it ought to exist.,
176
Reflecting on the initial justifications for the reorganization provision, some
lawmakers resisted this instrumental use of tax policy.177 But this resistance proved
futile. The calls for tax relief and the demands for the routinization of measures that
could provide greater legal predictability ultimately shaped the final version of the
1921 law. Indeed, taken as a whole, the 1921 Revenue Act signaled the start of
Republican attempts to roll back redistributive taxation. The new law significantly
lowered top marginal rates, raised exemption levels taxing even fewer wealthy
citizens, eliminated the excess-profits tax, and codified the holding in Macomber
(excluding stock dividends from taxation). It also included several new tax benefits
for investors and businesses, including a tax preference for capital gains, the tax-
deferral of like-kind exchanges of investment property, and generous allowances
for depreciation. 178 The incessant calls for tax relief and the scope of the granted
benefits led Congressman Cordell Hull, one of the principal architects of the
progressive income tax, to complain that "large income taxpayers," were trying "to
wipe out all graduated income taxation."' 1
79
With pro-business Republicans controlling Congress, it is not surprising that the
reorganization exception was broadened as part of the 1921 Revenue Act. Passed
along partisan lines, with most Democrats and progressive Republicans opposing
the bill, the new law expanded the reorganization preference in three principal
ways. First, it provided a broad and more comprehensive description of eligible
reorganizations that included asset-for-stock as well as stock-for-stock transactions,
thus, placating those who believed the more restrictive benefit restrained legitimate
transactions. Second, the law included incorporation transactions, thereby
assuaging the concerns of those taxpayers and lawmakers who believed these
transactions could stimulate business creation and greater economic activity. Third,
and perhaps most importantly, the 1921 provisions eliminated the obsolete use of
par values to determine gain or loss from a reorganization. This last modification
not only updated reorganization law, it also clarified a nagging ambiguity, recently
exacerbated by Treasury rulings, about the treatment of no-par value stock.180
Many commentators enthusiastically embraced the 1921 law. Newspapers
reported it as a compromise between lawmakers that was "generous and
welcome."' 81 Arthur A. Ballantine, a leading tax attorney and former wartime
Treasury official, noted how propitious the new law was for business. "Changes in
corporate form, frequently necessary for the most vigorous development of
176. Id. at 131.
177. For more on this resistance, see Mehrotra, supra note 26, at 67-68.
178. Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, § 202(b), 42 Stat. 227, 233 (1921).
179. 61 CONG. REc. 6563-64 (1921). Hull's alarm may have overstated the case, for the
new law also contained an increase in corporate tax rates, illustrating Mellon's commitment
to balanced budgets.
180. Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, § 202(b), 42 Stat. 227, 233 (1921).
181. Lower Taxes, WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 1921, at 6. See generally To Pass Tax Bill
Today and Adjourn, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1921, at 15; Federal Tax Legislation During Past
Year, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 1922, at 12.
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industry, are now clearly free from penalizing tax," wrote Ballantine in a 1922 New
York Times article. The new law, Ballantine concluded, was "a great step."'
8 2
Some tax experts were more wary of the expanded tax benefit. George E.
Holmes, the New York lawyer and treatise writer, labeled the expanded exception
"recognizedly too liberal."' 8 3 Revising his earlier analysis of the initial provision, 14
Robert Montgomery once again explored the substantive changes in ownership and
investment risk that accompanied certain transactions. This time he focused on the
type of consideration used in a transaction to determine whether it should be treated
as a tax-deferred reorganization or a taxable sale. "If the shares received [in a
reorganization] are those of a corporation for whose securities there is a broad
market," Montgomery explained, "and the securities received can readily be
disposed of without affecting the market, I see no objection to holding that the
equivalent of cash has been received.' ' 8 5 Administrative concerns about liquidity
and valuation were, for Montgomery, insignificant obstacles given appropriate
market conditions.
Montgomery's analysis connoted a logical normative conclusion. When target
shareholders in a reorganization received as consideration shares that were "the
equivalent of cash," they had fundamentally altered the risk profile of their
investment. 8 6 If those target shareholders happened to be the owners of a closely-
held private company, Montgomery seemed to imply, then they would have surely
"cashed in" their investment by exchanging their closely-held corporate property
for highly liquid, marketable securities. Montgomery's suggestion could have led
to a plausible policy proposal. One could certainly envision a rule along
Montgomery's line of analysis-a rule that extended the tax benefit only to
taxpayers who received privately held stock as consideration for their shares. Over
time, lawmakers would consider several amendments to the reorganization rule, but
this recommendation was given short shrift, though it would be raised again by
other policymakers and commentators.1
8 7
D. Judicial Intervention into Reorganization Law: From Phellis to Marr
Any comfort that taxpayers and legal professionals may have found in the 1921
revisions was soon disrupted. Just days before Congress passed the 1921 law, the
Supreme Court handed down a set of reorganization tax decisions that only seemed
to muddy the legal waters.188 In two cases that examined the popular corporate
182. Arthur A. Ballantine, Light on New Revenue Law, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 11, 1921, at
100.
183. GEORGE E. HOLMES, FEDERAL INCOME TAX, 656 (1925).
184. See supra text accompanying note 134.
185. Montgomery, supra note 53, at 131.
186. More technically, Montgomery's use of "the equivalent of cash" phrase gestured
towards the conclusion that such a transaction should fit Section 202's general presumption
that property exchanges were taxable. Id.
187. Hellerstein, supra note 26, at 284; Surrey, supra note 52.
188. Previous scholarship has mistakenly assumed that the 1921 Supreme Court
reorganization cases influenced the 1918 and 1921 revenue acts. While Steve Bank and
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readjustments of the teens, namely the domiciliary reincorporations to Delaware
and the subdivision of oil companies, the Court ruled that these transactions were
taxable. Because these cases interpreted the reorganization rules prior to the
enactment of the 1919 and 1921 laws, they demonstrated, as Randolph Paul noted,
the hazy and tangled alternative path that the common law treatment of
reorganizations might have taken had Congress not intervened.' 89 Indeed, between
1921 and 1925, the Court decided several similar cases with varying results,
suggesting that the Court's reorganization jurisprudence was less than coherent.
The first 1921 case, United States v. Phellis, addressed the DuPont Company's
relocation from New Jersey to Delaware. 19° DuPont had executed this transaction
by transferring assets from its New Jersey company to a newly created Delaware
corporation; in exchange, the New Jersey enterprise received shares of the new
Delaware corporation, which it subsequently distributed to the stockholders of the
old New Jersey corporation. Examining the case under the precedent established by
Macomber, which held that stock dividends were not taxable, the Court ruled that
DuPont's reincorporation was distinguishable from the facts in Macomber. In
substance, the Court acknowledged, the fair market value of the DuPont
stockholders' investments remained intact; they received shares in the new
Delaware company that had a fair market value equal to the value of their shares in
the New Jersey corporation. But because the shareholders received, as a stock
dividend, shares of another corporation located in a different state with different
legal rights, the majority held that this transaction was taxable.' 91 Not surprisingly,
the dissenting Justices led by Justice James C. McReynolds, one of the most
forceful advocates of laissez-faire constitutionalism, were astonished by the Court's
seemingly inconsistent application of Macomber.1
92
The second case, decided on the same day as Phellis, addressed the spin-off of
oil company assets into separate corporate entities. In Rockefeller v. US.,' 93 the
Court consolidated two similar transactions in which oil companies, responding to
regulatory pressures, created two formally distinct corporations within the same
state by transferring pipeline assets to a new corporation in exchange for the stock
of the new corporation. This subdivision, or spin-off transaction, as we have seen,
was relatively common during the preceding decade. In the end, the stockholders of
the oil companies retained, in the aggregate, the economic substance and ownership
risks of their original investments. They went from being owners of one company
Randolph Paul have corrected this chronological oversight, they have underestimated the
extent to which the 1921 cases affected the future development of the 1924 revisions to the
reorganization rules. See Bank, supra note 26, at 22-27; Paul, supra note 26, at 9-10.
189. This line of case law, according to Paul, also illustrated what Congress did
accomplish, and "the difficulty of the job Congress attempted when it decided to draw an
objective line across the unchartered area of reorganization law." Paul, supra note 26, at 10.
190. 257 U.S. 156 (1921).
191. Id. at 175.
192. Id. at 175-76. For more on the laissez-faire constitutionalism of this time period, see
generally BARRY CusHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTrrUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT
REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1995).
193. 257 U.S. 176 (1921).
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that held oil production and transportation assets to the owners of two distinct
corporate enterprises that held the same total assets.
The Court agreed in Rockefeller that the value of the stockholders' investments
remained intact. Still, the Court held that these property exchanges were taxable.
Using language reminiscent of Macomber, Justice Pitney, writing for the majority,
held that the stock distribution "constituted in the case of each individual a gain in
the form of actual exchangeable assets transferred to him from the oil company for
his separate use in partial realization of his former indivisible and contingent
interest in the corporate surplus."1 94 Unlike the domiciliary relocations in Phellis,
Pitney seemed to suggest, the division of assets in Rockefeller diversified the
investment holdings of the oil company owners. By holding shares in two separate
corporate entities after the spin-off, stockholders in these transactions ultimately
had the flexibility of selling off a portion of their ownership rights. Even if they did
not sell any stock, the corporate readjustment had essentially diversified their
owners' investment portfolio. This substantive difference failed to persuade
Justices McReynolds and Van Devanter, who dissented from the majority opinion
in Rockefeller.'
95
The Court's continued intervention in reorganization law encouraged Congress
to revise the statutory rule once again in 1924. But before it did so, the Court
addressed several other pre-1919 reorganization transactions. In 1923, in Cullinan
v. Walker, the Court upheld a tax on the shareholders of a Texas oil company that
divided its production and pipeline businesses and subsequently reorganized the
two separate companies as subsidiaries of a Delaware holding company.' 96 Despite
Justice McReynolds's earlier dissents, this case was relatively straightforward,
considering the precedent of Phellis and Rockefeller. Since the taxpayers had both
severed their initial investment and created a new corporation in a different state
with presumably different legal rights, the combined logic of Phellis and
Rockefeller dictated that this transaction was also taxable.
A year later, however, the Court appeared to return to the laissez-faire leanings
that characterized much of its 1920s jurisprudence.' 97 The conservative Justice
McReynolds, in Weiss v. Steam, got the upper hand in striking down a tax on the
reorganization of an Ohio corporation.198 In this taxpayer victory, the transaction
included the receipt of cash and shares of a newly incorporated company in the
same state of Ohio. Relying on Macomber, Justice McReynolds ruled that the
receipt of shares was not taxable because it represented the same ownership interest
as the shares that were surrendered. Justices Holmes and Brandeis dissented, as
they had in Macomber, arguing this time that the precedent of Rockefeller and the
other reorganization decisions had undermined Macomber's application to
corporate readjustments.199
194. Id. at 183-84.
195. Id. at 184.
196. 262 U.S. 134 (1923).
197. See generally CUSHMAN, supra note 192; LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 192.
198. 265 U.S. 242 (1924).
199. Id. at 254 (Holmes, J. & Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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Finally, in Marr v. United States, the Court ruled on General Motor's 1916
domiciliary reincorporation from New Jersey to Delaware.200 Unlike the DuPont
transaction, which was an asset-for-stock transfer, the GM reincorporation was
conducted entirely as a stock-for-stock exchange. Justice Brandeis, writing for the
majority, retreated to the formalistic logic of Phellis in holding that because the
shares of the new Delaware company embodied different aspects of state-level
corporate law, with different legal rights and entitlements, the stockholders who
exchanged their New Jersey shares for stock in the new Delaware corporation had a
different investment.201 This analysis of the exchanged shares might have held up
but for the earlier decision in Steam. Indeed, the McReynolds wing of the Court
was dismayed to learn that the precedent of Steam held little value for the
majority.20
2
The Supreme Court's logic in the line of reorganization cases from Phellis to
Marr appeared to turn on the fundamental issue of whether or not the
reorganization resulted in a significant change to the legal ownership interests of
the investors/taxpayers involved. In each of the transactions, stockholders
ultimately received shares in a new company, prompting the question whether these
new shares represented a substantively different set of legal rights of ownership. If
they did, that presumably meant they held assets that had a significantly different
set of business risks from the property that was exchanged. For Justices Brandeis
and Pitney, even a relatively minor change in the legal rights and entitlements of
ownership was sufficient to trigger a tax. McReynolds, by contrast, was more
lenient towards the owners of capital, allowing them to make some rather complex
organizational changes without any adverse tax consequences.
The Court's conflicting decisions over reorganization law gave taxpayers little
comfort. In fact, by 1923, taxpayers were likely eager for Congress to step in, once
again, to expand the statutory provisions beyond what appeared to be the evolving
indecisiveness of the common law. If the Court's decisions illustrated an alternative
policy path, as Randolph Paul suggested, taxpayers and their advisors certainly did
not bemoan this lost alternative.
20 3
E. Economic Prosperity, Republican Control and the 1924 Act's Comprehensive
Revisions
Although the Supreme Court's intervention into reorganization law did not
influence the early versions of the statutory provisions,2° by 1923 tax experts were
200. 268 U.S. 536 (1925).
201. Id.at541.
202. Id. at 542.
203. Randolph Paul described the Supreme Court cases dealing with reorganizations as
an example where "logic was having a fling at the expense of practical values. ...
Rationalization was hard at work to put desired results in acceptable legalistic form. The
result was complete confusion. Predictability, an item of particular concern in matters of
taxation, was out of the question." Paul, supra note 26, at 18.
204. As scholars have shown, the Supreme Court decisions could not have influenced the
1921 law because they were handed down just as the law was enacted. Bank, supra note 26,
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certainly dissatisfied with the Court's confusing line of logic and the ambiguities
that remained in the law. The 1921 expansion of the provisions may have been a
"great step," as Ballantine noted.20 5 But as economic conditions improved and
Republicans consolidated their control over national policymaking, taxpayers
clamored for greater legal certainty and predictability.
When the Treasury Department and Congress began to consider tax reforms in
the summer and fall of 1923, the political and economic conditions appeared vastly
different from what they were just two years earlier. By 1923, the post-war
recession had given way to the start of a swift upswing in economic activity.
Indeed, early revenue estimates indicated that the federal government could have
sizeable surpluses in the coming years, despite the burden of interest payments and
the political commitment to provide for World War I pensions in the form of a
soldiers' bonus. 206 To be sure, not all aspects of American society enjoyed the
economic renewal equally. Certain sectors, including railroads, coal mining, and
agriculture, remained stagnant. Still, many Americans were on the cusp of halcyon
times. 207
With the economy rebounding, Republicans sought to continue their program of
systematic retrenchment. Consequently, Treasury Secretary Mellon embarked on a
nationwide campaign in 1923 to sell another round of tax reductions as part of his
agenda for "scientific" tax reform, which was modestly dubbed, "the Mellon
Plan."20 8 Rather than tinker with the tax laws, Mellon's Treasury Department
envisioned a compete overhaul, one that included rewriting the reorganization
provisions. 209 Treasury Department officials began to re-evaluate the political,
structural, and administrative aspects of the existing tax code in the summer of
1923. In drafting a new version of the property exchange provisions, high-ranking
Treasury officials swapped ideas about how far they could go in expanding the
reorganization tax benefit. 210 After approximately six months of work, the Treasury
Department presented the House Ways & Means Committee with "a complete
redraft of the Revenue act" in December 1983.21 A.W. Gregg, a young special
assistant to Secretary Mellon and a rising tax policy wunderkind, also prepared a
at 27; Paul, supra note 26, at 9-10.
205. Ballantine, supra note 182.
206. For more on the importance of the World War I soldiers' bonus to the development
of American tax policy, see generally Alstott & Novick, supra note 153.
207. GOLDBERG, supra note 149; DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE IN DEPRESSION AND WAR, 1929-1945, at ch. 2 (1999).
208. Mumame, supra note 153.
209. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY ON THE STATE OF THE
FINANCES FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1922, at 12-15 (1923); BLAKEY & BLAKEY,
supra note 47, at 201-02; Murname, supra note 153.
210. Letter from A.W. Gregg, Special Assistant to the Sec'y of the Treas., to S. Parker
Gilbert, Under Sec'y of the Treas. (Aug. 1923); Letter from Garrard B. Winston, Under
Sec'y of the Treas., to A.W. Gregg, Special Assistant to the Sec'y of the Treas. (Aug. 9,
1923), RG 56 General Records of the Dep't of the Treas., Correspondence of the Office of
the Sec'y of the Treas., Central Files of the Office of the Sec'y of the Treas., 1917-1932,
Box 187, Folder "Tax-Exchange of Property, 1921-1932," NARA II (on file with archive)
211. Mellon Reveals Tax Law Changes in Draft to House, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1923, at
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detailed analysis of the draft legislation based on internal departmental memos and
correspondence.212 His analysis was circulated to the popular press, and soon
became the foundation for both the House and Senate reports on the 1924 Revenue
Act.213
While Republican attempts to sustain economic prosperity certainly provided
the important political and economic conditions for the continued liberalization of
the reorganization benefit, the critical trigger once again was the perceived
inadequacies of the existing law. Not only did the Phellis and Rockefeller line of
cases increase tax uncertainty, the language of the 1921 reorganization exception
seemed to provide taxpayers with new methods of tax avoidance while constraining
the readjustment of legitimate transactions. Numerous tax professionals notified
Mellon and his aides about the myriad of ways in which taxpayers and their
advisors were exploiting the ambiguities of the property exchange exceptions of the
1921 law. These lawyers and accountants contacted the Treasury Department not
only because they wanted these loopholes closed, but because they believed that
clarifying the ambiguities would provide taxpayers with greater legal precision and
predictability. 2 14 In response, Mellon and other lawmakers concluded that the
reorganization rules needed to be "rewritten to eliminate existing uncertainties in
the present act and to include other usual forms of corporate reorganization in aid
of business." 215 For these corporate liberal policymakers, providing greater legal
stability and predictability was one way to insure the continued growth of the
economy.
By halting questionable transactions, government officials maintained they
could lend a greater degree of legal legitimacy to those tax benefits they believed
were necessary for a dynamic and robust corporate economy. Tax-exempt
government securities, for example, were a favorite target of lawmakers. Mellon
and others had long claimed that high marginal income tax rates were inducing
wealthy citizens to avoid taxes by funneling their savings into tax-exempt securities
rather than private taxable investments. This was one of the rationales behind the
Mellon Plan's push for slashing rates. The ambiguity of the reorganization rules
was another contributing factor to tax avoidance, according to Mellon. Almost
212. AW. Gregg, Aided US. Treasury, 58, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1958 at 27; House
Committee Speeds Decisions on the Mellon Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1924, at 1.
213. Treasury Expert Explains Tax Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1924, at 1. This newspaper
article contained the text of Gregg's "Statement of the Changes in the Revenue Act of 1921."
214. Letter from Robert Miller, Miller & Chevalier, to S. Parker Gilbert, Under Sec'y of
the Treas. (Sept. 1921); Letter from William S. Moorehead to Andrew W. Mellon, Sec'y of
the Treas. (Jan. 27, 1923) ; Letter from Watson Washburn, Perkins, Malone &Washburn, to
S. Parker Gilbert, Under Sec'y of the Treas. (Apr. 10, 1922); Letter from Watson Washburn,
Perkins, Malone & Washburn, to S. Parker Gilbert, Under Sec'y of the Treas. (Dec. 18,
1922); Letter from S. Parker Gilbert, Under Sec'y of the Treas., to Watson Washburn,
Perkins, Malone & Washburn (Jan. 13, 1923), RG 56, Box 187, Folder "Tax-Exchange of
Property, 1921-1932," NARA II (on file with archive).
215. Mellon Reveals Tax Law Changes in Draft to House, supra note 211, at 4. Ways &
Means Chairman, William R. Green, echoed this exact phrase when he explained the
reorganization section to his colleagues in the House. 65 CONG. REC. 2429 (1924).
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immediately after the 1921 law was in effect, tax professionals notified government
officials that brokerage houses were helping companies and wealthy individuals
use the reorganization rules to avoid taxes. 216 For example, corporations were
exploiting the ambiguity of whether the reorganization benefit applied to
corporations by executing tax-free reorganizations for their shareholders; while at
the same time taking the assets from these transactions at a cost, rather than carry-
over, basis. This permitted the corporations to exaggerate their depreciation
deductions, or reduce subsequent capital gains from the sale of such assets.
217
In addition, taxpayers were exploiting the open-ended description of
transactions that qualified as a reorganization. As tax experts noted, the specific
language of the exception did not define what an eligible reorganization was, but
rather, provided only an illustration of the types of transactions that would qualify
for tax-deferral treatment.218 Some lawmakers claimed that too many other
readjustments might fit this vague description. Ways & Means Chairman William
R. Green (R-IA) explained, with slight hyperbole, the need for a more
comprehensive treatment of corporate reorganizations. "There is no more frequent
or common cause of evasion at the present time than the provisions of the present
[1921] law with reference to reorganization of corporations," Green announced on
the House floor.2 19 "They are so extremely broad and so loose that you could drive
a four-horse team through them, and any good corporation lawyer can provide a
method of reorganization by which if a company has a large amount of cash on
hand, it could be distributed without any tax." 220 Just as Congress reacted to the
ambiguities of the 1919 law with revisions in 1921, lawmakers claimed they were
compelled by the same institutional dynamics to close apparent loopholes once
again in 1924.
Congress readily embraced the Mellon Plan and the Treasury Department's
desire to legitimate the reorganization exception by eliminating tax-avoidance
techniques. The overall thrust of the 1924 Revenue Act was dedicated mainly to
216. Letter from George 0. May, Price, Waterhouse & Co., to J.E. Sterrett, Price,
Waterhouse & Co. (Dec. 13, 1921) (copy on file with author); Letter from S. Parker Gilbert
to Andrew W. Mellon, Sec'y of the Treas. (Aug. 7, 1922) (copy on file with author); see also
DILLIoN, READ & Co., EXCHANGES OF PROPERTY UNDER THE INCOME TAX LAW (1922)
(marketing pamphlet detailing like-kind exchange loophole)(on file with archive), RG 56,
Box 187, Folder "Tax-Exchange of Property, 1921-1932," NARA II.
217. Both the 1919 and 1921 versions of the reorganization exception contained a basis
carry-over provision, but tax analysts claimed that it was unclear whether this carry-over
provision applied to corporations. Thus, corporations were swapping assets for stock and
taking the "assets on its books [for the purposes of] determining the gain or loss from the
subsequent sale ... and for determining depreciation and depletion" at its fair market value
at the date of transfer. S. REP. No. 68-398, at 18 (1924); H.R. REP. No. 68-179, at 17 (1924);
Paul, supra note 26, at 23.
218. BAAR & MoRmus, supra note 45, at 17. As commentators have noted, the definition
of a reorganization was changed in 1924 "from an indicative one to a determinative one." Id.
219. 65 CONG. REc. 2429 (1924).
220. Id. Observant tax experts agreed that the 1924 Act's attempts to close abusive
transactions would advance the legitimacy of the reorganization rules. HOLMES, supra note
183, at 656.
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lowering tax rates, just as the Mellon Plan had recommended. The revisions to the
reorganization provisions were more subtle, but equally far-reaching. As Randolph
Paul explained, the 1924 version became "the nucleus of all later acts.,,221 There
were several principal changes made in 1924. First, the law attacked the corporate
abuse of mischaracterizing the basis of corporate assets transferred as part of a
reorganization. It did this by explicitly stating that the basis of such assets "shall be
the same as it would be in the hands of the transferor."
222
Second, in what appeared to be a response to Phellis and Rockefeller, Congress
included spin-off transactions among the more specific definitions of a
reorganization. 223 Working under the assumption that corporate consolidations
were responsible for the recent economic revival, lawmakers reasoned that
subsidiary spin-offs-those readjustments where shareholders did not surrender
stock in the old corporation but received stock in a new corporation (via the old
corporation) in exchange for corporate assets-were "a common type of
reorganization and clearly should be included., 224 Third, the new law also codified
the BIR's longstanding position of applying the tax benefit to corporations as well
as shareholders. Given the "doubtful legality" of the Treasury Department rulings,
the Senate Finance Committee believed that "a statutory provision is most
necessary." 225 In addition, the 1924 law clarified the prefatory language regarding
the applicability of the tax benefit.
226
In drafting the 1924 law, Congress seized the opportunity to expound upon the
broad theories validating the continued tax preference for corporate
reorganizations. Of course, some lawmakers maintained that even these greatly
broadened reorganization rules adhered to the initial 1919 concern for not taxing
"continuous" or "open" transactions .227 Pointing particularly to the carry-over of
basis provisions, some legislators claimed that the transactions covered "are merely
changes in form and not in substance, and consequently should not be considered
as affecting a realization of income at the time of the exchange."
228
More forward-looking lawmakers and policy analysts, however, appeared to
abandon the initial policy rationale. They focused, instead, on using tax policy as a
macroeconomic impetus. Gesturing to the recent economic boom, some contended
that the new reorganization section provided the increased tax certainty necessary
to stimulate "ordinary business transactions., 229 Others went further. For
221. Paul, supra note 26, at 24.
222. I.R.C. § 204(a) (1924).
223. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 203(c), 43 Stat. 253.
224. H.R. REP. No. 68-179, at 14 (1924).
225. S. REP. No. 68-398, at 14-15 (1924).
226. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 203(c), 43 Stat. 253. Among these simplifying
changes, the most significant was the modification to the initial language of property
exchanges being taxable. See H.R. REP. No. 68-179, at 17 (1924); S. REP. No. 68-398, at 14
(1924); Brauner, supra note 43, at 57.
227. See generally Montgomery, supra note 53.
228. H.R. REP. No. 68-179, at 16 (1924); see also Treasury Expert Explains Tax Bill,
supra note 213, at 8; S. REP. No. 68-398, at 17 (1924).
229. H.R. REP. No. 68-179, at 16 (1924).
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policymakers such as Garrard B. Winston, the former Chicago corporate lawyer
and Undersecretary of the Treasury in the early 1920s, the broadened provisions
were necessary to permit the liberal movement of capital. According to Winston,
the newly-revised reorganization rules were meant to apply to nearly any kind of
corporate rearrangement, as long as the corporate owners did not liquidate their
investments.
During the process of drafting the 1924 law, Treasury officials exchanged
internal memos illustrating how far they were willing to go in expanding the
reorganization exception. 23 When A.W. Gregg presented a draft version of the law
that included debt as part of the definition of permissible consideration, Winston
concurred. He noted initially that this "greatly increases [the] scope of
reorganizations. 23' Indeed, permitting parties to a reorganization to use bonds
without exchanging an equity interest, as the memos implied, would have had far-
reaching implications. But Winston was not opposed to such a radical liberalization
of the exception. In responding to Gregg's draft version, Winston wrote, "I note
that you can put through a reorganization without a tax, giving some of the old
stockholders bonds. This broadens the scope of the section, but I see no objection
to it from the Treasury's standpoint." 232 The final version of the 1924 law did not
go as far as Winston and Gregg had hoped, but the internal correspondence
demonstrates that at least some Treasury officials were willing to condone just
about any reorganization that was not an outright cash sale.
As a former corporate lawyer and leading member of the nascent tax bar,
Winston was not reticent about his views. Soon after the 1924 law was enacted, he
revealed, in a speech before the National Tax Association (NTA), the Treasury
Department's intentions in drafting the new rules. After noting that the
reorganization section was "the most complicated and most difficult section we had
to draw," Winston admitted that Treasury officials were working upon the theory
"that you can go through any kind of a reorganization which the necessities of the
particular business require, provided the stockholders get no money out of the
transaction or no different property than they had before. That is, you can take two
corporations and merge them into one, and give the stockholders of the two the
stock in the single corporation." Alternatively, Winston continued, with Rockefeller
no doubt in mind,
230. See Letter from Gregg to Gilbert, supra note 210; Letter from Winston to Gregg,
supra note 210. Winston also recommended including spin-off transactions in this early
Treasury draft of the bill. Id.
231. Garrard B. Winston handwritten notes to himself (Aug. 1923), RG 56 General
Records of the Dep't of the Treas., Correspondence of the Office of the Sec'y of the Treas.,
Central Files of the Office of the Sec'y of the Treas., 1917-1932, Box 187, Folder "Tax-
Exchange of Property, 1921-1932," NARA II (copy on file with author).
232. Letter from Garrard B. Winston, Under Sec'y of the Treas., to A.W. Gregg, Special
Assistant to the Sec'y of the Treas. (Aug. 9, 1923), Box 187, Folder "Tax-Exchange of
Property, 1921-1932," NARA II (copy on file with author). Winston also recommended
including spin-off transactions in this early Treasury draft of the bill. Id.
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You can take a single corporation-and this is a most important change in the
new law-and split it into two corporations and give the stock of each
corporation to the original stockholders. If, however, in doing this, the
stockholders realize additional cash, such cash is taxed to the proper parties in
the proper way.
233
But, he added, "if you just get other pieces of paper, and no more than you had
before, then the original value attaches to those pieces of paper, and when you
dispose of those and realize your gain, you are taxed as if the organization had not
taken effect. ' ,234 The main goal, Winston concluded, was "to permit the freer play
of business. 235
Winston's comments before the NTA represented how at least one group of
policymakers used the formalistic logic of the reorganization rule to support
corporate consolidations. Winston did not appear concerned about limiting the
preference only to simple changes in corporate structure. Nor did he seem
interested in exploring the potential substantive change in business or investment
risk that a reorganization posed. Instead, what seemed to matter most was
liquidity-whether an investor had cashed out his or her investment. Keeping the
wheels of capital moving was critical to Winston and his colleagues. "It is the
belief in treasury that we shall make more in taxes," Winston concluded his speech
to ringing applause, "if we keep business running than we shall if we are a drag on
its wheels."2 36 The overriding desire to support commercial interests during a time
of economic prosperity appeared to trump any concern about principled policy
positions.
The Treasury official's private correspondence and public pronouncements
reflect just how far the justifications for the reorganization benefit had come. For
with the 1924 revisions, the early and formative phase in the incremental
transformation of the corporate reorganization provisions was nearly complete.
While the economic argument that the preference removed tax obstacles to
commercially sound transactions continued to resonate, the expansive reading of
the law by key policymakers suggested that the reorganization tax preference had
become an important corporate subsidy--one necessary to maintain economic
prosperity. Thus, what began during a wartime national emergency as a narrow
formalistic exception to the general rule of taxing property exchanges had been
transmuted within six years amid turbulent social, political, and economic
circumstances into a modem corporate dispensation.
V. THE NEW DEAL ORDER AND A FAILED ATrEMPT AT REPEAL
If the 1920s was a period of prosperity and stability, the onset of the Great
Depression and the New Deal quickly punctured the political and economic
233. Garrard B. Winston, Changes Made by the Revenue Act of 1924, 17 PROC. NAT'L
TAX Ass'N 267, 267 (1924).
234. Id.
235. Id. at 267.
236. Id. at 268.
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equilibrium. As the harmonious business-government relations of the previous
Republican-dominated decade gave way, and as breadlines and bankruptcies
became more ubiquitous, Franklin D. Roosevelt and his allies attempted to use the
cataclysmic Depression to implement fundamental changes to the American
economy. Initially, New Deal lawmakers were reluctant to challenge business
interests, for fear of dampening any chances of an economic recovery. This early
reluctance was exploited by the newly emerging organized interests who had come
to rely on tax preferences, including the reorganization tax benefit.3 7
Despite this initial hesitancy to challenge business interests, the early New Deal
was not bereft of ideas or experimental energy. During the celebrated First One
Hundred Days of his administration, Roosevelt used the political capital from his
election and the Democratic congressional victories to enact a series of laws
designed to stimulate the economy and bring comfort to the millions of Americans
ravaged by the Depression. Laws aimed at reforming the banking system,
protecting American farmers, regulating capital markets, providing employment,
and guaranteeing organized labor the right to bargain collectively were among the
important legislative proposals enacted during Roosevelt's frenetic first few months
in office.238
Yet for all this legislative activity, Roosevelt's early fiscal policies did not
depart significantly from his predecessor's. Like Herbert Hoover, Roosevelt was
initially committed to balanced budgets. Roosevelt's early tax policies contained
few innovations, instead following the general trend of modest increases in tax
rates and the elimination of certain tax preferences. It was not until the mid-1930s
that New Deal tax policy began to change course. Political victories on the left
during the 1934 mid-term elections and increasing pressure for more radical wealth
redistribution from the likes of Senator Huey Long (D-LA) and others contributed
to a dramatic shift in federal tax policy.
239
Beginning in the summer of 1935, Roosevelt took the lead in encouraging
Congress to use tax laws to attack concentrations of wealth and economic power.
237. The classic historical studies of the New Deal remain, ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW
DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY: A STUDY IN ECONOMIC AMBIVALENCE (1966);
WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBERG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL (1963); and
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1957-1960). For more recent
reevaluations of the meanings of New Deal liberalism and the impact of its reforms, see
generally ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RECESSION AND
WAR (1995); KENNEDY, supra note 207; JASON SCOT SMITH, BUILDING NEW DEAL
LIBERALISM: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC WORKS, 1933-1956 (2006).
238. See generally JONATHAN ALTER, THE DEFINING MOMENT: FDR's HUNDRED DAYS
AND THE TRIUMPH OF HOPE (2006); KENNEDY, supra note 207, ch. 5.
239. ALAN BRINKLEY, VOICES OF PROTEST: HUEY LONG, FATHER COUGHLIN AND THE
GREAT DEPRESSION (1982); Edwin Amenta, Kathleen Dunleavy & Mary Bernstein, Stolen
Thunder? Huey Long's "Share Our Wealth" and the Seond New Deal 59 Amer. Soc. Rev.
678 (1994). On the history of New Deal tax policy, see generally BROWNLEE, supra note 30,
at 81-106; MARK H. LEFF, THE LIMITS OF SYMBOLIC REFORM: THE NEW DEAL AND
TAXATION, 1933-1939 (1984); and JOSEPH THORNDIKE, THE PRICE OF CIVILIZATION:
TAXATION FOR DEPRESSION AND WAR, 1932-1945 (2005) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Virginia).
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As the economy began to show signs of recovery, Roosevelt initiated a rhetorical
campaign against rapacious capitalists whom the president and his allies
subsequently referred to as "economic royalists. '240 Congress responded with a
series of tax laws in the following years that raised top marginal rates and
eliminated numerous tax preferences. The Revenue Act of 1935, for instance,
enacted steeply progressive income taxes, dividend taxes that sought to prevent tax-
avoidance schemes, and larger wealth transfer taxes. In the following year, an
election year, New Dealers were also able to enact a radical, albeit short-lived,
"undistributed profits tax" on corporations. Much of the redistributional edge of
this levy and the general 1935 Revenue Act was counterbalanced by the regressive
nature of the payroll taxes enacted as part of the 1935 Social Security Act. The
countervailing effects of these two laws, and the dramatic shift in political priorities
over time, suggested that Roosevelt's fiscal views-like much of the early New
Deal-suffered from some dissonance. As the historian Mark Leff has concluded,
New Deal tax policy was perhaps more symbolic than substantive or reformist in its
inclinations. 241 Yet, however one views early New Deal tax policy, most historians
agree that by 1937 the collapse of the limited economic recovery and the stinging
defeat of Roosevelt's court-packing plan brought an end to New Deal reform.242
A. The Reorganization Rules in the Context of Changing New Deal Tax Policy
The specifics of the reorganization rule seemed to run in opposition to the
changing posture of New Deal tax policy. In some ways, the proposed reform of
the reorganization rules was ahead of its times, and thus anticipated rather than
effectuated the changing tenor of New Deal tax policy. In the late 1920s, there were
several factors that influenced how lawmakers approached tax reform. The general
anti-business environment that followed the stock market crash of 1929 and the
ensuing depression was exacerbated by the fear of growing corporate
consolidations and by revelations of rampant tax avoidance among the nation's
wealthiest citizens. These social and political conditions emboldened some
lawmakers in 1934 to recommend the complete repeal of the corporate
reorganization tax benefit. Yet, because this proposal came at a time when
Roosevelt aides were focused on balancing budgets and promoting economic
recovery, repeal was discouraged by the Treasury Department. After some debate,
Congress ultimately agreed with the Treasury experts who claimed that repeal
would reduce revenues and blunt economic recovery.243
240. Roosevelt to War on 'Economic Royalists,' N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1936, at 1;
Roosevelt Reaffirms Pledges Against 'Economics Royalists,' WASH. POST, June 28, 1936, at
M1; see also KENNEDY, supra note 207, at 280, 313.
241. BROWNLEE, supra note 30, at 92-93; LEFF, supra note 239.
242. See generally BRINKLEY, supra note 237; CUSHMAN, supra note 192. For a recent
summary of the historical debates surrounding the constitutional history of the New Deal
period, see generally Forum: The Debate over the Constitutional Revolution of 1937, 110
AMER. HIST. REv. 1046 (2005).
243. See infra note 258.
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This failed attempt at repeal, however, was not simply an intergovernmental
squabble, or further evidence of the dissonance of New Deal tax policy; it also
illustrated the political power of the historically constituted economic interests who
had become wedded to this corporate tax benefit. If corporate managers were
relatively reticent in resisting repeal, 244 big business lobbying groups stridently
opposed this change. So too did those ancillary tax professionals-the lawyers,
accountants, and bankers-who facilitated these complex mergers and acquisitions,
and hence became reliant on the law as a source of revenue and professional
prestige. During congressional hearings and in correspondence with lawmakers,
these interests voiced their displeasure over the possibility of repeal.
Repeal opponents found a receptive audience among many lawmakers in 1934,
but soon thereafter political leaders would begin to use tax laws in a rather different
fashion. The subsequent and substantive change in Roosevelt's tax policies
suggests that the timing of reforms was critical. During the early New Deal, when
Congress and Roosevelt were preoccupied with balanced budgets and economic
recovery, a radical proposal to abolish the corporate reorganization tax benefit
seemed doomed to fail. By contrast, during the period of 1935-37, when New
Dealers were seeking to assuage demands from the political left, the idea of
attacking corporate privileges by repealing tax benefits-like the reorganization
rules-may have had a larger likelihood of success. Thus, the temporal dimension
of historical events, like the broader social context of the times, played an
important part in shaping the development of this corporate tax law.
Congress and the Roosevelt Administration were not the only institutions
molding the reorganization rules during the 1930s. The courts were also influenced
by political and social circumstances, as they began to develop a new set of
doctrines in the realm of reorganization tax law. The disclosure of extensive tax
avoidance led the courts to create one of the most significant common-law
bulwarks against tax avoidance and evasion, in the form of the business purpose
doctrine. More specifically, the courts, in examining corporate reorganizations
executed under the lenient 1920s statutes, nominally supported the traditional
"purely paper" rationale for the tax benefit. In substance, however, these judicial
decisions gradually added a layer of complexity and flexibility that suggested that
the courts, like Congress, were willing to grant taxpayers a great deal of leniency in
structuring transactions that adhered to the expanded reorganization rule.
245
B. The Growing Concern over Tax Avoidance and Corporate Consolidation
Even before Roosevelt was elected in 1932, there was a search in Washington
for the causes of the Great Depression. President Hoover, frustrated by his inability
to lift the nation out of the Depression, urged the Senate in the spring of 1932 to
investigate the Wall Street community. If leaders of American business and finance
were responsible for the prosperity of the 1920s, the conventional reasoning at the
244. Bank, supra note 40, at 38.
245. See infra text accompanying notes 323-47.
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time suggested, then they must also be the culprits of the devastating downturn.
246
With Hoover's encouragement, the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency
launched an investigation into Stock Exchange practices. Led by the fiery New
York attorney Ferdinand Pecora, the Senate committee brought "Wall Street Under
Oath,, 247 as it exposed the corruption, tax avoidance, and general malfeasance of
some of the nation's leading bankers and captains of industry.248
Although the Pecora investigation is best remembered today for its crucial role
in spurring the adoption of the 1933 Securities Act and the Glass-Steagall Banking
Act, the Senate committee's discovery of numerous tax avoidance techniques
employed by J.P. Morgan and other wealthy financiers also had a resounding
impact on the development of early New Deal tax laws. Under Pecora's relentless
questioning, Morgan and several other prominent financiers admitted that they paid
no income taxes in the previous two years. By exploiting the legal rules that
permitted deductions for capital losses and sales to related parties, these affluent
individuals created and claimed tax losses by selling depreciated assets, and then
repurchasing the same assets from their related parties after the required waiting
period. 249 The Pecora investigation demonstrated that these and other tax-avoidance
practices were not only legal--exploiting gaps in the existing tax laws-they were
also rather widespread among the nation's wealthiest citizens.
250
These startling stories received prominent media coverage,251 and gave
lawmakers ample reasons to include tax changes as part of early New Deal
legislation. The National Industrial Recovery Act (1933), for instance, included a
ban on capital loss carryovers, a hefty tax on corporate dividends, and several other
changes aimed squarely at denying partnerships like the House of Morgan the
ability to deduct losses.25 2 With ordinary Americans starving in the streets, tales of
the wealthy escaping their fair share of taxes infuriated the public consciousness.
253
This outrage, in turn, encouraged some lawmakers to challenge nearly every aspect
of corporate privilege, including what some believed to be the generosity of the
corporate reorganization rules. Yet, if rampant tax avoidance was a trigger for
increased congressional scrutiny of the reorganization tax benefit, there were also
other broader historical factors, namely the growing concentration of corporate
246. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 237, at 19.
247. FERDINAND PECORA, WALL STREET UNDER OATH (1939).
248. Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings Before the Sen. Comm. on Banking and
Currency on S. Res. 84 and S. Res. 239, 73rd Cong. (1933) [hereinafter Pecora
Investigation].
249. Id.; RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN: AN AMERICAN BANKING DYNASTY AND
THE RISE OF MODERN FINANCE 355-56 (2001).
250. Pecora Investigation, supra note 248, at 189-205; LEFF, supra note 239, at 58-59.
251. See generally Harold J.T. Horan, Kahn Escaped Tax 3 Years, Quiz Reveals, WASH.
POST, June 29, 1933, at 1; Tax 'Evasion'By Morgan In Legal Stock Dealings Is Now Hunted
ByPecora, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1933, at 1.
252. National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), 15 U.S.C. § 709 (1933); see also LEFF,
supra note 239, at 59-60 (discussing how the NIRA would remedy the tax avoidance
scheme pursued by J.P. Morgan and others).
253. BROWNLEE, supra note 30; LEFF, supra note 239.
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power, which gave lawmakers and the public a much stronger reason to reconsider
the expanded versions of the reorganization rules.
As we have seen, the early 1920s was a pivotal period for corporate
consolidations. Nowhere was this more evident than in the actual number and size
of corporate mergers and acquisitions that occurred during the second half of the
decade, after the important liberalization of the reorganization rules in 1924. In the
manufacturing and mining industries, more than half of the acquisitions that
occurred between the end of World War I and 1931 were executed during the five-
year period, 1926-1932, with 1928 and 1929 representing the peak years of the
post-war M&A cycle.254 Transactions during this time were not only numerous but
large. Within two years, the Standard Oil Company, alone, acquired three other oil
producers, with a total acquisition value of nearly $575 million.2 55 Although it is
unclear whether these numerous transactions were facilitated by the expanded
reorganization tax benefit, lawmakers and later commentators certainly believed
that the tax laws were at least partially responsible.
25 6
C. The Recommendation to Repeal the Reorganization Rules
Concern over the growing concentration of corporate power and disclosure of
widespread tax-avoidance led the House Ways & Means Committee to appoint a
special subcommittee in 1933. In anticipation of a new revenue bill, the
subcommittee was asked to explore ways to (1) limit tax avoidance, (2) simplify
the revenue laws, and (3) seek out new sources of tax revenue. Clearly, Congress
was responding to the revelations of tax avoidance. But the lack of any express call
for addressing increasing corporate consolidations suggests that lawmakers were
not yet bold enough to use tax laws as a cudgel against capital concentration.
Similarly, by allowing Congress to take the lead in drafting a new tax law, the
Roosevelt Administration demonstrated its reluctance to alter the placid trajectory
of existing tax policy.
25 7
Although the subcommittee's preliminary December 1933 report contained
modest general proposals, 258 its recommendation for the tax-free like-kind
exchanges and corporate reorganization rules was rather extreme. The
subcommittee bluntly recommended abolishing the entire section of the existing
254. J. KEITH BUTTERS, JOHN LINTNER & WILLIAM L. CARY, EFFECTS OF TAXATION:
CORPORATE MERGERS 292 (1951) (citing TEMP. NAT'L ECON. COMM., MONOGRAPH No. 27,
THE STRUCTURE OF INDUSTRY 233 (1941)).
255. Gardner C. Means, The Large Corporation in American Economic Life, 21 AMER.
ECON. REv. 1 (1931).
256. See generally BERLE & MEANS, supra note 106; Eric L. Kohler, Reorganizations
and the Federal Income Tax Law, 4 NAT'L INCOME TAX MAG. 161 (1926); Sandberg, supra
note 41, at 125.
257. LEFF, supra note 239.
258. Preliminary Report on Prevention of Tax Avoidance, Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 73rd Cong. (1933). The subcommittee suggested increasing
rates, tightening the base by limiting depreciation deductions, and passing stiffer taxes on
personal holding companies. Id.; see also BLAKEY & BLAxEY, supra note 47, at 348-53.
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law dealing with tax-free exchanges and reorganizations. In effect, members of the
subcommittee sought to return to the pre-1919 regime when nearly all property
exchanges were taxable, though they seemed willing to provide a small exception
for those cases where "the immediate payment of the tax on a gain ... results in an
undue hardship.,
25 9
On the surface, the subcommittee's repeal proposal followed the first two
aspects of its mandate. The subcommittee reported that "[t]he elimination of the
exchange and reorganization provisions... will close the door to one of the most
prevalent methods of tax avoidance," and "will greatly simplify the income tax law
by eliminating some of its most complicated provisions., 260 The members
emphasized that abolishing the provisions would eliminate a particular type of
flexible tax avoidance technique. "The underlying principle behind all of the
exchange and reorganization provisions," the subcommittee acknowledged, "is that
they do not result in tax exemption, but that the tax is postponed." Yet the taxpayer
"is able to escape tax on these gains entirely by being permitted to elect the year in
which he shall report such gain.",261 Taxpayers essentially could choose to realize
deferred gains in those years where they had losses large enough to absorb their
gains.
The subcommittee also had other more fundamental reasons for suggesting the
repeal of the reorganization rules. In a detailed memorandum included as an
appendix to its report, the subcommittee trenchantly critiqued the exception's
conventional rationales. After briefly reprising the provisions' legislative history,
the subcommittee explained that there were three principal policy reasons for the
law. First, the provisions were meant to limit the uncertainty and litigation
associated with the pre-statutory rulings. Second, by deferring the tax on "paper
profits" the law facilitated normal business adjustments. And, third, the law
enhanced government revenue "by preventing taxpayers from taking colorable
losses. 262
Each of these early rationales, the subcommittee concluded, was by 1933 no
longer tenable. First, rather than decreasing uncertainty, the growing complexity of
the rules made the present law "very involved, difficult to understand, and
particularly hard to interpret.' 263 Likewise, the increasing intricacy of
reorganization transactions themselves led to administrative problems in
determining whether transactions were eligible for the tax benefit. Second, instead
of merely facilitating "normal business adjustments," the existing law was used for
"other purposes of an indefensible character," namely to avoid taxes-as many of
the cases making their way through the courts revealed.26 Moreover, given the
growing concern over corporate consolidation, the subcommittee noted that the
"present provisions encouraged the injection into business structure of an unsavory
stimulus, such as the organization of large holding companies and the
259. Preliminary Report on Prevention of Tax Avoidance, supra note 258, at 8.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 38.
263. Id.
264. See infra text accompanying note 323.
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overcapitalization of business., 26 5 Third, rather than increase government revenue
by limiting losses, the complexity of theses rules allowed taxpayers, especially
those operating with "legal advice," to take "substantial losses in most instances
without actual interference" in their original plans or purposes. 266 In sum, the
subcommittee was convinced, after over a decade of experience with these
provisions, that "the abuses under the present policy far outweigh the
advantages. "
267
In addition to debunking the conventional explanations, the subcommittee also
commented on how the complexity of the expanded exception permitted taxpayers
to manipulate the superficial form of a transaction while shrouding its true
economic substance. The original law appeared to be concerned mainly about the
substance of reorganization transactions, about whether corporations and
stockholders were swapping similar types of investments, and hence retaining the
same economic risks. But by the 1930s, the subcommittee explained, substance had
become irrelevant. As long as taxpayers-usually with the aid of their tax
advisors--could properly structure the details of their mergers and acquisitions in
accordance with the law's formal requirements, tax liability could be deferred
regardless of whether the underlying substance of the investments remained the
same. The lawmakers contended that "[o]ne of the main objections to the
reorganization provisions is that the recognition of gain depends more upon the
form of the transaction than upon the essential facts, undue importance being given
to 'expert advice. '
268
These words seemed to reaffirm earlier comments and foreshadow future ones.
Nearly a decade earlier, Garrard Winston had informed the NTA that the
reorganization rules had been purposefully unmoored from their initial policy
roots. 269 Whereas Winston in 1924 celebrated the expanded version of the rules, the
House Subcommittee in 1933 bemoaned the unprincipled application of the law.
And it used this reasoning, as well as the heightened resentment of tax avoidance,
to call for the complete elimination of the tax benefit. Decades later, tax experts in
calling for a similar reevaluation of the reorganization rules would echo the
subcommittee's concern about how the formal requirements of the corporate
reorganization rules could permit taxpayers and their expert counsel to mask the
substance of their transactions.270
D. The Treasury Department's Warnings Against Repeal
With the Roosevelt Administration still proceeding slowly in the area of tax
policy, congressional leaders took the lead in preparing what would become the
1934 Revenue Act. 27 1 Responding to the subcommittee's report, the House Ways &
265. Preliminary Report on Prevention of Tax Avoidance, supra note 258, at 38.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 40.
268. Id. at 39.
269. Winston, supra note 233.
270. See supra text accompanying note 44.
271. LEFF, supra note 239, at 61.
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Means Committee held a series of hearings in the winter of 1933-34 to evaluate
their colleague's recommendations.272 The hearings began with testimony from the
Treasury Department. There was perhaps no greater indication of the Roosevelt
Administration's hesitancy in using early New Deal tax laws to attack concentrated
wealth than the testimony provided by Roswell F. Magill, the Assistant Secretary
of Treasury.
A former Columbia University law professor, Magill had only recently joined
the Roosevelt Administration. Though he was a personal friend of Treasury
Secretary Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Magill was sufficiently independent in his tax
thinking to have served years earlier as an expert in the Mellon Treasury
Department, where he was an advisor on the 1924 Revenue Act. 27 Many within the
Treasury Department were disappointed that Morgenthau chose his tax lawyer
friend Magill rather than Harold M. Groves, the Wisconsin progressive economist
and Brandeis prot6g6, whom Morgenthau did not know personally. 274 The selection
of the more cautious Magill, as the Administration's top tax expert, may have had
an important impact on the subsequent development of tax policy.
When Morgenthau and Magill testified before the House Committee, their
statements illustrated the administration's reluctance in embracing bold tax
reforms. When Magill turned his attention to the proposal to abolish the
reorganization provisions, he agreed with the subcommittee that these rules were
"perhaps the most complicated and difficult to understand of any sections of the
law." He emphasized that their greatest defect was that they were "overspecific."
The 1924 revisions to the law may have provided the legal certainty that taxpayers
and lawyers were clamoring for, but at the cost of leaving the Treasury Department
with what Magill characterized as "no leeway in the administration of the law." As
a result, "astute lawyers could and did arrange what were really sales to take the
technical form of a reorganization within the statutory definition, with resultant loss
of revenue."
275
Magill's criticism of the reorganization rules paralleled the subcommittee's
report. But while he concurred with its assessment of the problem, he disagreed
with its solution. Rather than supporting the repeal of the reorganization rules,
Magill declared that "the present provisions should be completely redrafted." He
hinged his recommendation on institutional competence. The Treasury Department,
Magill explained, envisioned a newly drafted reorganization statute that expressed
as "simply as possible the general plan for dealing with these transactions, leaving
to the [Treasury] Department as in other cases the power to make rules and
regulations to carry out the congressional intent."
276
272. Revenue Revision, 1934, Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 73rd
Cong., (1934) [hereinafter Revenue Revision].
273. ROBERT T. SWAINE, THE CRAVATH FIRM SiNCE 1906, at 649 (1948); Paul W. Ward,
Henry Morgenthau and His Friends, NATION, Aug. 14, 1935, at 182.
274. Ward, supra note 273, at 182.
275. Revenue Revision, supra note 272, at 57.
276. Id. Magill later agreed with Robert Jackson that the Administration needed a "long-
range program of revenue revision." Letter from Roswell Magill to Robert H. Jackson (Oct.
5, 1934), Box 16 Correspondence, Folder 4 - "Roswell Magill", Robert H. Jackson Papers,
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Past experience, Magill contended, had taught Treasury officials that
comprehensive legislation was futile in limiting the creativity of "astute lawyers"
and other tax professionals. "In the case of complicated subjects of this kind, it is
almost impossible to foresee all the ingenious devices which lawyers will invent,
and to provide against them expressly in the statute," Magill told the lawmakers.
He went on to argue that "[t]he more effective plan is to place the responsibility
squarely upon the [Treasury] Department administering the law from day to day"
and that "[i]t can readily amend its regulations to cover new situations as they
arise. 277 The World War I infusion of administrative capacity into the Treasury
Department led many tax officials to believe that the Treasury had the institutional
capability and flexibility to govern the tax treatment of increasingly complex
corporate reorganizations. Whereas the subcommittee believed that the best course
of action was to eliminate the non-recognition provisions completely, Treasury
officials preferred the more moderate route of revising the rules to grant it and the
BIR greater discretion in evaluating the tax treatment of reorganizations. Thus, in a
sense, the Treasury Department, like the subcommittee, wanted to return to the pre-
1919 reorganization regime-a regime under which it believed agency experts
could effectively craft a coherent set of tax rules dealing with corporate mergers,
acquisitions, and consolidations.
Despite its claims to superior institutional abilities, the Treasury Department did
not yet have an overall plan for how the reorganization rules ought to be rewritten.
Nevertheless, officials were steadfastly opposed to the subcommittee's
recommendation to repeal the provisions. Magill suggested, instead, that Congress
retain the rules until the Treasury had had an opportunity to investigate the matter
further. To bolster his proposal, Magill offered several reasons for why the
provisions should remain. All of these justifications turned on the empirical reality
that in the early 1930s most corporate reorganizations were generally "being
carried out in order to revise the capital structures of unsuccessful or insolvent
enterprises." 278 Thus, the reorganization rules were protecting government revenue
by limiting the losses that taxpayers could claim from these transactions.
Abolishing the reorganization rules at this time would lead to a loss of revenue
rather than the increased tax dollars anticipated by the subcommittee. Moreover,
without the existing exception, many losses would be permitted for transactions
where the underlying economic investment had not changed. As Magill explained:
The immediate result of abolishing the reorganization provisions would be to
permit the thousands of bondholders and stockholders of such [failing]
organizations to establish losses, even though they obtain and retain securities
in a new enterprise which is substantially the same as their original investment.
Even though it be required that such losses can only be deducted from capital
gains, a wide door will be opened to reduction of tax liability.
279
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. [hereinafter Jackson Papers]
(copy on file with the author).
277. Revenue Revision, supra note 272, at 57.
278. Id.
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Playing on lawmakers' fears of a potential revenue loss, Magill highlighted the
adverse impact that eliminating the reorganization rule might have. Some
legislators may have wondered whether "astute lawyers" with their "ingenious
devices" were not already manipulating the rules to create tax losses. Such
skepticism towards Magill's comments, however, was absent, as lawmakers faced
growing annual deficits not seen since the end of World War 1.280
The Treasury Department also objected to the repeal proposal because it
believed that a tax on corporate reorganizations at this time might interfere with
economic recovery. Furthermore, a newly enacted tax on corporate spin-offs would
also conflict with some of the regulatory measures created by the New Deal. The
Glass-Steagall Act's required division of banking and securities enterprises, for
example, could facilitate the creation of further non-economic tax losses, as Magill
explained to lawmakers.
281
E. Organized Interests and the Death of Repeal
Magill's testimony reflected the cautious outlook of the Roosevelt
Administration. Business interests, however, did not waste any time in exploiting
such hesitancy. The recommendation to repeal the reorganization rules did not
garner a great deal of attention, but business lobbyists were still quick to voice their
opposition. In their official testimony before Congress, several trade groups echoed
the Treasury's warnings about revenue loss, frequently with near identical
language. Other professional organizations who benefited from the complex
reorganization law similarly articulated their objections, often through more
informal channels.
Nearly every group that appeared before the Ways & Means Committee's
hearings in the winter of 1933-34 agreed with the general aims of simplifying the
tax laws and closing the gaps that permitted lawful tax avoidance. But several
groups also opposed many of the subcommittee's specific recommendations,
including abolishing the reorganization rules. The Depression and the lack of
business confidence were palpable during the hearings. Lawmakers needed to find
some way to lift the nation out of its economic troubles, and business interests
confidently stated that their productive powers would be the source of financial
recovery. As the representatives from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
("Chamber") explained, commercial interests resisted "any undue penalty or any
undue burden upon any class of taxpayers or any productive enterprise, upon which
our recovery, in the last analysis, depends.,
282
In opposing the repeal of the reorganization rules, the Chamber listed a litany of
reasons, including some of the more theoretical and administrative explanations for
280. The $3 billion deficit for fiscal year 1933 was estimated to more than double in the
following year. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY ON THE STATE OF
FINANCES FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1933, at 21 (1933); HISTORICAL STATISTICS
OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 102, tbl. Ea584-587.
281. Revenue Revision, supra note 272, at 76.
282. Id. at 287 (statement of Chester Leasure, representing the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce).
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not taxing "paper profits." The Chamber, however, also spotlighted more pressing
and immediate material concerns. After reminding lawmakers that tax laws should
encourage not restrict ordinary business transactions, the Chamber underscored that
"this is especially true at the present time when many reorganizations are
unescapable [sic] as a result of the depression. Reorganizations which are necessary
to business recovery and increased employment will not be undertaken if an
immediate tax liability is imposed. 28 3 These words surely resonated for legislators
overwhelmed with the need to respond to the Depression. The Chamber did not
stop there, however. In its official statement, it reiterated the potential revenue loss
that Magill had cited as the Treasury Department's main reason for opposing
repeal. "Many of the reorganizations today include hard-pressed or insolvent
business units," explained the Chamber. "If gain or loss is recognized at the time of
reorganization, there would undoubtedly now be many losses immediately
established,
'284
Other commercial interests affirmed these sentiments through less public
channels. The Boston Chamber of Commerce, for instance, reiterated that tax
certainty also remained an important objective for many business groups. In a
personal letter to Congressman Robert L. Doughton (D-NC), the new chair of the
Ways & Means Committee, the Boston business leaders acknowledged that "the
ingenuity of attorneys and tax advisors has given to some of these provisions a
scope and effect considered by the average citizen and by the average legislator as
going far beyond their legitimate purpose and intent. ' '285 But without this tax
benefit, the Boston Chamber contended, "many business adjustments economically
desirable will be prevented, or harshly penalized., 286 Rather than support the
existing law, the Boston business leaders proposed the interesting "supplemental
suggestion" of empowering the Treasury Department to issue binding and final
advance determination of tax liability for corporate reorganizations. Magill and his
Treasury colleagues certainly would have supported such a suggestion. Yet, the
Boston Chamber was less interested in augmenting the powers of the executive,
than they were in seeking greater clarity and predictability in tax law. "Some
desirable business organizations may, of course, be prevented if the provisions are
abolished," the Boston Chamber admitted. "Many others, however, will be
prevented not so much by the fact of resulting tax liability as by the uncertainty as
to its amount. This uncertainty ought to be possible to eliminate by such
anticipatory determinations as are here suggested. 287 Tax certainty and economic
predictability, and not just tax relief, seemed to be at the top of the business agenda.
More specific trade groups joined large business lobbying organizations in
objecting to the repeal proposal. The National Coal Association, for instance,
283. Id. at290-91.
284. Id.at291.
285. Letter from James W. Mudge, Boston Chamber of Commerce, to Rep. Robert L.
Doughton (Jan. 15, 1933), RG 233, Box 353-Committee on Ways & Means, 73d Cong.
Committee Papers, HR 73A-F28.1 "Folder on Income Tax," NARA I (copy on file with
author).
286. Id.
287. Id.
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voiced a "strong protest," contending that both theoretical and practical
considerations favored retaining the current rules. Indeed, the National Coal
Association listed several types of internal corporate readjustments currently being
contemplated that might be blocked if the rules were repealed. "The purpose of
such consolidations may be to strengthen the security to be given under a bond
issue, to eliminate a lot of intercompany accounting, or to enable a clearer
statement of the financial standing of the group to be presented," the Coal
Association representative explained. "To lay a tax on such a transaction is to put a
penalty on efficient management, whether operating or financial., 288 Likewise, the
American Mining Congress protested that repeal of the reorganization rules would
"block those normal and wholly proper transactions which mean more business and
also more revenues for the Government."
289
The pleadings of businesses considering readjustments were nothing new. But
by the 1930s, other professional organizations also had developed a stake in the
liberalized reorganization laws, as the reoccurring references to the creativity and
ingenuity of tax advisors suggested. The accounting profession, for example, had
become an important player in structuring many complex corporate transactions,
especially those related to mergers, acquisitions, and consolidations, as many
lawmakers duly noted.290 When the reorganization rules were first introduced in
1919, these professionals did not appear to influence the shape of the law. But as
the rules became broader and more complex during the 1920s, tax advisors of all
sorts became reliant on this tax benefit. Indeed, the robust tax laws of the war
period had led many large Wall Street law firms to concentrate on tax matters
during the 1920s.291 Law firms specializing in taxation were also being formed at
this time, and new periodicals dedicated to tax law and accounting were being
published.292 The proposed elimination of an important and complex tax rule thus
became an assault on a potentially lucrative source of revenue and professional
autonomy.
These professional groups were quick to voice their protest over repeal. The
New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants, an organization
considered by tax officials to be a "well-informed and reputable body,"293 contacted
Chairman Doughton directly to plead its case. Though the CPAs did not mention
their own self-interest in arguing for the continued existence of the complex
reorganization rules, their emphasis on the need for "increased clarity or ease of
administration" left little doubt that they had a stake in insuring that the creativity
288. Revenue Revision, supra note 272, at 323 (brief by C.B. Huntress, Executive
Secretary, National Coal Association).
289. Id. at 391 (statement of Henry Fernald, representing the Mining Congress).
290. On the changing roles of the American accounting profession during this time
period, see generally PAUL I. MIRANTI, JR., ACCOUNTANCY COMES OF AGE: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF AN AMERICAN PROFESSION, 1886-1940 (1990); Rebecca Roiphe, The Most
Dangerous Profession, 39 CONN. L. REV. 603 (2006).
291. SWAINE, supra note 273, at 268.
292. See, e.g., NAT'L INCOME TAx MAG., Feb. 1923, at 1.
293. Letter from Robert H. Jackson to Roswell Magill (Aug. 10, 1935), Box 16, Folder 4,
Jackson Papers (copy on file with author).
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and ingenuity of tax advisors remained valued assets for corporate managers and
shareholders.
294
In the end, the Treasury Department's warnings and the lobbying against repeal
by organized interests had a significant impact. Even members of the full House
Ways & Means Committee could not support their colleagues' idea of abolishing
the reorganization rules. Citing to the Treasury's concerns that repeal "might result
in some immediate loss of revenue," and act as "a severe handicap upon legitimate"
transactions, the Ways & Means Committee decided against eliminating the
reorganization rules. But instead of following Magill's recommendation to draft a
general law deferring to the rulings of the BIR, the House Committee decided to
attempt another comprehensive revision of the law. In its official report, issued at
the conclusion of its hearings, the committee contended that given the continuing
economic troubles and the likelihood that corporate reorganizations would lead to
reduced capital structures and hence potential losses, the "wiser policy is to amend
the provisions drastically to stop the known cases of tax avoidance, rather than to
eliminate the sections completely. This decision will further avoid the period of
litigation and uncertainty which would necessarily follow a complete reversal of
the established policy. '295 The fear of revenue loss and the immediate concerns
about economic recovery seemed to override any serious attempts to abolish the
reorganization tax benefit, or to defer to the institutional competence of the BIR.
F. The 1934 Act-Another Attempt at Comprehensive Revisions
As part of its efforts "to amend the provisions drastically,, 296 the Ways & Means
Committee proposed two significant changes. First, it eliminated the section of the
reorganization law that permitted corporations to distribute tax-free to their
shareholders the securities of newly consolidated corporations. Lawmakers
believed that this would end the tax avoidance technique of distributing dividends
without tax liability. Second, the House Committee sought to streamline the
definition of eligible reorganizations to conform to state corporation laws by
limiting such transactions to "(1) statutory mergers ... ; (2) transfers to a controlled
corporation . . . ; and (3) changes in the capital structure or form of
organization.
'
"
297
With these changes, the committee believed it could achieve the dual aims of
preventing tax avoidance and simplifying the tax code. Legislators were confident
that they had outmaneuvered "astute lawyers" by removing "the danger that taxable
sales can be cast into the form of a reorganization." At the same time, they believed
that their changes permitted "legitimate reorganizations, required in order to
strengthen the financial condition of the corporation., 298 By adopting the Treasury
294. Letter from Walter A. Staub to Robert L. Doughton (Jan. 24, 1934), RG 233, Box
353 - Committee on Ways & Means, 73d Cong. Committee Papers, HR 73A-F28.1 "Folder
on Income Tax," NARA I (copy on file with author).
295. H.R. REP. No. 73-704, at 13 (1934).
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
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Department's suggestions to maintain the reorganization rules, and through some
technical procedural maneuvers, the Ways & Means Committee was able to
persuade the full House to pass the bill with little floor debate.299
While members of the House may have been willing to heed the Treasury
Department's warnings, the Senate was not so accommodating. Progressives in the
Senate led by La Follette attempted to insert a more radical edge to the tax bill by
increasing rates and broadening the base. 30 0 Although much of the Senate hearings
focused on top marginal rates and various deductions, the House proposal to
redefine eligible reorganizations did receive some attention. Business lobbying
groups, such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, simply restated their position that
"in view of recent economic conditions" any change in the reorganization rule
would be unwise. 30 1 Meanwhile, other groups noted that the new definition of
eligible reorganizations based on state statutory mergers and acquisitions would
lead to increased uncertainty and "a substantial amount of litigation. 30 2 The twin
dangers of suppressing economic recovery and increasing uncertainty were
heralded, yet again, as the reasons for maintaining the tax benefit.
The Senate Finance Committee seemed to agree that the House's new definition
was insufficient. Committee members focused specifically on the definition of
eligible reorganizations and its connection to state-level corporate laws. At a time
when Congress was significantly expanding the reach of the federal government in
matters of interstate commerce, 303 it appeared odd that the reorganization rules
ought to be linked to divergent state corporate laws. Thus, the Senate committee
provided, as a supplement, a broader more conceptual definition of eligible tax-free
reorganizations:
[T]he acquisition by one corporation in exchange solely for [all or part of] its
voting stock: of at least 80 per centum of the voting stock and at least 80 per
centum of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock of another
corporation; or of substantially all the properties of another corporation.304
With this language, the Finance Committee expanded the definition beyond
statutory mergers, while at the same time limiting the type and amount of
consideration that could be transferred. This redefinition underscored the
importance of maintaining an equity interest in eligible reorganizations. In
emphasizing the principle of continuity of interest, the committee clarified
299. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 47, at 356.
300. Id. at 358; LEFF, supra note 239, at 61--64.
301. Hearings on H.R. 7835 Before the S. Comm. On Finance, 73rd Cong. 1 (1934) (brief
of F.H. Clausen, Chairman of Special Committee on Federal Taxation, U.S. Chamber of
Commerce).
302. Id. at 2-3 (statement of Cleveland Chamber of Commerce representative).
303. See generally Barry Cushman, The Great Depression and the New Deal, in 3 THE
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 268 (Christopher Tomlins & Michael Grossberg
eds., 2008).
304. S. REP. No. 73-558, at 16 (1934).
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language that was first inserted in the 1924 Revenue Act. Some tax experts viewed
this as "perhaps the most radical change" to the reorganization provisions.
30 5
One would have expected that this potentially "radical" modification to the
reorganization rule would have elicited a reaction from business groups and
professional organizations. But these organized interests remained relatively silent,
perhaps because lawmakers, by clarifying the type of permissible consideration,
were demonstrating their willingness to maintain the tax preference. Or perhaps
corporate interests preferred the Finance Committee's definitive language because
they saw it as a necessary response to recent case law, which seemed to leave open
the issue of permissible consideration. In this sense, the Finance Committee's
added definition afforded greater certainty and predictability in tax matters. Indeed,
for some elite members of the tax bar, the detailed elaboration may have provided
the rational clarity that was missing from the emerging case law.
Even before the enactment of the 1934 Revenue Act, the federal courts had
begun the process of creating the judicial doctrine of continuity of interest. In fact,
there were two particular cases that may have influenced lawmakers during the
adoption of the 1934 law. The first was Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner.
30 6
Decided in the summer of 1932, this case examined the transfer of substantially all
the assets of a closely-held petroleum company to a competitor in exchange for
roughly $53,000 cash and $160,000 in unsecured notes with maturities ranging
from two to fourteen months. In holding that this transaction was a taxable sale
rather than a tax-free reorganization, the Second Circuit explained that the
reorganization tax benefit "presupposed a continuance of interest on the part of the
transferor in the properties transferred. 30 7 By exchanging its assets for cash and
short-term notes, the taxpayer did not receive the "stock or securities" that the 1924
version of the law required, and thus the Second Circuit ruled that since "a transfer
made entirely for cash would not be enough, it cannot be supposed that anything so
near to cash as these notes payable in so short a time and doubtless readily
marketable would meet the legislative requirements."
308
The second case was Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner.309 In
this case, the assets of two ice companies under common control were exchanged
for $400,000 cash and $1,000,000 in short-term notes of the acquiring corporation.
Writing for the court, even Justice McReynolds, the staunch supporter of free-
market capitalism, could not condone this as a legitimate tax-free exchange.
McReynolds ruled that this transaction did not qualify as a tax-free reorganization
because it lacked the requisite continuity of interest. The "mere purchase for money
of the assets of one Company by another," wrote McReynolds "has no real
305. HOLZMAN, supra note 37, at 66.
306. 60 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1932).
307. Id. at 940.
308. Id. The Cortland case also mentioned that "reorganization presupposes continuance
of business under modified corporate forms." Id. This language foreshadowed the
subsequent development of the "continuity of business enterprise" doctrine in the context of
tax-free reorganizations. See Standard Realization Co. v. Comm'r, 10 T.C. 708 (1948);
Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1 (d); BITTKER & EusTicE, supra note 14, 14.51.
309. 287 U.S. 462 (1933).
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semblance to a merger or consolidation. Certainly, we think that to be within the
exemption the seller must acquire an interest in the affairs of the purchasing
company more definite than that incident to ownership of its short-term purchase-
money notes.
'
,
310
Like Cortland, the Pinellas decision held that short-term debt was insufficient
"stock or securities" to substantiate the continuity of interest principle. But the
courts said nothing about what type of "stock or securities" or what amounts were
sufficient. Given the uncertainty created by the courts, business groups were
probably elated to learn that the Finance Committee by 1934 had not only agreed to
maintain the provision, but that it also attempted to address this significant lacuna
in the law. Although there does not appear to be any direct evidence that the
Finance Committee had these cases in mind when it made its contribution to the
1934 bill, other lawmakers certainly welcomed the supplemental language, which
became part of the 1934 law and has survived to this day, though in a different
form.
31 1
For their part, leading tax lawyers welcomed the legislative clarity. In an August
1934 address before the American Bar Association's tax section, Robert N. Miller,
a former Treasury Department lawyer and author of a leading tax treatise,
applauded the new law's "commendable sharpening up of the definition of
reorganizations. '" 312 But even this improvement was not enough for Miller. Voicing
the concerns of other tax attorneys, Miller complained about the "intolerable
uncertainty" related to the taxation of corporate exchanges. He contended that there
were several causes of this "twilight zone of doubt," but among the most pernicious
was the rise ofjudicial activism in tax cases, and "the tendency of the times toward
'rough-housing the rich' and toward using taxation as an agency for governmental
regulation., 313 New Deal administrators had not yet begun to use tax law
assiduously to confront the "economic royalists," but for elite members of the tax
bar the signs of change seemed ominous.
G. Historical Sequence and the Contingency of Repeal
The broader political, social, and legal context of the mid-1930s illustrates how
Congress, the Roosevelt Administration, and the courts were implicitly responding
to cues from each other in developing reorganization tax law. This institutional
dynamic and the evolution of reorganization law, however, were also affected by
the chronology of events. The timing of reform proposals was critical-not only in
determining their ultimate success or failure, but in structuring how different legal
and political institutions responded to past policy choices and decisions.
Placed in a wide historical context, then, the general contours of the 1934
Revenue Act were rather unremarkable. Congress was able to enact some
310. Id.at470.
311. I.R.C. § 368 (2000).
312. Robert N. Miller, Corporate Reorganizations: The Present Situation, Address at the
Federal Tax Clinic, In connection with the 57th Annual Meeting of the American Bar
Association (Aug. 28, 1934).
313. Id. at 2.
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progressive proposals, including a controversial and short-lived provision providing
for the publicity of income tax returns. 31 4 But for the most part the new law raised
little revenue and closed only a few loopholes, illustrating how the President and
lawmakers were not yet ready to use the tax system to challenge "economic
royalists." In the area of corporate reorganizations, the 1934 Revenue Act appeared
to confound the dual congressional aims of simplifying the code and preventing tax
avoidance. The final version of the law was not only more complex than its
predecessor, it seemed to do little but plug a few gaping tax avoidance holes. "The
result," Randolph Paul later observed, "was a provision which reached an all-time
peak in completeness and verbosity." 3 1 5 And-no doubt--to the joy of the New
York CPAs and other related tax professionals elsewhere, the increased complexity
of the new rules only made the services of tax advisors all the more necessary.
Not long after the 1934 law was enacted, the Roosevelt Administration and key
congressional leaders began to craft a more ambitious program of radical tax
reforms.316 In the ensuing three years, three separate revenue laws were passed,
dramatically increasing rates and limiting deductions. The 1936 Revenue Act was
perhaps the pinnacle of this new "soak-the-rich" form of tax policy; it even
included an innovative "undistributed profits tax," levied on the profits that
corporations retained rather than distributed to their stockholders.317
The surprising and radical change in the Administration's tax policy in 1935
raises an interesting, though speculative,318 counter-factual question about timing
and historical sequence: if the proposal to abolish the corporate reorganization rules
had been introduced in 1936, along with the undistributed profits tax, rather than in
1934, would the proposal have been successful? 31 9 Business lobbying, to be sure,
remained robust in 1936, as the opposition to the undistributed tax indicated.
Indeed, it is likely that the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and other commercial
interests and professional organizations would have resisted, as they did in 1934,
any attempt to abolish the reorganization tax benefit.
320
314. On the rise and fall of the publicity provision, see generally Marjorie E. Komhauser,
Shaping Public Opinion and the Law in the 1930s: How a "Common Man" Campaign
Ended a Rich Man's Law (Tulane Public Law Res. Paper No. 06-02, Feb. 2006), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=880383.
315. Paul, supra note 26, at 38.
316. BROWNLEE, supra note 30, at 88-92; LEFF, supra note 239, at 91-92; Amenta et al.,
supra note 239.
317. Revenue Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-740, § 14(b), 49 Stat. 1648, 1655-57.
318. On the promise and perils of counterfactual history, see DAVID HACKETT FISCHER,
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(2002); Niall Ferguson, Virtual History: Towards a 'Chaotic' Theory of the Past, in
VIRTUAL HISTORY: ALTERNATIVES AND COUNTERFACTUALS 1 (Niali Ferguson, ed., 1997).
319. For an interesting and provocative counterfactual historical analysis of World War II
tax policy and its possible implications for current tax law, see Lawrence Zelenak, "The
Federal Retail Sales Tax That Wasn't: An Actual History and an Alternative History"
(unpublished manuscript on file with author).
320. In fact, the immense opposition to the undistributed profits tax by corporate
managers eventually led to its repeal in 1939. Bank, supra note 40, at 1201-06.
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Still, the political and economic climate and the fiscal ambitions and political
leadership of the Roosevelt Administration were dramatically different after 1935.
The strident calls from Huey Long and the "Thunder on the Left" for more
redistributional taxes forced lawmakers to reconsider their faith in the business
community as the source of economic salvation. 321 Likewise, the signs of economic
recovery that began in 1934 emboldened political leaders to be less concerned
about building business confidence. The Treasury Department, which had led the
way in quashing the proposal to abolish the reorganization rules, was by 1936 also
more enthusiastic about redistributional taxes. Morgenthau, together with Magill
and other Treasury officials such as Robert H. Jackson, became increasingly
concerned about the distributional effects of taxation.322 Treasury officials, working
together with key Roosevelt aides, consequently led the charge in altering the
course of Roosevelt's tax policy, drafting many of the proposals that sought to
attack concentrations of wealth, including the controversial "undistributed profits
tax. 323 Given these altered historical conditions, it is certainly plausible that the
proposal to eliminate the reorganization rules might have had a different fate if it
was put forward during the height of the New Deal's "soak-the-rich" tax policies.
The timing of the congressional proposal to repeal the reorganization rules may,
indeed, provide one example of the importance of historical sequence to the
provisional development of this corporate tax benefit. But Congress and the
Roosevelt Administration were not the only key institutional players operating
along this important temporal dimension. The courts also had a significant role in
the chronology of events. Not only did they spur Congress to take action in 1924
and again during the enactment of the 1934 law, they also crafted common law
rules, such as the "business purpose" and "continuity of interest" doctrines, that
initially appeared to provide some judicial support for the original policy of
limiting the reorganization benefit. Over time, though, the judiciary paralleled the
legislative expansion of permissible transactions by gradually reevaluating the type
of consideration that could meet the "continuity of interest" standard. In so doing,
the courts seemed to provide further credence to the notion that the increasingly
complex corporate reorganization rules were becoming deeply entrenched within
American corporate tax law.
H. Judicial Re-Intervention into Reorganization Law
Soon after the 1934 tax law was enacted, the U.S. Supreme Court decided
several influential cases dealing with transactions that occurred under the
321. BRINKLEY, supra note 239; BROWNLEE, supra note 30, at 88; Amenta et al., supra
note 239; Leff, supra note 239, at 123-26.
322. Letter from Robert Jackson to George Haas, Treasury Department Statistician (Aug.
2, 1935), Box 76, Folder 3 "Assistant General Counsel, BIR" Jackson Papers (copy on file
with author); see also EUGENE C. GERHART, AMERICA'S ADVOCATE: ROBERT H. JACKSON
(1958); ROBERT H. JACKSON, THAT MAN: AN INSIDER'S PORTRAIT OF FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT (2004); Kirk J. Stark, The Unfulfilled Tax Legacy of Justice Robert H. Jackson,
54 TAX L. REV. 171 (2001).
323. LEFF, supra note 239, at 171-77.
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reorganization rules of the 1920s. Viewed in light of the earlier Pinellas and
Cortland cases, the new decisions demonstrated how the courts were struggling to
interpret the principal policy rationale behind the reorganization tax benefit. The
development of these decisions in response to the changing social and political
conditions also illustrated how the courts were entangled in the same historical
processes that were transforming the statutory reorganization rules.
In the landmark case of Gregory v. Helvering,324 the Court was called upon to
examine a purported reorganization transaction that complied with the technical
details of the existing law, but appeared to lack any business purpose. The taxpayer
in the case was the sole shareholder of a corporation, which owned appreciated
minority shares in a second company. The taxpayer was seeking to sell the
appreciated minority shares while limiting her tax liability. To do so, she first
created a new corporation, which then allegedly engaged in a reorganization plan
with the taxpayer's initial corporation. The reorganization entailed the exchange of
the appreciated minority shares for the stock of the newly created corporation, and
the subsequent tax-free distribution of that stock to the taxpayer as part of the
liquidation of the newly created corporation. In essence, the taxpayer had created
the new corporation solely to exploit the reorganization rules and hence bailout the
appreciated minority stock with significantly diminished tax liability.325 This was
certainly the type of complex tax-avoidance transaction that lawmakers had in mind
when they referred to the "expert advice" and "astute lawyers" who were making a
mockery of the existing tax laws.
The Supreme Court made quick work of Gregory. In a unanimous decision, the
Court concluded that the transaction was "outside the plain intent of the statute."
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice George Sutherland was careful not to deny
the taxpayer's right to minimize taxes under the law, a point that Judge Learned
Hand had eloquently made in his Second Circuit opinion siding with the
Commissioner. 326 Nonetheless, Southerland resolutely held that the series of
transactions was:
Simply an operation having no business or corporate purpose-a mere device
which put on the form of a corporate reorganization as a disguise for concealing
its real character, and the sole object and accomplishment of which was the
consummation of a preconceived plan, not to reorganize a business or any part
of a business, but to transfer a parcel of corporate shares to the [taxpayer].327
324. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
325. Id. at 467. For more on the structure of the transaction in Gregory, see Assaf
Likhovski, The Story of Gregory: How are Tax Avoidance Cases Decided?, in BusINEss TAX
STORIES, supra note 26, at 90-93.
326. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), affd 293 U.S. 465 (1935). In
support of a taxpayer's right to minimize her taxes within the bounds of the law, Hand
wrote: "Anyone may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not
bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic
duty to increase one's taxes." Id. at 810.
327. Gregory, 293 U.S. at 469.
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Although the transaction corresponded to the letter of the law, the court concluded
that it "was in fact an elaborate and devious form of conveyance masquerading as a
corporate reorganization, and nothing else."
328
It did not take long for Gregory to become a seminal case in the subsequent
development of American tax law. Not only did the terse decision create the
"business purpose" test, it also quickly became the foundation for numerous
judicially created anti-tax avoidance doctrines. 329 As the legal historian Assaf
Likhovski has shown, the decision was truly a product of its historical context.
330
The economic significance of the Great Depression, the congressional revelation of
tax avoidance, and the recent increase in tax evasion prosecutions-as evidenced
by the creation of the Department of Justice's new tax division and its prosecution
of prominent, wealthy citizens including former Treasury Secretary Andrew
Mellon-were all important historical factors that explain why the Supreme Court
took the issue of tax avoidance seriously in Gregory.
33 1
The Gregory case also came before the courts during the ascendancy of
purposivist statutory interpretation. By the 1930s, leading jurists such as Learned
Hand seemed more willing than their predecessors to move beyond the "plain
meaning" of statutes to seek out legislative purpose, especially in the context of tax
law. 332 Justice Southerland's opinion certainly displayed the growing judicial
affinity for modem purposivism, as did Learned Hand's lower court opinion. Both
decisions emphasized how, in Hand's words, "the meaning of a sentence may be
more that that of the separate words, as a melody is more than the notes."
333
Gregory and the rise of purposivism was an important defense against the
expansion of the reorganization benefit, but not everyone saw the case in that way.
Even before Gregory reached the Supreme Court, members of the tax bar protested
Judge Hand's judicial activism, or what contemporaries referred to as "the so-called
'free decision' attitude." 334 As Robert Miller remarked in 1934, Hand's decision
"tends to widen the twilight zone in many reorganization cases. It apparently
indicates that the court is willing to make the tax depend in part on the difficult
question of purpose, a view which necessarily introduces new difficulties as to
328. Id. at 470.
329. In addition to the business purpose rule, Gregory is often regarded as leading to the
step transaction, substance over form, sham transaction, and the economic substance
doctrines. Likhovski, supra note 325, at 101.
330. Id. at 123-27. Tax officials duly noted how Gregory empowered the government
attack on abusive reorganizations. Letter from Robert H. Jackson to Roswell Magill (May
17, 1935), Box 16 Correspondence, Folder 4 Roswell Magill, in Jackson Papers (copy on file
with the author).
331. BROWNLEE, supra note 30, at 96-97; CANNADINE, supra note 151.
332. WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 131-44 (1999).
333. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), aft'd 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
In an internal memo, Hand went further in his defense of purposivism. Writing to his fellow
jurists, he declared: "I refuse to read this section with a dictionary in one hand, closing my
eyes to the obvious purpose which suffused the words chosen." Likhovski, supra note 325,
at 96.
334. Miller, supra note 312, at 5.
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forecasting what view the courts will take on the fact question as to what any
particular taxpayer's motive was." 335 Linking Hand's decision to the recently failed
attempt to repeal the reorganization rules, Miller suggested that the courts were
attempting to do what Congress and the Treasury refrained from doing, namely
eliminating the provisions all together:
It is interesting to see how nearly this new wave of uncertainty synchronizes
with the vigorous efforts made in this year's Congress to repeal the non-
recognizing provisions in their entirety. While those efforts did not succeed-
largely because the Treasury's experience with taxpayers leads it to favor the
retention of provisions of this general type-they obviously had political force
behind them and will be renewed. It is as if some of the courts in construing
words enacted ten years ago by another body of legislators are giving effect to
the newer views now being expressed.336
Although Miller may have exaggerated the potential impact of Gregory, he
undoubtedly supported a rather expansive view of the reorganization tax benefit.
In his address before the ABA's tax section, Miller outlined his justifications for
a liberal reading of the reorganization rules. He placed the provisions in the context
of the larger tax code to argue that such "ameliorations" were a necessary counter-
balance to the prevailing high marginal rates. Inverting what Robert La Follette and
Cordell Hull had claimed a decade earlier,337 Miller maintained that "the
ameliorations were not forced into the law by opponents of the tax, but are as much
a part of the scheme as the tax itself., 338 By comparing the reorganization
preference to other deductions, Miller defended the provisions as an intentional
congressional subsidy. "It is common knowledge that, if no deductions were
allowed from gross income in calculating taxable income, the rate of tax would
have to be very much lower than at present, if the law is to work efficiently," he
proclaimed. "It is therefore erroneous to think of any such ameliorations as tax-
avoidance provisions."
339
Miller's selective use of legislative history did not end there. Employing a
classic version of "lawyer's history," he discounted both the evolving political
context of the rules and the initial policy rationale of limiting the benefit to "purely
paper" transactions. In his zealous advocacy for the provisions, Miller focused
instead on the broader social and econoic benefits. "These provisions were not
put into law by the selfish efforts of special interests, but were originated for the
benefit of Government, within the Treasury," he announced. Echoing the
sentiments of his former Treasury colleagues, T.S. Adams and Garrad Winston,
Miller argued that "it is best to lubricate the axles of the cart which produces tax
revenue-not for the sake of the cart but for the sake of the tax-collecting
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. See supra text accompanying notes 136-39, 179.
338. Miller, supra note 312, at 8.
339. Id.
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government which needs to keep its cart efficient."3 40 Congress and the Treasury
Department, Miller believed, were doing their part to grease the wheels of the
economic cart by liberalizing the reorganization benefit. But activist courts, in the
form of Hand's Gregory decision, were becoming an unnecessary brake on the
cart's forward progress.
Gregory may have signified how the courts were attempting to bolster the main
policy principles behind the reorganization laws--or, as Miller saw it, putting a
brake on the expansion of the provisions. But a subsequent line of cases showed
how the Court would soon follow Congress's lead in unhinging the tax benefit from
its origins as a narrow exception and provide the solace that Miller and other tax
lawyers were seeking. After Gregory the Court decided several reorganization
cases that seemed to erode the "continuity of interest" principle first established in
Pinellas and Cortland and recently codified in the 1934 revisions.
341
In Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 342 decided less then a year after Gregory, the
Court ruled that an asset-for-stock transfer was a tax-free reorganization despite the
substantial amount of cash used as consideration for the assets. In 1928, the
Minnesota Tea Company transferred substantially all of its assets to the privately
held Grand Union Company in exchange for roughly $427,000 cash and 18,000
shares of Grand Union common stock; the latter constituted roughly fifty-six
percent of the total value of the consideration. Although almost half of the
consideration was in cash, the Court held that the transaction was a reorganization
because "the taxpayer received an interest in the affairs of the transferee which
represented a material part of the value of the transferred assets."3
43
In a detailed opinion written by Justice McReynolds, the Court seemed to
acknowledge the historical importance of the case. McReynolds began by briefly
summarizing the legislative history of the reorganization rules, a history which at
least implicitly illustrated how Congress had gradually expanded the coverage of
this tax benefit. McReynolds then liberally cited to, and quoted from, the Pinellas
case to concur that "continuity of interest" was a fundamental perquisite for a tax-
free reorganization. Building directly on Pinellas, McReynolds stated that the court
was attempting to provide greater guidance on the type of interest that the
"continuity of interest" doctrine required: "this interest must be definite and
material," wrote McReynolds, "it must represent a substantial part of the value of
the thing transferred. 344 Without further xplanation, McReynolds concluded that
an equity interest equaling roughly fifty-six percent of the assets transferred was
enough for the seller to acquire "a definite and substantial interest in the
purchaser.,
345
Minnesota Tea significantly diminished the scope of the nascent judicial
doctrine of "continuity of interest." Because Pinellas and Cortland simply stated
earlier that short-term debt was insufficient to provide the necessary representation
340. Id. at 7.
341. Revenue Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-216, § 112(g), 48 Stat. 680, 705.
342. 296 U.S. 378 (1935).
343. Id. at 386.
344. Id. at 385.
345. Id. at 386.
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of continuity of business interest, one could presume that it was necessary to have
something closer to one hundred percent of continuity of interest, that perhaps only
the exchange of equity for assets would satisfy the technical details of the
reorganization rules. By 1935, however, the Court dispelled that presumption with
its holding in Minnesota Tea. Just as Congress in the 1920s had begun the
incremental process of widening the scope of permissible reorganization
transactions, the Court in the 1930s seemed to follow suit in its liberal construction
of "continuity of interest."
The Court did not stop there. In two other reorganization cases decided in 1935,
it went on to liberalize further the meaning of "interest" in the "continuity of
interest" doctrine. In one case evaluating the transfer of corporate assets for stock
and cash, the court held that nonvoting preferred stock that constituted less than
forty percent of the total consideration was sufficient to demonstrate that "the seller
acquire[d] a definite and substantial interest in the affairs of the purchasing
corporation. ' '346 In the other case, which was a stock-for-stock transaction, where
the taxpayers transferred all of their stock in a company in exchange for the stock
and long-term bonds of the acquirer, with the stock constituting only forty-five
percent of the consideration, the Court similarly held that such a transaction also
qualified as a reorganization. 347 Thus, by the end of 1935, just as the Roosevelt
Administration and Congress were changing the direction of federal tax policy, the
Court had dramatically altered the permissible amount of consideration that was
necessary to qualify a transaction as a reorganization.348
Within three years, the Supreme Court both established the "continuity of
interest" principle and undermined its significance. Initially, Pinellas and Cortland
suggested that the courts might be the last institutional bulwark for the principled
application of the reorganization rules. The judicial focus on whether or not
transferors maintained an ownership interest after the exchange of their assets
corresponded with the early congressional intent of granting the tax-deferral benefit
only to those transactions that were mere changes in the form of a corporate
investment. The holding in Gregory appeared to bolster the notion that courts
would pierce the form of a transaction to get at its economic substance. But
whatever solace Pinellas, Cortland, and Gregory may have provided was soon lost.
For with Minnesota Tea and its accompanying cases, the Court appeared to grant
taxpayers and their advisors a great deal of latitude in structuring such transactions.
The courts thus appeared to replicate, in their own way, the transformative process
that had been going on in Congress throughout the earlier decade.
346. Nelson v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 374, 377 (1935).
347. Helvering v. Watts, 296 U.S. 387 (1935).
348. This process of expansion appeared to abate by 1940 when the Court determined
that the receipt of bonds alone was insufficient to confer a proprietary interest in the
transferor. See LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415, 418-20 (1940). The "continuity of
interest" requirement generated other requirements such as the "continuity of business
enterprise" doctrine. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d). This latter doctrine developed well after
the 1930s and is thus beyond the historical scope of this Article.
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CONCLUSION
From its beginnings as a narrow and formalistic exception through its
subsequent expansion into a broad and seemingly elective corporate tax benefit, the
reorganization provisions have been historically constituted by changing social,
political, and economic conditions. The power of economic ideas and legal
concepts, to be sure, has played a part in the development of this corporate tax law.
But ideas and concepts have not been timeless influences. Rather, historical context
and temporal sequence have created and shaped these beliefs and principles.
Material historical forces, in the end, have had an indelible impact on the
emergence, growth, and maintenance of this important corporate tax law.
Historical processes, however, do not always unfold in dramatic or sudden
fashion. Frequently, it is the gradual development of broader, more structural
social, political, and economic circumstances that explain the evolution of our
current legal system. Such is the case with the corporate reorganization provisions.
These highly technical corporate tax rules did not appear immediately as an
expansive and voluntary corporate subsidy. Indeed, the initial provision was a
rather restrictive exception to the general law taxing property exchanges. This legal
regime also did not transmutate overnight into its current form as a dispensation for
business consolidations. Instead, a more incremental and contested political process
of transformation-a process that included the courts, Congress, and the executive,
as well as the actions of taxpayers and their advisors---determined the future fate of
this significant business tax preference.
Because the process of liberalizing this tax law over time was consistently
challenged, there was nothing inexorable about its development. Throughout the
early evolution of the law, tax officials and commentators explored several
plausible alternative methods of addressing the tax implications of corporate
mergers and acquisitions. From the Treasury Department's initial attempts to tax
nearly all reorganizations, to the expert commentary that recommended taxing the
consolidation of publicly held companies, to the muddled common-law doctrines of
the 1920s, policymakers have been presented with several paths of legal
development. Indeed, the failed 1934 attempt at repeal underscores the provisional
nature of this law, revealing an institutional path not taken. While it is impossible
to determine whether repeal would have been successful if it had been proposed at
a later date, when political and social conditions may have been more amiable, the
plausibility of success certainly highlights the saliency of historical sequence and
chronology.
In the end, this Article's historical analysis of the critical junctures in the early
development of the reorganization tax provisions only partially explains the great
transformation and enduring appeal of this important corporate tax law. It focuses
on the formative early expansion of the provision and the failed New Deal attempt
at repeal. Further investigations of the World War II context of the 1940s, the Cold
War conditions of the 1950s and 1960s, the resigned acceptance of the provisions
during the economic malaise of the 1970s and 1980s, and the recurring cycle of
M&A transactions could all shed additional light on how other historical
circumstances and social processes may have influenced the durability of this tax
rule. Additional historical research, in other words, is necessary to understand how
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the reorganization rules have become an entrenched part of modem American
corporate tax law.
The M&A boom that Martin Lipton presciently anticipated has come to an
abrupt end. Yet even if the scholarly focus on the tax consequences of different
types of corporate mergers and acquisitions has subsided, this and other tax benefits
remain an indelible part of the American tax code. When scholars and
commentators revisit these important tax laws, they should take note that these
rules are a product not solely of economic ideas or legal logic, but also of changing
social, political, and economic conditions and interests-a product, that is, of
historical sequence and material context.

